The Often Overlooked Equity of Exoneration: How It Could Save Your Family Home
With insolvencies surging by 43% in the quarter ending 29 September 2024, many small and medium businesses — and their owners — are feeling the financial strain.
For directors and their families, the impact can be especially severe if personal guarantees are enforced and the family home is used as security for business loans.
This article explains the “equity of exoneration” (EOO) — a lesser-known legal principle—and how it may help a non-bankrupt spouse protect the family home or other jointly owned property after a business failure and personal bankruptcy of one of the spouses.
What is the Equity of Exoneration?
The EOO applies when co-owners mortgage jointly owned property, but the funds are used solely for the benefit of one of them. It often comes into play when bankruptcy trustees seek to claim a share of jointly owned property, used as security for loans advanced to one spouse’s business.
Here’s how it works in a simplified example:
- John and Kate own their family home as joint tenants, valued at $1,500,000.
- The property has two loans secured against it:
- A $500,000 residential mortgage; and
- A $500,000 business loan tied to John’s building company.
- John is the sole director and shareholder of the company, while Kate has no involvement in the business.
When John’s business fails and ends up in liquidation, suppliers enforce personal guarantees and he is declared bankrupt. Upon bankruptcy, John’s share of the property transfers to his trustee in bankrupcty. The trustee demands $250,000 from Kate (representing 50% of the remaining equity) or asks that the property be sold and proceeds divided equally.
How the EOO Protects Kate
The EOO changes the equation. It ensures that loans benefiting only one party (in this case, John) must first be repaid from that party’s share of the property.
Here’s how the equity would be distributed:

Thanks to the EOO, Kate retains the entire $500,000 equity. If she can continue making mortgage payments, she may be able to keep the property.
When the EOO May Not Apply
The EOO might not be available if the non-bankrupt spouse received a “tangible benefit” from the loan secured against the property.
For example:
- In Parsons & Parsons v McBain [2001] FCA 376 a wife successfully relied on the EOO even though the business loan was intended to keep her husband’s transport business running, which indirectly supported her family. The court ruled this benefit was too remote to disqualify her from asserting the EOO.
- In Arvanis (Trustee) v Kapp [2023] FCA 702 a wife was allowed to claim the EOO after charging her property to secure payment of her husband’s legal fees. Even though the husband was sued in his capacity as trustee of a trust in which the wife was a beneficiary, the court found any benefit to her was speculative and not sufficient to deny her claim.
Take Action Early
The equity of exoneration is a powerful legal tool that can significantly benefit non-bankrupt spouses, especially during emotionally and financially challenging times.
However, asserting this right requires a clear understanding of its nuances and timely action. Seeking professional advice early may make the difference between losing the family home or retaining enough equity to make a meaningful fresh start.
If you have questions about this topic or related disputes, contact Carl Millington.
Director Penalty Notices: A refresher as the ATO ramps up collections activity
During 2022, the ATO issued almost 18,500 director penalty notices (DPNs) to directors of Australian companies. A further 52,000 directors received warnings, and the ATO has started referring certain debtors to credit reporting agencies. This is indicative of a significant uptick in collections activity following a period of relative leniency during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Accordingly it is an appropriate time for a brief refresher on the DPN regime for directors and their advisers.
What is a DPN?
Company directors are responsible for ensuring that a company’s tax and superannuation obligations are reported and paid on time. When a company fails to meet its tax debt payment obligations, the ATO can recover unpaid amounts from the company’s directors personally by issuing the directors a DPN. A DPN is typically a 2 page standard-form letter sent to directors at their address registered with ASIC. The DPN will also be published on the ATO portal.
The ATO can recover the amounts due under the DPN by:
- issuing garnishee notices, which permit the ATO to deduct amounts from director’s bank accounts or wages;
- offsetting the amount payable under the DPN against tax credits otherwise available to the director; or
- by commencing legal proceedings against the director in respect of the debt.
It is important for directors to understand that where there are multiple directors of a company, the DPN regime makes each director joint and severally liable for the company’s tax debt. This means the ATO can focus on the director they consider has the best ability to pay, rather than pursuing each director for an equal “share” of the company’s tax debt.
What are the options once a DPN is issued?
There are two types of DPN, lockdown and non-lockdown. What options are open to the directors within the 21 day compliance period will depend on the type of notice received.
