Counterfeit Imports — Tougher Penalties at the Border
The Customs Legislation Amendment (False Trade Marks Infringement Notices) Bill 2026 (“Bill”) amends the Commerce (Trade Descriptions) Act 1905 (Cth) (“CTD Act”) and the Customs Regulation 2015 (“Customs Regulation”) and seeks to strengthen Australia’s response to the importation of counterfeit goods. The Bill was introduced into the House of Representatives on 25 March 2026 and subsequently passed Parliament, receiving Royal Assent on 20 May 2026.
According to the Explanatory Memorandum, the purpose of these amendments is to strengthen enforcement against the importation of counterfeit goods by:
- Creating a new strict liability offence under the CTD Act for importing goods that bear false trade marks (being an offence which imposes liability without the need for the prosecution to prove fault). The new provisions provide that a person can be punishable by a maximum penalty of 60 units. At the time that the Explanatory Memorandum was prepared, one penalty unit was equal to $330 AUD and so 60 penalty units was $19, 800. A body corporate however can be subject to a maximum pecuniary penalty of an amount 5 times higher (being 300 penalty units- $99,000). For offences committed on or after 1 July 2026 however, one penalty unit is currently equal to $364 instead; and
- Including the new offence in the Customs Infringement Notice Scheme, by amendment of the Customs Regulation, allowing the Comptroller-General of Customs and delegates in the Australian Border Force (“ABF”) to issue infringement notices as an alternative to prosecution for the offence.
The Explanatory Memorandum states that the the policy objective behind these amendments is as follows:
“The purpose of the amendments is to make counterfeit importers’ business model unprofitable, because the value of the seized goods, together with the amount of a penalty specified in an infringement notice, may exceed the profits realised from the consignments of infringing goods that escape detection.”
The protection of intellectual property rights from the importation of counterfeit goods is regulated through legislation such as the CTD Act (which includes certain labelling requirements with respect to goods imported into Australia), the Trade Marks Act 1995 (“TM Act”) and the Copyright Act 1968 (“CA Act”) (both of which contain provisions dealing with importations of goods infringing intellectual property rights). For instance, under the TM Act a registered trade mark owner may give a notice in writing to the Comptroller- General of Customs objecting to the importation of goods that infringe its trade mark (“Notice of Objection”) (similar provisions apply under the CA Act with respect to the rights of copyright owners), and the Comptroller- General of Customs may seize imported goods that infringe such intellectual property rights. A Notice of Objection is valid for a period of 4 years, unless revoked. The registered trade mark owner may also bring court proceedings for infringement of their intellectual property rights.
The Explanatory Memorandum further states as follows:
“The intellectual property rights holder remains responsible for any subsequent legal action against the importer under civil prosecution. Once the ABF refers the matter to the intellectual property rights holder, it no longer has authority to take action against the importer.
In the majority of cases where counterfeit and pirated goods are seized, the importer forfeits or abandons the goods. When this occurs, the Commonwealth is unable to pursue the importer through fines or prosecution. The only consequence to the importer is the financial loss of the value of the seized counterfeit goods. Access to the customs infringement notice scheme adds an added financial deterrent against the importation of counterfeit goods.”
Accordingly, these amendments do not seek to alter or change the existing Notice of Objection process, rather they aim to complement the existing framework12.
A Spread Stoush in Kraft v Bega: Lessons on the Assignment of Unregistered Trade Marks and Underlying Goodwill
In Australian law, unregistered trade marks and their associated
goodwill are treated as one in the same. Goodwill can have many
shapes and sources, but it is understood generally to refer to the
commercial aspects of a business other than tangible assets that
have attracted custom to it.
Under section 106 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 ('the
Act'), an assignment of a registered trade mark may be with or
without the goodwill of the business concerned in the relevant
goods and/or services. The Act, however, is silent in relation to
the assignment of an unregistered trade mark. A 2020 judgment of
the Full Court of the Federal Court illustrates the position in
Australian law and its far-reaching implications for trade mark
licensing and assignment.
Background
In 2018, Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC ('Kraft') brought
a claim against Bega Cheese Limited ('Bega') over use of an
unregistered trade mark. The trade mark in question was the yellow
lid and clear plastic jar of their peanut butter products
('Trade Dress'), as shown below in examples of products
sold by Kraft Foods Limited, an Australian entity within the Kraft
corporate group which was later renamed to Mondelez Australia
(Foods) Ltd following a restructure ('KFL/MAFL').

Image source: Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC v Bega Cheese
Limited [2020] FCAFC 65, [1].
