Pointon Partners

It’s Time to be More Transparent — An Update on the Privacy Act

Australia’s privacy law is soon to enter a new phase. From 10 December 2026, and as part of the amendments introduced by the Privacy and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2024 (Cth), an agency or organisation that is categorised as being an “APP entity” under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (“Privacy Act”) will be required to be more transparent with respect to automated decision-making.

These reforms reflect increasing concerns about the use of automated decision-making systems to assist or replace the judgement of human decision makers, as well as the potential privacy risks (and lack of transparency) with respect to such use of an individual’s personal information, which may have a significant impact.

The Australian Privacy Principles under the Privacy Act regulate how APP entities collect, use, disclose, store, and provide access to “personal information”, being “information or an opinion about an identified individual, or an individual who is reasonably identifiable: (a) whether the information or opinion is true or not; and (b) whether the information or opinion is recorded in a material form or not”. An APP entity under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) includes an “organisation”, being “an individual, body corporate, partnership, any other unincorporated association; or a trust; that is not a small business operator, a registered political party, an agency, a State or Territory authority or a prescribed instrumentality of a State of Territory”. Further, a business is a “small business” if “at a time…in a financial year…. its annual turnover for the previous financial year is $3,000,000 or less”, subject to certain exceptions set out in the Privacy Act.

Australian Privacy Principle 1.3 requires an APP entity to have “a clearly expressed and up-to-date policy ….about the management of personal information by the entity.” This privacy policy must include information such as: the kinds of personal information that the entity collects and holds; how the entity collects and holds personal information; the purposes for which the entity collects, holds, uses and discloses personal information; how an individual may access personal information about the individual that is held by the entity and seek correction of such information; how an individual may complain about a breach of the Australian Privacy Principles or a registered APP code (if any) that binds the entity and how the entity will deal with such complaint; whether the entity is likely to disclose personal information to overseas recipients; and if so, the countries in which such recipients are likely to be located if it is practicable to specify in the policy.

The new provisions require APP entities to include additional information in their privacy policies if the entity “has arranged for a computer program to make, or do a thing that is substantially and directly related to making, a decision; and… the decision could reasonably be expected to significantly affect the rights or interests of an individual; and …..personal information about the individual is used in the operation of the computer program to make the decision or do the thing that is substantially and directly related to making the decision.” In such circumstances, under these new requirements, an APP entity will also need to include in its privacy policy, information in relation to:

These amendments require greater transparency from APP entities with respect to how an APP entity handles an individual’s personal information and for what purposes, and affected businesses should review their automated decision-making programs and privacy policies accordingly.

Not Just Pies and Beer — Court Rules Racing NSW Cannot Appoint an Administrator to ATC

The Supreme Court of New South Wales has set aside Racing NSW’s appointment of an administrator to the Australian Turf Club (ATC) in Australian Turf Club Ltd v Racing NSW (No 2) [2026] NSWSC 184.

In September 2025 Racing NSW issued a show cause notice to ATC raising concerns about the club’s financial position, governance and strategic direction. Following that process, Racing NSW resolved in December 2025 to appoint an external administrator to the ATC.

ATC challenged the appointment in the Supreme Court.

The decision

Justice Kunc held that the appointment was invalid and of no effect.

The judgment emphasised that the case was not about whether Racing NSW’s concerns about ATC were justified. The issue was whether the Thoroughbred Racing Act 1996 (NSW) (NSW Act) authorised Racing NSW to intervene and appoint an external administrator.

The NSW Act does contain an express power allowing Racing NSW to appoint an administrator to a race club. Section 14(2)(g) provides that Racing NSW may “appoint an administrator to conduct the affairs of a race club“.

The existence of that power was not in dispute. However, the powers in s 14 must be exercised “for or in connection with” Racing NSW’s statutory functions, including its core function under s 13(1)(b) to “control, supervise and regulate horse racing in the State“. The Court held that the decision to appoint an administrator to the ATC was not made in the exercise of that function.

In explaining the limits of Racing NSW’s statutory role, the Court referred to the well-known line from the Temby review of the racing industry that if too many functions were taken away from race clubs it might leave them with little to do but “staff the turnstiles and keep the pies hot and the beer cold“. The reference illustrates the distinction drawn by the legislation between regulating racing itself and managing the commercial affairs of race clubs.