A. Non-lockdown DPNs
A non-lockdown DPN is issued in circumstances where the company has lodged its business activity statements, instalment activity statements and superannuation guarantee charge statements within the relevant time periods, but has not made the required payments.
The options available to a director under a non-lockdown DPN during the 21 day period are:
- cause the company to pay the underlying tax debt;
- pay the penalty set out in the DPN;
- put the company into voluntary administration;
- appoint a small business restructuring practitioner;
- put the company into liquidation.
Taking any of the last three steps within the 21 day period will avoid personal liability for the director under a non-lockdown DPN.
Critically, following a recent change in ATO policy, it is no longer possible for a director to escape personal liability under a DPN by causing the company to enter into a payment arrangement with the ATO.
B. Lockdown DPNs
Lockdown DPNs are issued where, in addition to having unpaid tax debts, a company has failed to lodge its business activity statements, instalment activity statements and superannuation guarantee charge statements within the relevant time periods.
It is not possible for a director issued with a lockdown DPN to escape personal liability by putting the company into administration or liquidation or appointing a small business restructuring practitioner.
Defences?
Directors will not be liable under a DPN if they can establish one of the limited defences:
- That they did not take part in the management of the company during the relevant period due to illness or “for some other good reason” and it would have been unreasonable to expect them to take part.
- The director “took all reasonable steps” to ensure that the company paid its outstanding tax debts or appointed a voluntary administrator, small business restructuring practitioner or liquidator.
- In relation to outstanding net SGC and GST obligations only, the company adopted a reasonably arguable position, and applied reasonable care, in applying the relevant legislation.
Recent cases have shown these defences, which import concepts of reasonableness, are difficult to make out.
Key takeaways
- Prevention is better than a cure, and engagement with the ATO is crucial. Whether or not to issue a DPN remains at the discretion of the ATO. The ATO is far more likely to issue a DPN where the company and its directors refuse to engage.
- Directors must ensure that personal and company information remains current. The 21 day period to comply with a DPN is short, and time will commence when it is sent by the ATO, not when it is received by the director. Having it sent to an old address will not be an effective defence.
- Even if the company is unable to immediately pay its tax debts, it remains important to comply with reporting obligations. There are far more options available to directors in relation to non-lockdown DPNs.
- Directors must be aware that they cannot simply leave management of the company to others, and should ensure they are aware of the company’s financial position and its compliance with reporting obligations. Failure to do so will likely not be a defence to a DPN.
- DPNs can be issued to new directors, who may have limited information about the existence or extent of any taxation liabilities or former directors in relation to debts incurred during their time as directors.
- In circumstances where a company’s tax debt is paid by one director following receipt of a DPN, that director will have a right of indemnity and contribution from the company, as well as the other directors.
- There are important distinctions between a director lending a company money to pay the underlying tax debt and the director paying the penalty amount directly to the ATO. If the company goes into administration or liquidation within 6 months after the company makes a payment to the ATO then that payment may be a preference and recoverable from the ATO by a liquidator. In those circumstances the legislation requires a director to indemnify the ATO for the preference, meaning that a director may effectively be paying twice. It is important to seek professional advice about how to comply with a DPN in order to avoid or manage such risk.
- A restructure of a company’s affairs achieved through a voluntary administration or small business restructuring plan may save a company’s business, as well as limiting a director’s exposure to personal liability under a non-lockdown DPN. Directors should be aware of and consider all options if a company appears at risk of insolvency.
Once a DPN has been issued, professional advice should be sought immediately.
Pointon Partners works with clients and their referring accountants in relation to DPN issues. We are also able to facilitate confidential, no-obligation referrals with a broad network of reputable administrators, small business restructuring practitioners and liquidators.
Please get in touch with Pointon Partners’ disputes or business recovery & insolvency lawyers with any queries regarding this article.
If you are facing a similar issue, see our page on ATO disputes.
Liquidators given Court’s approval to compromise judgment debts
In the recent decision of Sheahan, in the matter of BCI Finances Pty Limited (in liq) [2018] FCA 1499, Justice White of the Federal Court approved the entry by liquidators into an agreement compromising the debts owed to companies to which they were appointed. The case serves as a useful restatement of the requirements of section 477(2A) & (2B) of the Corporations Act 2001.
Background
The plaintiffs in Sheahan were the joint and several liquidators of four companies (Liquidated Companies). In 2015, the liquidators caused the Liquidated Companies to commence proceedings against former directors for alleged breaches of their duties, as well as a number of associated entities and financial institutions.