In July 2017, Bega acquired the assets of KFL/MAFL's
Australian peanut butter business. After removing the Kraft
trademarked logos, Bega continued to use the Trade Dress as it had
been designed and used by KFL/MAFL. Kraft commenced proceedings and
argued that Bega did not acquire the Trade Dress when it bought the
peanut butter business, as it was never KFL/MAFL's to sell.
Instead, Kraft claimed that Bega's use of the Trade Dress was
actually licensed by them, and when that licence expired in
December 2017, Bega had no right to continue using it.
Kraft lost at first instance and appealed to the Full Federal
Court. The Full Court was asked to decide to whom the goodwill of
the mark inured, and which entity could continue to use the Trade
Dress to the exclusion of the other.
Decision
The Full Court highlighted two key principles on which it based
its decision.
Firstly, unregistered trade marks or product 'get-up'
are not species of property in Australian common law. They do not
have statutory infringement provisions like registered trade marks.
Instead, it is the business goodwill or reputation generated
through their use that is recognised and protected.
Secondly, the Court noted that this goodwill is
property capable of assignment. Thus, the sale, assignment or
ownership of an unregistered trade mark is the sale, assignment, or
ownership of business goodwill; the two are inseparable. Their
Honours stated that the rationale for this prohibition against a
"naked assignment of the mark without the accompanying
goodwill" goes to the nature of trade marks and the very
objective of trade mark law, which is to protect consumers from
being misled or confused as to the origin of goods or services.
These principles were fatal to Kraft's claim against Bega.
The Court traced the use of the Trade Dress across various
licensing agreements and restructure documents and ultimately found
that the goodwill inured to KFL/MAFL and that they had maintained
ownership over it during the relevant period. Consequently, when
KFL/MAFL transferred all of the assets that comprised the peanut
butter business in Australia to Bega, this constituted the
assignment of the rights in relation to the Trade Dress from
KFL/MAFL to Bega. Bega was therefore entitled to use the Trade
Dress in relation to the peanut butter products that it
manufactured and sold. Even though some aspects of the peanut
butter business were licensed from Kraft to KFL/MAFL, the Court
held that they never owned the goodwill generated by, and thus the
rights to, the Trade Dress.
Kraft also attempted to prevent Bega's use of the peanut
butter Trade Dress by arguing consumers would be misled into
believing Bega had a connection to Kraft because of the jar style,
regardless of any rights Bega may have. The Court disagreed,
holding that nothing in Bega's conduct beyond their lawful use
of the Trade Dress would cause a mistaken belief of connection in a
reasonable consumer.
Key Takeaways
The Full Court's judgment confirms that in Australian law,
unregistered trade marks do not have property rights like
registered trade marks; the business goodwill they generate is
taken to be inseparable from the business to which it adds value,
and cannot be dealt with except in conjunction with the sale of
that business.
Accordingly, the assignment or licensing of unregistered trade
marks is not possible without the transfer of the accompanying
goodwill. In contrast, registered trade marks (and trade marks
pending registration) can be assigned with or without the
associated goodwill, as expressly provided by section 106 of the
Act.
To avoid any unwitting transfer of underlying goodwill,
businesses should ensure that all important trade marks are
registered with the Trade Marks Office.
Should you wish to speak further on this, or have any queries
relating to your business's IP protection, please contact our
Intellectual Property team David Mazzeo, Stefano Mazzeo or Jess Tomlinson of our office.
Fashion Designer Wins: What the Katy Perry v Katie Perry Decision Means for Australian Trade Mark Owners
The long-running dispute between Australian fashion designer Katie Perry and international pop star Katy Perry has now been resolved with the High Court of Australia handing down a landmark trademark decision. The case concerned whether the Australian designer’s registered trade mark “Katie Perry” for clothing should be removed from the Trade Marks Register due to the prior reputation of the singer’s stage name “Katy Perry”.
Background:
The proceedings arose under the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth). In particular, the Court considered whether the registration should be cancelled under ss 88(1), 88(2)(a) and 88(2)(c) on the basis that the mark could have been opposed at registration, including under s 60, which applies where an earlier trade mark has acquired a reputation in Australia such that the use of a later mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion, however this is restricted to the goods or services specific to the reputation.
The dispute arose after the designer, Katie Taylor (“Taylor“) formally known as Katie Perry, launched her clothing label under her birth name “Katie Perry” and registered the mark in Class 25 (clothing) in 2008. The singer Katy Perry (whose legal name is Katheryn Hudson) (“Hudson”) subsequently obtained Australian trade mark registrations for “Katy Perry” in Class 9 (electronic and recorded media products) and Class 41 (entertainment services) in 2009.