The Court also held that the decision was affected by jurisdictional error, including a material misunderstanding of accounting information relied upon by Racing NSW when assessing ATC’s financial position.

Why the decision matters

The decision draws a clear boundary around the statutory role of Racing NSW. While the regulator has extensive powers in relation to the conduct and integrity of racing, the Court confirmed that those powers do not extend to intervening in the internal financial management or corporate governance of a race club simply because the regulator considers those matters unsatisfactory.

That point will be of particular interest to regional and provincial race clubs, many of which operate independently of Racing NSW but remain dependent on industry funding and infrastructure support.

At a policy level, the judgment also highlights a potential gap in the legislative framework. If the intention is that the regulator should be able to intervene in the governance or solvency of race clubs in circumstances where industry funds are at risk, that power would need to be clearly conferred by legislation.

Racing NSW has indicated that it will appeal Justice Kunc’s decision.

Position in Victoria

The Victorian legislative framework is structured differently.

Under the Racing Act 1958 (Vic) (Vic Act), Racing Victoria is the controlling body responsible for the conduct and integrity of thoroughbred racing. Race clubs operate as separate entities with their own boards and management.

Unlike the NSW Act, the Vic Act does not confer a statutory power on Racing Victoria to appoint an administrator to take control of a race club comparable to s 14(2)(g) of the NSW Act.

Instead, the primary statutory control mechanism is licensing.

If serious concerns arose about the governance or financial position of a Victorian race club, the more likely regulatory pathway would involve a show cause process in relation to the club’s racing-club licence. The Minister for Racing ultimately has power under s 24A of the Vic Act to suspend or cancel that licence.

In reality, the existence of that power would likely create strong pressure for the club to address the issue itself, for example by appointing its own administrator or restructuring adviser. Licence cancellation would likely be the ultimate regulatory sanction if those steps were not taken to the satisfaction of Racing Victoria.

Pointon Partners has a long history acting for participants across the thoroughbred and harness racing industries, including trainers, breeders, syndicators and industry bodies.

If you would like to discuss the decision or any related regulatory or governance issues affecting racing industry participants, please get in touch.

To Scan or Not to Scan — Administrative Review Tribunal Decision on Bunnings’ Use of Facial Recognition Technology

The Administrative Review Tribunal (Tribunal)
recently set aside the Privacy Commissioner's
(Commissioner) 2024 determination that
Bunnings Group Limited's (Bunnings) had acted
unlawfully in its use of facial recognition technology
(FRT) in stores, finding that Bunnings conduct in
scanning customer faces fell within a statutory exception of the
Privacy Act 1998 (Cth) (Privacy Act).

Despite the Tribunal's finding that during the relevant
period Bunnings was permitted to use the FRT technology for the
limited purpose of combatting significant retail crime and
protecting staff and customers from abuse, violence, and
intimidation within its stores, the Tribunal maintained
that Bunnings was still in breach of key Australian Privacy
Principles (APPs) contained within Schedule 1 of
the Privacy Act, including failing to comply with obligations to
clearly notify individuals of the use of FRT (APP 5.1)
and failing to properly manage personal information (APP
1.3).

The Tribunal emphasised that this case highlights an inherent
conflict within the Privacy Act: that is, safeguarding
individuals' personal information alongside the legitimate
operational needs of organisations performing their functions and
activities.

Background:

Between November 2018 and November 2021, Bunnings operated a FRT
system in up to 62 of its stores. The FRT system
involved Bunnings keeping a database of individuals considered to
present a risk to its operations due to their criminal or violent
conduct. CCTV cameras were positioned in Bunnings'
stores to capture an image of entrants' faces as they entered
the store, and those images were converted into biometric data for
comparison against the stored data of known individuals stored on a
database maintained by Bunnings in search of a match.
Where the FRT system identified a match between the facial image
captured in store and its database, it generated a notification to
authorised team members of Bunnings, who could then respond as
necessary, including alerting staff, security guards or relevant
authorities. Once the matching process was complete, the biometric
data (known as a vector set) from the image captured was
automatically deleted – on average, within 4.17
milliseconds.