The Liquidated Companies were successful against all but two of the respondents, with further hearings determining that the aggregate amount which could be recovered pursuant to the judgments was over $110 million.
Appeals by the unsuccessful respondents and cross appeals by the Liquidated Companies were heard over four days in August 2018. The Full Federal Court was reserved in its judgment at the time of the application in Sheahan. The parties to the appeals proceedings agreed to resolve the matters in dispute for significant undisclosed payments to each of the Liquidated Companies.
Powers of a liquidator to compromise debts
Section 477(1)(d) of the Corporations Act allows the liquidator of a company to compromise any debts owed to the company and give a complete discharge in respect of such debt. This power is subject to the approval of the Court, the committee of inspection, or the company’s creditors, where the amount is greater than $20,000 pursuant to s 477(2A) and where the agreement may result in a party’s obligations extending for more than 3 months pursuant to s 477(2B).
The liquidators in Sheahan conducted concurrent creditors’ meetings for each of the Liquidated Companies, where the creditors resolved pursuant to s 477(2B) to approve the liquidators entering into the proposed settlement agreement.
On the day before the agreement was to be signed, the other parties informed the liquidators that they would not proceed unless the agreement was also approved pursuant to s 477(2A). As a meeting of creditors was not scheduled to grant such approval until a month later, the liquidators urgently brought the application before the Court.
Matters taken into account by the Court in relation to s 477(2A)
White J emphasised that the Court will not simply rubber stamp any matters put forward by a liquidator and that approval does not equate to the Court’s endorsement of a proposed compromise. The approval is instead a permission for liquidators to exercise their own commercial judgment, once the Court is satisfied that there is no sound reason to intervene.
There were a number of matters which indicated to White J that it was appropriate for the Court to grant approval in the circumstances:
- The creditors of each of the Liquidated Companies had already given approval to the proposed agreement pursuant to s 477(2B) and had informally indicated their willingness to give approval pursuant to s 477(2A).
- Despite being informed of the hearing, none of the creditors sought to be heard by the Court.
- The number of creditors was quite limited and in all matters the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation was either the only creditor, or by far the largest of the creditors. Representatives from the Deputy Commissioner had been actively involved in the negotiation of the agreement.
- The liquidators took advice from solicitors and counsel, who advised in favour of entering into the agreement. The liquidators themselves were experienced and clearly deposed that they considered the compromise to be in the best interests of the Liquidated Companies’ creditors.
- Finally, the content of the agreement was detailed and complex, reflecting close consideration and attention by the parties. In other words, it was not hastily prepared such that it gave rise to any concerns from the Court.
Lessons for liquidators seeking to compromise debts
Where a liquidator appointed to a company seeks to reach a compromise in respect of the company’s debts, careful thought should be given to the application of s 477(2A) & (2B). In the context of time-sensitive negotiations with debtors, it may be impracticable to obtain the approval of the company’s creditors on short notice.
If the Court’s approval is sought to expedite matters, liquidators should seek legal advice as to the appropriateness of the settlement and ensure that the relevant agreement is carefully drafted, to avoid any appearance of an ill-considered compromise.
Pointon Partners have extensive experience in insolvency and restructuring matters and can assist at all stages of external administration.
Please contact Carl Millington or Ben Drysdale for advice.
How the Court assesses competing applications for substitution in winding up applications
Pointon Partners regularly appears for creditors at winding up applications in the Supreme Court of Victoria.
Creditors owed debts by companies subject to winding up proceedings commenced by others may appear at such hearings as ‘supporting creditors’.
Commonly, a company attempting to stave off being wound up, will source funds to pay the creditor who has brought the winding up application (the Petitioning Creditor). It is then up to the supporting creditors to decide whether they would like to be ‘substituted’ in place of the Petitioning Creditor, in accordance with section 465B of the Corporations Act 2001 (The Act).
One of the key benefits to a supporting creditor is the ability to seek orders that a liquidator of their choosing be appointed by the Court to administer the winding up of the debtor company.
Matters become complex where there are numerous supporting creditors, and competing applications for substitution are made.
A recent case in which Pointon Partners acted for a successful supporting creditor (In the matter of Erfanian Developments Pty Ltd [2018] VSC 342) sets out the relevant principles that the Court will consider when there are competing applications for substitution.