As the singer’s commercial activities expanded, merchandise bearing the name “Katy Perry”, including clothing associated with tours and promotional events, was sold in Australia which were not protected under the registered trademarks of the singer. This gave rise to a dispute as to whether the sale of such merchandise infringed the designer’s earlier registered trade mark for clothing.
The High Court Decision and fundamental key aspects for business going forward:
- Reputation regarding particular goods and services:
The majority found that an acquired reputation cannot extend beyond the actual use of a trade mark on or in relation to, particular goods or services. Further in support of this the majority found that very few people would have seen any “KATY PERRY” labelled clothing before the registration of Taylor’s trade mark registration.
- Likely to deceive or confuse:
The High Court distinguished between the reputation in a trade mark and the fame of a celebrity. It held that although the marks KATIE PERRY and KATY PERRY were similar, an ordinary consumer would quickly realise that clothing sold under KATIE PERRY was not connected to the pop star, particularly as the products contained no references to her image, music or tours. Any confusion would be momentary rather than real.
- Lack of confusion evidence
The marks co-existed in Australia for around ten years without evidence of actual confusion. The High Court held that this period was sufficiently long to support an inference that consumers were unlikely to be deceived or confused, making the absence of confusion evidence significant.
- Knowing infringement
The Court was critical of Ms Hudson continuing conduct that infringed Ms Taylor’s trade mark despite being aware of the issue. Justice Steward described the conduct as a “persistent and assiduous” infringement and further noted that a party should not be able to benefit from their own wrongdoing by later seeking cancellation of the mark.
Accordingly, this decision underscores that trade mark protection is limited to the goods and services listed in the trade mark registration. Brands should ensure their trade marks reflect current operations and anticipate future expansion. As brands grow into new products, services, or markets, additional registrations across relevant classes are necessary to be able to maintain adequate protection.
It is common for businesses to adopt a staged trade mark strategy, filing new applications as commercial activities expand. This approach not only strengthens brand protection but also helps avoid potential issues such as non-use challenges. At Pointon Partners, we work with our clients to regularly review trade mark portfolios, align registrations with business plans, and plan for growth to safeguard long-term brand value.
Ultimately, the Katy Perry v Katie Perry case serves as a useful reminder that while reputation can play a role in brand protection, it is not a substitute for a well-considered trade mark strategy. Regardless of how well known a brand may become, the most effective way to protect it is to ensure that appropriate trade mark registrations are in place covering the relevant goods and services.
Jacksons Drawing Supplies Pty Ltd v Jackson’s Art Supplies Ltd (No 2) [2025] FCA 1127
The Federal Court recently considered a passing-off dispute involving two competing art supplies businesses operating under the name “Jackson”. The Australian retailer and applicant, Jacksons Drawing Supplies (JDS), whom did not register the trade mark “Jackson”, brought proceedings against Jackson’s Art Supplies (JAS) the UK competitor and its Australian affiliate, Jackson’s Art Australia Pty Ltd (JAA).
Background:
JDS is an established Australian art supplies retailer which started in Western Australia dating back to 1930. It has traded under the name “Jacksons Drawing Supplies” since 1955 and has since had a long standing brick-and-mortar, in Perth. JDS’s website has been in operation since the early 2000s, and the business has maintained significant annual sales revenue. It trades under the names “Jacksons” and “Jacksons Drawing Supplies.”
JAS is a UK based art retailer established in 2000, selling art materials both in store and online. It trades under the names “Jackson’s,” “Jackson’s Art,” and “Jackson’s Art Supplies,” with its website (jacksonsart.com) accessible to Australian customers since 2001.
From 2013, JAS began offering Australian dollar payments and, by 2018, introduced an Australia-specific website. In 2022, it created Jackson’s Art Australia Pty Ltd (JAA), based in Adelaide, to handle local warehousing and customer service. JAS itself does not operate any physical stores in Australia.
Issues:
The key issue before Justice Jackson was whether JAS’s conduct amounted to misleading or deceptive conduct and misleading representations contrary to sections 18 and 29 of the Australian Consumer Law (ACL), and further whether such conduct also constituted the tort of passing off. Justice Jackson evaluate the following to assist in determining his decision.
Date for Assessing JAS Reputation
A critical question was the point in time at which JDS’ reputation should be measured. While JDS limited its claim to JAS’ conduct from October 2018, the underlying activities, such as selling to Australian consumers and using Australian dollars online, had begun as early as 2005 and 2013. Justice Jackson accepted the October 2018 date for the purposes of the case as JAS did not challenge JDS’ assertion.