Bunnings main drive to implement the FRT system was to combat
the rate of organised retail crime and violent and aggressive
behaviour within certain stores, with the goal of identifying and
monitoring known offenders. The use of the FRT system
initially started with a two month trial in 1 store and was later
included in 62 stores which were deemed high risk
stores.

In October 2024, the Commissioner initiated an investigation and
made a determination that the use of the FRT system by Bunnings
involved the collection of sensitive information within the meaning
of the Privacy Act and that Bunnings had breached its obligations
under the Australian Privacy Principles, specifically APPs 1.2,
1.3, 3.3 and 5.1, in relation to its use of the FRT system in 62 of
its retail stores.

The Tribunal decision:

A key issue in review by the Tribunal was whether Bunnings had
breached APP 3.3 by collecting sensitive information in
circumstances where a permitted general situation did not exist,
which required the Tribunal to consider:

  1. Whether there was a 'collection' of personal
    information by Bunnings.
  2. If there was a 'collection', whether the collected
    information was 'sensitive information'.
  3. If there was a 'collection' of 'sensitive
    information', whether a permitted general situation existed
    pursuant to section 16A of the Privacy Act.

Did Bunnings 'collect' personal information?

The Privacy Act defines 'Collects' as an entity
collects personal information only if the entity collects the
personal information for inclusion in a record or generally
available publication.

The Tribunal noted that there was no dispute that the personal
information of persons enrolled in Bunnings database that were
assessed as posing a risk to its operations because of their
violent or criminal conduct was 'collected' by Bunnings
within the meaning of the Privacy Act.

However, Bunnings contended that its FRT system did not
'collect' personal information of persons entering the
store who were not enrolled in the database as the information was
collected by the CCTC system, not the FRT system, and, all that was
occurring within the FRT system was that the information was
momentarily analysed to determine whether to delete or collect
it. Bunnings further contended that the FRT system
lacked the necessary purpose as it was designed with the intention
of excluding unmatched images and all vector sets from any
record.

The Tribunal found that the CCTV cameras were a necessary and
integral component of Bunnings FRT system as the vector sets used
by the FRT system were created from the images taken by the CCTV
cameras and therefore the information was collected by the FRT
system.

The speed of the matching process did not mean that the
information was not collected. The Tribunal found that the
information was collected from persons entering the store and held
on the local server's RAM, albeit momentarily, and this was a
necessary pre-requisite to the matching process. This
finding demonstrates that there is no minimum temporal threshold
for collection, meaning information held merely momentarily is
still considered 'collected'.

Sensitive information?

The Tribunal considered whether the information collected by
Bunnings was 'sensitive information' or 'personal
information'. This is an important distinction as APP 3.3 sets
out, for example, that an APP entity (as defined by the Privacy
Act) must not collect 'sensitive information' about an
individual unless a permitted general situation under APP 3.4
exists in relation to the collection of the information by the APP
entity.

The term 'sensitive information' is defined in the
Privacy Act and includes:

(d) biometric information that is to be used for the purpose
of automated biometric verification or biometric identification;
or

(e) biometric
templates.

It was found that the facial images captured by the CCTV cameras
of the FRT system did constitute biometric information and
therefore 'sensitive information' for the purposes of the
Privacy Act.

Did a permitted general situation exist?

Permitted general situations are contained in section 16A of the
Privacy Act. If a permitted general situation exists, the APP
Entity is not required to obtain the individual's consent to
lawfully collect sensitive information. Bunnings
claimed that a permitted general situation existed in relation to
the collection of personal information based on item 2 of section
16A of the Privacy Act, which provides that:

(a) the entity has reason to suspect that unlawful activity,
or misconduct of a serious nature, that relates to the entity's
functions or activities has been, is being or may be engaged in;
and

(b) the entity reasonably believes that the collection, use
or disclosure is necessary in order for the entity to take
appropriate action in relation to the
matter.

There was no dispute that retail crime committed by customers of
Bunnings was unlawful activity that related to Bunnings functions
or activities. Bunnings established that it faced a
problem of violence and theft in its stores and there was a
significant level of theft and violence by repeat offenders which
included organised retail crime.