The Facts
An application was made to wind up the debtor company by an unpaid subcontractor, following the expiry of a statutory demand. Pointon Partners acted for another unpaid subcontractor.
Since the winding up application was commenced, the original petitioning creditor’s debt was acquired by a company carrying on a pre-insolvency consulting business (the Adviser) for its full face value together with costs. The Adviser had previously provided accounting services to the debtor company.
When it became clear that the debtor company would not oppose the winding up application, the Adviser indicated that it would be seeking the appointment of a liquidator chosen by it.
Given the Adviser’s pre-existing relationship with the debtor company and concerns over the commerciality of the Adviser’s purchase of the petitioning creditor’s debt, Pointon Partners were instructed to make a competing application for substitution and put forward alternative liquidators.
The Decision
Where there are competing applications for substitution, the Court has discretion to decide which application will be successful.
Judicial Registrar Hetyey’s decision set out the following relevant principles:
- There is a clear public policy in insolvent companies being wound up promptly, protecting existing and future creditors.
- The winding up procedure established by the Act should not be used as a debt collection mechanism, and the Court should not encourage the acquisition of an insolvent company’s debts for a collateral purposes.
- That in exercising its discretion, the Court may have regard to the attitude of the remaining supporting creditors.
In his decision, JR Hetyey indicated that he was perplexed as to the Adviser’s motive for acquiring the original petitioning creditor’s debt (for full value plus costs) where it was already owed money by the debtor company, winding up proceedings were on foot and numerous supporting creditors had appeared at the first return. This indicated a possible collateral motive of the Adviser (it is important to note, that JR Hetyey in his decision, and Pointon Partners in this article, make no concluded findings about the Adviser’s motives).
JR Hetyey sought the opinions of the remaining 9 supporting creditors, many of whom were also unpaid subcontractors of the debtor company. All 9 of the supporting creditors supporting the substitution application made by Pointon Partners’ subcontractor client, and the appointment of its nominated liquidators.
JR Hetyey noted that this preference should be afforded significant weight and ultimately made orders providing for the substitution of our client, the winding up of the debtor company, and costs.
Key Takeaways
The key takeaways from this update are:
- It is generally worth appearing as a supporting creditor – supporting creditors who are substituted avoid the cost of filing fees and professional costs associated with preparing the initiating documents. Supporting creditors who appear are generally awarded costs.
- Where competing applications for substitution are made the Court will consider the circumstances of the parties seeking to be substituted. Where there is or appears to be evidence of a creditor acting in furtherance of a collateral purpose (whether that be debt collection or control of the liquidation), the Court may prefer the competing creditor’s application.
- Supporting creditors’ representatives should discuss what is in the best interests of the companies’ creditors prior to the hearing of a winding up application, to ensure the body of creditors’ views are put to the Court before orders are made.
Please contact Nicholas McCarthy or Carl Millington with any query in relation to the above.
Ipso Facto Amendments: Do they apply to existing contracts?
The Government says the amendments apply only to contracts entered into after commencement. But what does the Bill say?
The proposed Ipso Facto amendments[1] impose a stay on the enforcement of contractual rights arising by reason of:
(a) an application or entry into a compromise or arrangement under Part 5.1;
(b) appointment of a managing controller over the whole of a corporations property; or
(c) a company coming under administration.
Other updates will consider the scope of the amendments. This update considers whether the amendments relate to existing contracts.
At first glance the position seems clear. The Explanatory Memorandum [2] says the amendments only apply to rights under contracts, agreements or arrangements entered into after commencement. The Senate Committee Report[3] noted the statement in the Explanatory Memorandum, considered various submissions regarding application to existing contracts and recommended the Bill be passed without amendment.
But is that what the Bill says?
Schedule 1 Part 2 item 17 of the Bill reads:
“The amendments made by this Part apply in relation to rights arising under contracts, agreements or arrangements entered into at or after the commencement of this Part.”
The phrase “at or after” commencement is ambiguous compared with the more usual “on or after”. Contracts entered into as at a particular date would ordinarily include contracts entered into prior to that date. Is that what is intended by “at” in this context?
A review of prior Corporations Act transitional provisions in Chapter 10 discloses frequent use of the phrase “on or after” in relation to date. However there appears to be no prior use of the phrase “at or after” in Chapter 10.
The phrase “before, at or after” is occasionally used[4] and inclusion of the word “before” removes ambiguity in those cases.