JDS Geographical Scope of Reputation
JDS had a strong reputation in its core markets of Western Australia and the Northern Territory. The question was whether this extended nationwide. Justice Jackson rejected the argument that success in a single state automatically translates to a national reputation. Nevertheless, he accepted evidence showing web traffic from across Australia as sufficient to demonstrate a consumer level of awareness beyond the core markets.
JAS Overseas Conduct and Misrepresentation within Australia
For the ACL claim to succeed, it was necessary to establish that JAS created the impression of being an Australian business. The Court highlighted features such as the use of an Australian subdirectory on the website, default pricing in Australian dollars, references to an Adelaide location, and packaging with an Australian address. These factors collectively contributed to ordinary consumers perceiving JAS as linked to JDS.
Business Names, Domain Names, and Metadata
JAS argued that JDS’ registration of business names and domains, and its addition of metadata keywords, constituted misleading conduct. Justice Jackson dismissed these claims, ruling that such registrations alone are unlikely to mislead consumers and that metadata changes had no evidential effect on consumer behaviour.
Applicant’s limitation to its relief- Delay and Discretionary Relief
Despite establishing liability, JDS’ delay in enforcing its rights limited the relief available. Justice Jackson found that JDS should have acted as early as May 2015, when its managing director discovered relevant domain names were in use by JAS but failed to investigate further. The Court concluded that this “want of diligence” meant broad injunctions were inappropriate, and instead required JAS to display a clear disclaimer distinguishing itself from JDS on its Australian website.
Court ordered:
The Court, ordered in addition to costs, for JAS to implement a Pop-Up Disclaimer that appears each time a user accesses the website in a new browser, which states “not affiliated with the Australian Company Jacksons Drawing Supplies Pty Ltd or its website jacksons.com.au” and a footnote which reinstates the disclaimer mentioned in their pop-up disclaimer. The court however rejected proposals for a hyperlink to the applicant’s website and declined to require disclaimers in other media, as the misleading conduct was confined to the website.
Conclusion
Justice Jackson’s decision highlights the intersection of IP, consumer law and passing off in an online, cross-border marketplace. Although JDS established misleading conduct, its delay in acting limited the scope of relief. The case reinforces the need for businesses to monitor online brand use and act promptly, while showing how the Court seeks to protect established reputations through targeted, practical remedies.
Should you wish to speak further on this, or have any queries relating to your businesses IP protection, please contact our Intellectual Property team David Mazzeo and Stefano Mazzeo of our office.
THE SPAM ACT – AN UPDATE
In Australia, the Spam Act 2003 (‘Spam Act’) contains requirements in relation to the sending of commercial electronic messages (‘CEMs’) which include, but are not limited to, SMS and email messages. Section 16 of the Spam Act expressly prohibits the sending of unsolicited CEMs that have an Australian link[1] and are not classified as a designated commercial electronic message (‘DCEM’).[2]
The Australian Communications and Media Authority (‘ACMA’) investigates and enforces compliance with the Spam Act and the recent investigation of Tabcorp Holdings Limited (‘Tabcorp’) highlights the importance for businesses of ensuring compliance with this legislation.
In April 2025, the ACMA found that Tabcorp, a large gambling and entertainment services provider, had breached the Spam Act by sending thousands of unlawful marketing messages to customers of its VIP program between 1 February and 1 May 2024. The ACMA issued a penalty of $4,003,270 against Tabcorp[3]—one of the highest penalties of its kind imposed by the regulator.
The case highlighted three key requirements under the Spam Act as follows:
- Consent (s 16(1)): that is, that an exception to the prohibition on the sending of CEMs under the Spam Act is the express or inferred consent of the electronic account-holder.
- Identification (s 17(1)): The CEM must clearly and accurately identify the individual or organisation that authorised the sending of the message, and include accurate information about how the recipient can contact such individual or organisation.
- Unsubscribe link (s 18(1)): The CEM must contain a functional unsubscribe facility in accordance with the requirements set out in the Spam Act and the Spam Regulations 2021.[4]
ACMA’s investigation report[5] outlined Tabcorp’s conduct during the relevant period which gave rise to the contraventions as follows:
- 11 CEMs sent via SMS were sent in contravention of s 16(1) after the relevant electronic account holders had made a request to unsubscribe and had therefore withdrawn their consent;
- 3,148 CEMs sent via SMS or WhatsApp did not contain accurate information about the identity of the sender and their contact details, in contravention of s 17(1); and
- 2,598 CEMs sent via SMS or WhatsApp were sent without providing a functional unsubscribe facility, in contravention of s 18(1).