The Tribunal highlighted the need to show a 'reason to
suspect' unlawful activity as a “relatively low
bar”. This meant that Bunnings only needed to
show that it had a reason to suspect unlawful activity. The
Tribunal agreed with the Commissioner's finding that Bunnings
“could reasonably suspect that such activity was occurring
and would continue to occur
“.

Bunnings held the reasonable belief that using FRT system and
therefore the collection of sensitive information was necessary in
order for Bunnings to take appropriate action against repeat
offenders. The Tribunal found that “collecting sensitive
information by the FRT in conjunction with the other security
controls was effective and suitable to identify known offenders and
if necessary to monitor them so as to reduce the likelihood of them
engaging in theft or violent or threatening behaviour”
.

Accordingly, the Tribunal found that there was no breach of APP
3.3 by Bunnings as APP 3.4 applied and a permitted general
situation existed in relation to the collection of personal
information by the FRT system.

Findings the Tribunal Affirmed:

The Tribunal affirmed the Commissioner's findings that
Bunnings had breached APP 1.2 (by failing to implement adequate
practices and procedures), APP 1.3 (by failing to have an adequate
privacy policy as Bunnings' privacy policy made no mention of
the use of FRT system) and APP 5.1 (as there was insufficient
notification to individuals about the collection of their personal
information through the use of the FRT system). Even though
Bunnings had a first entry notice which stated that 'video
surveillance is utilised', a second entry notice and a privacy
poster, these notices were found to be insufficient as for example,
the Tribunal held that first entry notice failed to notify
individuals that the FRT system was being used, the purpose of the
collection and the main consequences of not collecting the
information through the FRT system.

Key Takeaways:

The Tribunal's decision highlights the tension between the
objects of the Privacy Act to promote the protection of an
individual's privacy and the interests of entities in carrying
out their functions or activities.

It is important to remember that information collected and held,
even momentarily, may still be considered to be 'collected'
information for the purposes of the Privacy Act.

While the Tribunal found that a permitted general situation
existed, which enabled Bunnings to collect sensitive information
without consent, any organisation contemplating the adoption of FRT
should first undertake a thorough evaluation of its specific risk
profile, operational environment, and internal processes and
procedures before proceeding.

Each APP Entity must carefully assess the purpose of collecting
information and ensure that it complies with its obligations under
the APPs including those relating to collection, notification and
management of personal information.

Should you wish to discuss these issues further, or understand
how they may relate to your business and privacy practices, please
contact Michael Bishop, Felicity
Cara-Carson
and Jess Tomlinson.

FRANCHISORS TAKE NOTE

In Australia, the conduct between franchisors and franchisees is regulated by the Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes—Franchising) Regulations 2024 (“Franchising Code of Conduct”). The Franchising Code of Conduct is a mandatory industry code enacted pursuant to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (“CCA”), and makes compliance mandatory for those caught by the Franchising Code of Conduct.

With some limited exceptions, the Franchising Code of Conduct applies to a ‘franchise agreement’, as defined under the Code, that is entered into, renewed, transferred or extended on or after 1 April 2025, and to conduct engaged in on or after 1 April 2025 in relation to such an agreement[1].

The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (“ACCC”), which is responsible for regulating the CCA and the Franchising Code of Conduct, recently issued infringement notices against three franchisors for allegedly breaching the Franchising Code of Conduct, as follows:

The Franchisor Disclosure Register (“Register”) is a free online register hosted by the Australian Government, which gives the public access to information provided by franchisors.  Under section 92 of the Franchising Code of Conduct, franchisors must provide specified information for inclusion in the Register such as the franchisor’s name; the name under which the franchisor carries on business in Australia relevant to the franchise; the franchisor’s Australian Business Number; the address of the franchisor’s registered office and principal place of business in Australia; the business telephone number and email address of the franchisor; the ANZSIC division and subdivision codes for the industry in which the business operated under the franchise operates; and any other information required by the Secretary[4].

Franchisors are also required to annually update or confirm information included in the Register in accordance with section 93 of the Franchising Code of Conduct[5].

If you wish to discuss the Franchising Code of Conduct or the above further, please contact Pointon Partners.