Tabcorp also entered into a three-year, court-enforceable undertaking, which included appointing an independent consultant to review its policies, procedures and systems applicable to its compliance with the Spam Act including its direct marketing systems, implementing improvements, conducting quarterly quality assurance audits of its VIP program messages, providing staff training, and reporting to ACMA. [6]
This is a timely reminder to ensure that your business reviews its marketing procedures and complies with the Spam Act.
If you have any queries in relation to the above, please do not hesitate to contact Felicity Cara-Carson of our office.
[1] ‘Australian link’ is defined in s 7 of the Spam Act 2003.
[2] Spam Act 2003 (Cth) s 16. As defined in Schedule 1 of the Act, DCEMs are messages consisting of no more than factual information and which contain additional information identifying the sender (such as name, logo and contact details), as well as a message, the sending of which is authorised by (and relating to goods or services supplied or to be supplied by) a government body, registered political party, registered charity, and in the case of educational institutions, such message is sent to present or former students.
[3] Australian Communications and Media Authority, Infringement Notice – Tabcorp Holdings Limited (4 April 2025)
[4] See regulation 7 of the Spam Regulations 2021.
[5] Australian Communications and Media Authority, Investigation Report – Tabcorp Holdings Limited (Final Report, 4 April 2025)
[6] Australian Communications and Media Authority, Enforceable Undertaking – Tabcorp Holdings Limited (Executed 26 May 2025)
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) Increases to Trademark Fees and Changes starting 18 January 2025
From 18 January 2025, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) will adjust its fees, with its rationale being that these increases are necessary to provide themselves with the necessary resources to administer the US trademark system.
As such, new surcharges/fees to the trademark application system have been introduced, which will result in increases to bills for prospective trademark owners.
A summary of the fee changes can be found at the end of the article.
1 – Application Fees
Notably, the USPTO will replace its two types of applications, the TEAS Standard and Plus application, with a single Base application, comprising of a fee of $350, per class. Three possible surcharges may also apply to this base application due to:
- Insufficient information being provided in an application per class ($100);
- Failure to use the USPTO’s Acceptable identification of Goods and Services Manual for goods and services ($200); and
- Exceeding 1,000 characters per class for the goods/services description ($200).
These changes highlight the need for owners to provide sufficient information for their marks to be registered in the US and to keep those applications as concise as possible.
In considering whether you have provided sufficient information to avoid the new fee outlined above, the USPTO, in its Final Rule dated 18 November 2024, provides the following should be included in your Base application:
- The applicant’s name and address;
- The type of entity the applicant is;
- Citizenship of each applicant, or the country that the applicant was incorporated in;
- If the applicant is a partnership, the name and citizenship of each partner;
- The filing basis of the trademark;
- Statement that the mark is in use or the applicant has a bona fide intention to use the mark on all of the goods/services listed;
- English translation of any non-English mark;
- If the mark includes non-Latin characters, a transliteration of the characters;
- If the mark includes an individual’s name or likeness, a statement that identifies the living individual as well as their written consent or a statement that the name or likeness does not identify a living individual;
- Whether the application is a concurrent use application;
- The designated representative of the applicant if the applicant is not a resident of the US; and
- Correctly classified goods and/or services.
Additionally, the USPTO have slightly increased the base application fee for WIPO/Madrid applications to $600 per class. However, these applications will not be subject to the surcharge fees outlined above.
2 – Post-Registration and Other Fees
To continue balancing the cost of base applications, offset higher processing costs for those filings and rebalance fee collections from those fees due to changes in demand, the USPTO has also increased fees for post-registration filings.
This includes sections 8 and 71 declarations, to indicate that you have used the trademark, section 15 declarations, of the incontestability of the mark and section 9 registration renewal applications. Sections 8 and 71 applications will now cost $325 per class, section 15 will cost $250 per class and section 9 registration renewal applications will cost $325 for each class.
Lastly, petitions to revive an application and letters of protest have had their fees increased by $100 with Petitions to the Director increased by $150.
3 – Fee Change Summary
3.1 – Application Fees

3.2 – Surcharge Fees

3.3 – Post Registration Fees

3.4 – Petitions and Letters of Protest

Disney’s Shift in Legal Strategy: A Case Study in Contractual Disputes and Arbitration Clauses
In October 2023, Jeffrey Piccolo faced a devastating loss when his wife, Dr. Kanokporn Tangsuan, passed away due to a fatal allergic reaction at Raglan Road Irish Pub in Disney Springs, part of the Walt Disney World resort property. Despite assurances that Dr. Tangsuan’s meal would be free of allergens to which she was sensitive, she suffered a severe allergic reaction leading to her death.