[1] Section 97(1) Franchising Code of Conduct

[2] ACCC Media Release dated 4 August 2025, “Harvey Norman franchisor pays penalty for alleged breach of   

   franchising code”

[3] ACCC Media Release dated 26 June 2025, “Cash Converters and Mobile Travel Agents pay penalties for

   allegedly breaching Franchising Code of Conduct”

[4] Section 92(2) Franchising Code of Conduct

[5] Section 93 Franchising Code of Conduct

GREENWASHING: IT’S NOT ALL GLAD

In today’s world, it is not unusual for businesses to make claims about the environmental benefits of their services or products to consumers- it is however important to ensure that those claims are accurate.  “Greenwashing” is a term, which generally speaking, refers to the making of false or misleading environmental claims, such as through advertising, marketing, packaging or representations. In fact, the English Oxford dictionary defines “greenwashing” as “the creation or propagation of an unfounded or misleading environmentalist image”.[1]

This issue was recently highlighted in the first civil penalty proceeding by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (“ACCC”) in the Federal Court of Australia (“FCA”) against Clorox Australia Pty Ltd (“Clorox”) for contraventions relating to “greenwashing” and for which the FCA ordered Clorox to pay penalties totalling $8.25 million.[2]

These contraventions related to the supply and promotion by Clorox of it’s “Glad to be Green” kitchen tidy bags and garbage bags as being bags which were “50% Ocean Plastic Recycled”.[3] The assertion and message being relayed to consumers was that the bags were made of 50% recycled plastic waste collected from the ocean. In reality, the bags were not made of 50% ocean recycled plastic: rather, the bags were made using plastic resin at least 50% of which came from recycled plastic waste collected from communities with no formal waste management system located within 50km of the shoreline, plastic resin not derived from recycled plastic and processing aid and dye/ink.

In this case, the Court declared that Clorox, on multiple occasions between June 2021 and July 2023 in trade and commerce:

Whilst there was a disclaimer on the back of the packaging stating that the bags were “made using 50% ocean bound recycled plastic that is collected from communities with no formal waste management system within 50km of the shore line”,[8] the parties agreed that the prominent statement “50% Ocean Plastic Recycled….”[9] on the front of the packaging was not dispelled by any other information on the packaging.

Further, while the FCA acknowledged the seriousness of the contravening conduct in this matter, the circumstances were not considered to be in the “most serious category of environmental misrepresentation”.[10] This was due to the earnestness of Clorox in believing that their products would contribute to the reduction of plastic waste in the ocean and that they did not “deliberately engage in a strategy to mislead consumers as to the composition of their products”.[11]

In this case, Clorox admitted to the contraventions and the FCA ordered the following:[12]

This case demonstrates the need for accuracy in the marketing of a business’ products and services, especially the making of environmental claims to attract consumers.

Should you wish to discuss this further, please do not hesitate to contact Felicity Cara-Carson.

[1] Oxford English Dictionary (Website) < https://www.oed.com/dictionary/greenwashing_n >

[2] Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Clorox Australia Pty Ltd [2025] FCA 357 (“Clorox”) at [3].

[3] Ibid at [1]

[4] Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2 (“Australian Consumer Law”) s18.

[5] Australian Consumer Law (n 1)  s29(1)(a).

[6] Ibid s29(1)(g).

[7] Australian Consumer Law (n 1)  s33.

[8] Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Clorox Australia Pty Ltd [2025] FCA 357 (“Clorox”) at [16].

[9] Ibid at [1]

[10] Ibid at [81]

[11] Ibid at [81]

[12] Ibid at [3].

Major Changes to Australia’s Cyber Security Landscape

In the wake of increasing data breaches,[1] on 29 November 2024, the Government passed its new tranche of legislative measures under its 2023-2030 Australian Cyber Security Strategy seeking to address legislative gaps, and bring Australia in line with international standards.[2]

The Cyber Security Act 2024 (“Act”) introduces several key measures aimed at strengthening Australia’s cyber security space.[3] These changes include:

While the new tranche of legislative measures have been passed, each change will take effect on different dates. [7]

__________________________________________________________________________________________________________

[1] ‘Optus notifies customers of cyberattack compromising customer information’, Optus (Media Release, 22 September 2022) < https://www.optus.com.au/about/media-centre/media-releases/2022/09/optus-notifies-customers-of-cyberattack>; See also Tiffanie Turnbull, ‘Medibank hack: Russian sanctioned over Australia’s worst data breach’, BBC (Article, 23 January 2024) < https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-68064850>.

[2] ‘2023-2030 Australian Cyber Security Strategy’, Department of Home Affairs (Media Release) < https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/cyber-security/strategy/2023-2030-australian-cyber-security-strategy >.

[3] Parliament of Australia: Cyber Security Bill 2024 < https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r7250>.

[4] Currently the Exposure Draft for the Cyber Security (Ransomware Reporting) Rules 2024 indicates that this is to be $3 million; See also Cyber Security (Ransomware Reporting) Rules 2024.

[5] Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018.

[6] *see section 9 of the Cyber Security Act 2024.

[7] *see section 2 of the Cyber Security Act 2024.

Further update to Australia’s privacy law reforms

In our previous article, we reported on the Privacy and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2024 (Cth) (“Bill”). The Bill passed both Houses of Parliament on 29 November 2024 and received Royal Assent on 10 December 2024.[1]

As foreshadowed, the Privacy and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2024 (Cth) introduces a range of measures targeting the protection of personal information and the privacy of individuals, including:

While most provisions came into effect immediately, certain provisions, such as the statutory tort for serious invasions of privacy, will commence on a later date to be proclaimed or six months after Royal Assent. Provisions relating to automated decisions will take effect two years after Royal Assent.

The second reading speech in relation to the Privacy and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2024 by the Attorney-General in September 2024 stated that its Department aims to develop the next tranche of reforms, including targeted consultations and draft legislation, in the coming months. [8]

Should you wish to discuss any aspect of the above, please contact Felicity Cara-Carson of our team.

[1] Parliament of Australia, Privacy and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2024 (Cth) <https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_LEGislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r7249>.

[2] Privacy and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2024 (Cth) sch 1 pt 2 (‘APP codes’), pt 10 (‘Commissioner to conduct public inquiries’).

[3] Ibid sch 1 pt 4 (‘Children’s privacy’).

[4] Ibid sch 1 pt 8 (‘Penalties for interference with privacy’).

[5] Ibid sch 1 pt 15 (‘Automated decisions and privacy policies’).

[6] Ibid sch 2 (‘Serious invasions of privacy’).

[7] Ibid sch 3 (‘Doxxing offences’).

[8] Attorney-General’s Department, Second Reading Speech – Privacy and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2024 (9 December 2024) <https://ministers.ag.gov.au/media-centre/speeches/second-reading-speech-privacy-and-other-legislation-amendment-bill-2024-12-09-2024>.

Financial Assistance, the “Whitewash” Procedure and other Exemptions

1. WHAT IS ‘FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE’?

The term ‘financial assistance’ refers to a situation where a company (Target Company) financially assists a person (purchaser) for, or in connection with the process of, acquiring shares in the Target Company. The Target Company can be either a public company or proprietary company.  Although ‘financial assistance’ is not defined in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Act), Courts have interpreted it to cover a broad range of actions which are financial in nature and which ease the purchaser’s financial burden or improves the purchaser’s net balance of financial advantage.

An example of direct financial assistance is when the Target Company provides a guarantee and indemnity or grants security to support a loan used by the purchaser to finance the price payable for the Target Company’s shares. Assistance can also occur indirectly; for example, where the Target Company’s action enables the selling shareholder to reduce the consideration payable for the shares, by releasing a debt owed to the selling shareholder.

2. THE GENERAL PROHIBITION ON FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AND EXEMPTIONS

Part 2J.3 of the Act sets out a general prohibition on financial assistance.  The rationale behind the prohibition includes protecting shareholders and creditors of the Target Company, as well as ensuring that the Target Company’s resources are not used for improper purposes. It is important to note that a contravention of the prohibition does not invalidate the financial assistance and the Target Company itself will not be guilty of an offence. However, persons involved in a breach (such as the board of directors and other officers of the Target Company) may be liable for criminal and civil penalties. As such, where there is a financial assistance issue, it is important to consider the available exemptions to this prohibition as early as possible.