On 22 February 2024, Jeffrey Piccolo filed a lawsuit against Disney and Raglan Road seeking a minimum of $50,000 in damages, with additional claims for pain and suffering, loss of companionship, and related financial expenses resulting from his wife’s death.
In response, Disney’s legal team argued that Piccolo was barred from suing for wrongful death due to a clause in the terms and conditions of the Disney+ streaming service, which he had signed up for as part of a free trial. The clause in question stipulated that disputes should be resolved through arbitration rather than litigation, effectively limiting Piccolo’s legal recourse. This argument made news headlines world-wide and saw a lot of public criticism of Disney as a result.
Following public discourse on the matter, on 19 August 2024, Disney’s Chairman, Josh D’Amaro, made a notable reversal of the company’s stance. In a public statement, D’Amaro announced:
“At Disney, we strive to put humanity above all other considerations. With such unique circumstances as the ones in this case, we believe this situation warrants a sensitive approach to expedite a resolution for the family who have experienced such a painful loss. As such, we’ve decided to waive our right to arbitration and have the matter proceed in court.”
This decision to forego arbitration and allow the case to proceed in court underscores the complex interplay between contractual obligations and the pursuit of justice. It highlights the critical importance for both consumers and businesses to carefully review and understand the terms and conditions of agreements, particularly those that include arbitration clauses which can limit traditional legal recourse, especially in jurisdictions such as the USA.
This case serves as a significant example of how contractual terms can impact legal disputes and the extent to which companies may reconsider their positions in light of public and ethical considerations. As this matter is yet to be fully deliberated, it remains a poignant reminder of the need for clarity and fairness in the drafting and enforcement of contractual agreements.
Should you wish to discuss the above please contact David Mazzeo or Stefano Mazzeo of or Intellectual Property team.
European Union Artificial Intelligence Act
In this digital age, it is interesting to note that legislation known as the “Artificial Intelligence Act” (“Act”) was recently approved by the European Parliament on March 13, 2024.[1]
The Act aims “to promote the uptake of human centric and trustworthy artificial intelligence (AI) while ensuring a high level of protection of health, safety, fundamental rights … including democracy, rule of law and environmental protection, to protect against the harmful effects of AI systems in the Union, and to support innovation”.[2] The legislation has broad extra-territorial scope and applies to AI providers in “a non-discriminatory manner”, irrespective of whether they are established in the Union or in a third country. [3]
Broadly speaking, the Act identifies three categories of AI systems and establishes obligations based on their risks and potential impact.[4] The three categories are:
- General purpose AI systems which refer to “foundation models” that display significant generality and can perform a diverse range of tasks.[5] An example is ChatGPT.[6]
- High risk level AI systems which refer to the use of AI technology in specific areas such as remote biometric identification systems, critical infrastructures, education, employment, essential services, law enforcement, migration, justice and democratic processes.[7] High risk AI applications also include those that are used in products falling within the scope of the EU’s product safety legislation, such as machinery, toys, medical devices and lifts.[8]
- Unacceptable risk level AI systems which are expressly prohibited under the Act, subject to limited exceptions. Examples of prohibited practices include the use of AI for purposes such as emotion recognition in workplace and school contexts, social scoring, behavioural manipulation and untargeted scraping of facial images (e.g. from the internet or CCTV footage).[9]
Violations of the Act trigger significant penalties, with fines up to the higher of 35 million EUR or 7% of annual turnover. [10] By way of comparison, the maximum penalty for breaches of the General Data Protection Regulation (EU) is 20 million EUR or 4% of the annual revenue.[11]
Upon receiving formal endorsement by the European Council, the law will be published in the Office Journal of the European Union and come into force twenty days after publication.[12]
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
[1] European Parliament, ‘Artificial Intelligence Act: MEPs Adopt Landmark Law’ (Press Release, 13 March 2024). <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20240308IPR19015/artificial-intelligence-act-meps-adopt-landmark-law>.
[2] European Parliament, ‘Corrigendum on the position of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) (Parliament Document, 16 April 2024) <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0138-FNL-COR01_EN.pdf>, 3.
[3] Ibid 21.
[4] Ibid 26.
[5] Council of the European Union, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act)’ (COM(2023) 812 final) (Council Document ST-5662-2024-INIT, 26 January 2024) <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5662-2024-INIT/en/pdf>, 58.