A Target Company is permitted to financially assist a person to acquire its own shares if:

a. No material prejudice exemption

The exemption applies where it can be established that the financial assistance is not materially prejudicial to the interests of the Target Company, its shareholders or its ability to pay creditors. There are risks with relying on this exemption, as this ultimately is a question of fact to be determined by the Court, not based on the reasonable conclusion of the Target Company’s board.

b. Whitewash shareholder approval exemption

A more conservative approach is to rely on the shareholder approval exemption under section 260B of the Act, which permits financial assistance where the Target Company obtains approval from its shareholders and complies with ASIC’s filing requirements.

Obtaining shareholder approval generally requires either a special resolution passed at a general meeting or a resolution agreed to by all ordinary shareholders at a general meeting. If the Target Company will become a subsidiary of a listed domestic company or have an ultimate Australian holding company, then approval must also be obtained by the shareholders of that corporation by special resolution passed at a general meeting.

With respect to notice of the general meeting, the Target Company must include with the notice a statement setting out all the information that is material to members’ decision to vote – unless such information had already been disclosed to members previously.

Timing is an important factor in the whitewash procedure, as ASIC prescribes specific timeframes with respect to filings:

  1. Before the notice of the meeting is sent to members, a copy of the meeting notice and any documents relating to the financial assistance to be sent to members must be lodged with ASIC.
  2. After obtaining shareholder approval, and at least 14 days before giving the financial assistance, the special resolution and notice must be lodged with ASIC.
  3. The notice must be in the form prescribed by ASIC and lodgement of the special resolution passed must occur within 14 days after it is passed.
  4. Section 260C exemptions

This section provides a number of specific exemptions to the general prohibition of financial assistance, for example the reduction of share capital, employee share schemes, share buy-backs, and the creation of a lien on partly paid shares in the company’s ordinary course of commercial dealings.

Financial assistance is interpreted broadly and can capture a range of conduct in the context of share purchases. To avoid uncertainty and risks of adverse claims, early identification of any potential financial assistance issues and consideration of the available exemptions are recommended.

If you have any queries in relation to the above, please do not hesitate to contact David Mazzeo or Ben Drysdale.

Authors & Area Practitioners

Update to ‘Privacy Act – Reform is on the Way’

As we reported in our previous article (https://pointonpartners.com.au/privacy-act-reform-is-on-the-way/), the Federal Government released a Privacy Act Review Report (“Review”) last year foreshadowing changes to privacy legislation in Australia.  A response to the recommendations outlined in the Review was then released by the Federal Government following feedback and consultations. In his speech at the Privacy by Design Awards in May 2024, Attorney-General Mark Dreyfus described Australia’s privacy regime as “woefully outdated and unfit for the digital age”.[1]

On 12 September 2024, the Privacy and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2024 (“Bill”) was introduced to Parliament. The Bill seeks to amend the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) and 7 other Acts, including referring to 23 of the 25 ‘agreed’ proposals,[2] a new statutory tort for serious invasions of privacy and a framework for developing a Children’s Online Privacy Code.[3]

We await the progress of this Bill through Parliament and any subsequent tranches of reforms.

If you have any queries about the above, please do not hesitate to contact Felicity Cara-Carson of our office.

[1] Attorney-General, ‘Privacy by Design Awards 2024’ (Speech, 5 February 2024) <https://ministers.ag.gov.au/media-centre/speeches/privacy-design-awards-2024-02-05-2024.>

[2] Parliament of Australia, Explanatory Memorandum, Privacy and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2024, <https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22legislation%2Fems%2Fr7249_ems_a01fc1bd-4aa3-4fc2-87d7-ed8aa84ab564%22.>

[3] Parliament of Australia: Privacy and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2024 <https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r7249.>

From Due Diligence to Warranty Claims: Navigating the Business Sale Maze

In any sale transaction whether it is a business sale or sale of shares, an important step is the due diligence process for both vendors and buyers. While, in our experience, purchasers are increasingly shifting their focus towards protection through comprehensive warranties in sale agreements, particularly given the growing trend of deferred consideration, the significance of thorough due diligence cannot be understated.