[6] European Parliamentary Research Service, ‘The European Union and International Law: An Overview’ (Briefing, March 2023) <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2023/745708/EPRS_ATA(2023)745708_EN.pdf>, 1.
[7] European Parliament, ‘Corrigendum on the position of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) (Parliament Document, 16 April 2024) <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0138-FNL-COR01_EN.pdf>, Annex III, 423-429.
[8] Ibid 46.
[9] Ibid 180-182.
[10] Ibid 390.
[11] General Data Protection Regulation, Regulation (EU) 2016/679, Art 83.
[12]European Parliament, ‘Artificial Intelligence Act: MEPs Adopt Landmark Law’ (Press Release, 13 March 2024). <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20240308IPR19015/artificial-intelligence-act-meps-adopt-landmark-law>.
The Battle of the Jars
Legal action has been initiated in the Federal Court of Australia between Koninklijke Douwe Egberts BV (“KDE”) and Jacobs Douwe Egberts AU Pty Ltd (“JDE”), as the applicants, with respect to the coffee brand, Moccona, against Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd (“Vittoria”), as the respondent, in relation to promoting and selling freeze-dried coffee under the Vittoria brand in a glass jar.
KDE is the registered owner of a three-dimensional shape trade mark in the form of a glass jar and lid,[1] and JDE is alleged to be the authorised user in Australia of the trade mark.[2] The applicants claim that they have advertised and sold coffee products in a clear glass jar since at least 1960, including under the Moccona brand and have alleged that Vittoria has engaged in infringement by marketing and selling freeze-dried coffee under the Vittoria brand in a glass jar that is “deceptively similar” to KDE’s trade mark.[3] Vittoria has been further accused of engaging in the tort of passing off as well as in misleading or deceptive conduct and the making of certain false representations under the Australian Consumer Law.[4] Vittoria has cross-claimed, arguing that KDE’s shape trade mark registration should be cancelled on the basis that: the mark does not distinguish the applicant’s goods from those of other persons, that the application for registration was accepted on the basis of false evidence or representations, and that as at the priority date, KDE did not intend to use, authorise the use of or assign the mark for use in relation to the registered goods.[5] Vittoria has made further claims that the shape trade mark registration should be removed on the ground of non-use as a trade mark. That is, that “the applicant’s glass jar is a utilitarian shape which does not involve the use of a trade mark for reasons including that it is not inherently distinctive”.[6] Vittoria has also claimed that the applicant has made unjustified threats to it which have caused loss and is seeking injunctions and damages.[7]
Justice Wheelahan from the Federal Court of Australia (in the interlocutory application hearing), has foreshadowed that it is evident from the pleadings and submissions of the parties that this is going to be a “hard fought litigation”.[8] For now, we watch this space and await the outcome of these proceedings.
[1] Australian trade mark registration no. 1599824.
[2] Koninklijke Douwe Egberts B.V. v Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd (2023] FCA 341 [2].
[3] Ibid [2]-[3].
[4] Sections 18, 29 and 33 of Australian Consumer Law (Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)- Schedule 2).
[5] Koninklijke Douwe Egberts B.V. v Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd (2023) FCA 341 [4].
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid [20].
Burger Brawl: Hungry Jack’s’ BIG JACK not deceptively similar to McDonald’s’ BIG MAC
In McD Asia Pacific LLC v Hungry Jack’s Pty Ltd,[1] the Federal Court dismissed McDonald’s trade mark infringement claim against Hungry Jack’s for using BIG JACK and MEGA JACK in relation to hamburgers. However, Hungry Jack’s was held liable for engaging in misleading or deceptive conduct.
This is one of the first major decisions to apply and interpret the High Court’s ruling in Self Care IP Holdings Pty Ltd v Allergan[2] and illustrates several important points for Australian trade mark law and consumer law.
Background
McDonald’s is the registered owner of the BIG MAC and MEGA MAC trade marks and has sold the Big Mac burger in Australia since 1971. Since March 2020, Hungry Jack’s has promoted and sold the Big Jack and Mega Jack burgers in Australia. Hungry Jack’s also ran two television commercials in which it represented that the Big Jack had “25% More Aussie Beef”.
McDonald’s commenced proceedings against Hungry Jack’s, alleging, among other things, trade mark infringement and breach of the Australian Consumer Law (“ACL).
The key issues before the Federal Court were:
- whether BIG JACK and MEGA JACK were deceptively similar to BIG MAC and MEGA MAC respectively within the meaning of s 120 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (“TMA”);
- whether BIG JACK should be cancelled under s 44 (substantially identical or deceptively similar) and/or s 60 (similar to a trade mark that has acquired a reputation in Australia) of the TMA;
- whether Hungry Jack’s’ “25% More Aussie Beef” representation constituted breach of s 18 (misleading or deceptive conduct) of the ACL.
Trade Mark Infringement
Central to the infringement claim was whether Hungry Jack’s’ impugned trade marks were deceptively similar to McDonald’s’ trade marks.
A deceptive similarity enquiry must take into account the notional buyer’s imperfect recollection of the registered mark and ask whether there is “a real, tangible danger of deception or confusion occurring” as to trade source.[3] Importantly, the Federal Court confirmed, following Self Care, that reputation based on actual use of the registered mark is irrelevant to assessing deceptive similarity under s 120(1) of the TMA.[4] Accordingly, contrary to Hungry Jack’s’ argument, any preconceptions about McDonald’s and Hungry Jack’s, or other aspects of packaging, branding or trade livery that were used in conjunction with the marks cannot be taken into account. Instead, “ach mark must be considered afresh, shorn of knowledge of the reputation”.[5]
Applying the above principles, Justice Burley dismissed McDonald’s’ infringement claim on the basis that BIG JACK was not deceptively similar to BIG MAC, and reached the same conclusion for MEGA JACK and MEGA MAC for similar reasons.
The following factors were of particular significance:
- As BIG is a descriptive and laudatory word that is commonly used, the notional buyer will more likely call to MAC and JACK as points of distinction.
- Despite the similar rhyme (“ack”) at the end of the two words, MAC and JACK are visually and aurally different.
- MAC is an unusual name or abbreviation while JACK is a popular forename. The notional consumer will more likely remember their differences, as people are generally attuned to noticing differences in forenames (e.g. Harry is not Barry, and Ronald is not Donald).
- The notional consumers are also likely to pay reasonable attention to a mark that denotes what food they will be eating.
- Furthermore, the intention of Hungry Jack’s was an important factor in determining whether there was a reasonable probability of deception or confusion. While evidence from Hungry Jack’s’ Chief Marketing Officer admitted to a degree of “cheekiness” in the Big Jack name, Justice Burley ultimately accepted that it was fashioned for the purpose of encouraging comparison, as opposed to confusing consumers as to trade origin.
The Validity Challenge to BIG JACK
As McDonald’s failed to establish deceptive similarly in the infringement claim, the validity challenge on the s 44 ground also failed. With regards to the s 60 ground, Justice Burley clarified that the notional consumer here is taken to be familiar with the reputation of BIG MAC. The differences between the marks and the (undisputed) enormous reputation attaching to BIG MAC meant that confusion or deception would be unlikely.[6]
Accordingly, McDonald’s’ validity challenge to BIG JACK was also dismissed on all grounds.
The ACL Claim – “25% More Aussie Beef”
While McDonald’s was unsuccessful in its trade mark claims, it obtained a small victory in the ACL claim.
McDonald’s alleged that the “25% More Aussie Beef” representation was misleading because the average cooked weight of the Big Jack beef patties was only 15% greater than the Big Mac. Hungry Jack’s defended its position by arguing that the comparison was based on pre-cooked as opposed to cooked meat patties.
The following factors were particularly decisive in the finding of breach:
- Audiences will unlikely pay attention to the distinction between cooked and pre-cooked weights.
- Instead, audiences are more likely form a general impression of the message, which is, that they will be eating 25% more Aussie beef than when they eat the competitor’s burger.
- To the extent that audiences do make a distinction between cooked and pre-cooked meat patties, they are more likely to perceive the comparison as being of the cooked meat patties. This is supported by the fact that the commercials depicted the meat patties as being in an advanced stage of cooking, and featured an image of a ready-to-eat burger meal.
Key Takeaways
- While the Federal Court acknowledged “a degree of artificiality in the [Self Care] approach”,[7] it is now definitive that reputation of the trade marks or any other aspects of packaging or branding (however sizeable) are irrelevant to the assessment of deceptive similarity in an infringement analysis.
- Caution needs to be exercised when making a comparative advertising claim. In addition to ensuring the representation is accurate and supported by reliable evidence, traders should also consider how the claim might be perceived from the perspective of the audience.
If you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact David Mazzeo or Stefano Mazzeo of our Intellectual Property Law Team.
[1] (2023) FCA 1412 (‘McD Asia Pacific’).
[2] Self Care IP Holdings Pty Ltd v Allergan Australia Pty Ltd (2023) HCA 8.
[3] McD Asia Pacific, 35-36.
[4] Ibid 39.
[5] Ibid 94.
[6] Ibid 147.
[7] Ibid 94.