The Importance of Due Diligence

Due diligence is a comprehensive appraisal of a business conducted by a prospective buyer to establish its assets and liabilities and evaluate its commercial potential. This process is pivotal as it provides the buyer with crucial information to make informed decisions and mitigates risks associated with the acquisition.

For buyers, due diligence is essential to:

  1. VERIFY the financial health of the business: review and confirm the accuracy of financial statements, including balance sheets, income statements, and cash flow statements. Identify any discrepancies or hidden issues, such as debt, tax liabilities, or legal obligations, and assess key metrics like revenue trends and profit margins to ensure stability and profitability;
  1. ASSESS the legal and compliance risks: Conduct a thorough review of the business’s compliance with all relevant legal and regulatory requirements. The assessment should be proportional to the nature and value of the assets involved, such as intellectual property registrations, which need to be verified for validity and ownership. Additionally, buyers should review freehold and leasehold interests to confirm that there are no encumbrances, disputes, or compliance issues related to property rights; and,
  1. IDENTIFY potential liabilities: Examine the company’s financial and legal documents to uncover any pending litigations that could lead to future legal disputes or financial losses. Evaluate debt obligations to understand the company’s current and future financial commitments, and examining contingent liabilities—potential obligations that may arise depending on the outcome of specific events or conditions. By identifying these liabilities, buyers can gauge the true financial health of the business and negotiate terms to address or mitigate these risks before finalising the acquisition.

For vendors, thorough compliance with due diligence is equally important as it positions them advantageously during negotiations. By being transparent about these obligations and other critical factors, vendors can effectively address any issues or concerns, thereby negotiating from a position of strength.

Red Flags for Vendors and Buyers during Due Diligence

During due diligence, both vendors and buyers must be vigilant for certain red flags that could indicate underlying problems.

Inconsistent financial statements can signal financial instability or fraudulent activities, undermining trust and the transaction’s viability. Legal and regulatory issues, such as pending lawsuits, non-compliance with regulations, or unresolved legal matters, can pose significant risks, potentially leading to financial losses and operational disruptions.

Employee and HR issues, including high turnover rates, unresolved employee disputes, or unclear employment contracts, may indicate internal problems that could affect the business’s stability and performance.

Customer and supplier contracts also require close examination. Unfavourable terms, reliance on a few key customers or suppliers, and short-term contracts can affect the business’s stability. Further, change of control provisions in these contracts also need to be closely examined to assess whether a supplier or customer would have the right to terminate the contract if the acquisition were to proceed.

The Shift towards Warranty Claims

Warranty claims in sale of business agreements are assurances provided by the seller regarding certain facts about the business, which if proven false, entitle the buyer to seek compensation or remediation. In recent years, we have seen there has been a notable shift among purchasers who are placing less emphasis on due diligence and more on warranty claims. This trend is driven by the increasing prevalence of deferred consideration structures in business transactions.

One common structure of deferred consideration is having monies held in an escrow account for a specified period (e.g. 12 months post-completion) to cover any claims or discrepancies that arise, providing a financial cushion for potential issues that may surface after the sale.

Another approach is straight deferred consideration, where a portion of the purchase price is deferred (e.g. 50% at completion, 25% after 12 months, 25% after 24 months). This payment structure helps manage cash flow and provides a safety net for buyers.

Earn-out amounts are also gaining popularity. These are additional payments based on the business’s performance (e.g revenue or profits) during specified periods post-completion (e.g. 12 or 24 months). Earn-outs align the interests of the seller and buyer by linking part of the payment to future performance.

These structures provide a safety net for buyers, allowing them to claim on warranties if the business does not perform as expected. However, this approach should not replace due diligence completely, as relying solely on warranty claims can lead to protracted disputes and potential litigation.

Key Points:

  1. Due Diligence is Essential: Comprehensive due diligence is crucial for buyers and vendors to assess the financial, operational, and legal aspects of a business, helping to mitigate risks and make informed decisions.
  2. Increasing Focus on Warranty Claims: Purchasers are increasingly relying on warranty claims and deferred consideration structures, such as escrow accounts and earn-outs, rather than solely on due diligence although due diligence remains important.

If you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact Michael Bishop of our office.

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