In two Parts of Chapter 10 reference is made to a status applicable at a particular time, which may have come into effect prior to that time:
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- Part 10.23 – Transitional Provisions Relating to the Clean Energy Legislation (Carbon Tax Repeal) Act 2014
s.1544 – “This section applies if, as at the end of the designated carbon unit day, an Australian financial services licence is subject to a condition ….”
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- Part 10.25 – Transitional Provisions relating to the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations)
s.1553(3) “ … a person … is not taken to be registered as a liquidator … on the commencement day if, at the beginning of that day:
(a) the person is an insolvent under administration; or
(b) the person is dead”
A Court could have to determine the issue if an Administrator asserted that the exercise of a right was stayed under a contract entered into prior to commencement. In doing so the Court would take into account the intention set out in the Explanatory Memorandum.
But why should Parliament use a novel ambiguous phrase and create uncertainty if it has a clear intention.
If it is intended that the Ipso Facto amendments will apply only to contracts entered into on or after commencement then the Bill should be amended to say so.
If you wish to seek advice in relation to these matters, please contact Andrew Cox on (03) 9614 7707.
[1] Treasury Laws Amendment (2017 Enterprise Incentives No.2) Bill 2017 (“the Bill”); Schedule 1 Part 2.
[2] at 2.99.
[3] Senate Economics Legislation Committee, August 2017 at 2.56-2.16 and 2.78.
[4] s.1501, s.1516, s.1533.
Going behind a judgement debt in bankruptcy proceedings
Often, bankruptcy proceedings will be based on a judgement debt. In such proceedings, the Bankruptcy Court must satisfy itself that the debt being claimed by the petitioning creditor is truly owing, and often the petitioning creditor will rely on the judgement debt as proof of this.
The High Court of Australia recently confirmed that a Bankruptcy Court is not bound to accept a judgement debt as conclusive, and has discretion to “go behind” a judgement debt, even if the judgment debt was obtained after a contested hearing.
In Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28, the High Court discussed the Bankruptcy Court’s obligation to satisfy itself that a judgement debt being relied upon by the petitioning creditor in a bankruptcy hearing, is in fact truly owing.
In this case, the plaintiff, Ramsay, commenced NSW Supreme Court proceedings against Mr Compton. Mr Compton engaged a solicitor and defended the proceeding. The quantum of the debt was not put as an issue before the Court at that time. The Court found in favour of Ramsay, and entered judgement against Mr Compton in the amount of $9.8 million. Mr Compton did not appeal this judgement.
After issuing a Bankruptcy Notice, with which Mr Compton failed to comply, Ramsay commenced bankruptcy proceedings to enforce the judgement debt. In the bankruptcy proceeding, Mr Compton requested that the Bankruptcy Court “go behind” the judgement to satisfy itself that the debt was actually owing to Ramsay. Ramsay’s solicitor conceded that it was an “open question” as to whether the debt, as calculated by Ramsay with respect to offsets and rebates was factually correct. As commonly occurs, the judge accepted the judgement debt as satisfactory proof of the debt owed by Mr Compton.
Mr Compton appealed this decision, arguing that the concession made by Ramsay as to the question of the debt calculation meant that the Bankruptcy Court could not be satisfied that the debt was truly owing, as required by section 52 of the Bankruptcy Act 1996 (Cth).
On appeal, the Full Court of the Federal Court, and subsequently, the High Court found that as there was a question in relation to the calculation of the debt, the judgement from the Supreme Court was not sufficient proof that the debt as claimed by Ramsay was in fact owing by Mr Compton.
What does this mean for you?
This case shows that in bankruptcy proceedings, a judgement debt from another Court may not be sufficient to satisfy the Bankruptcy Court that the debt being claimed is truly due and payable.
If you can show that there is a question as to whether the debt being claimed is truly owing, notwithstanding that there may be a judgement debt against you in that amount, the Bankruptcy Court cannot simply accept the judgement debt as proof of debt, and must go behind the judgement to satisfy itself that the claimed debt is truly owing.
If you have received a Bankruptcy Notice or Creditor’s Petition, and dispute that the debt being claimed is actually owing, please do not hesitate to contact our office on 03 9614 7707 with any queries or to discuss.
New Safe Harbour Provisions – Directors’ protection in insolvent trading situations
Australia’s insolvent trading laws are set to be drastically altered by the Treasury Laws Amendment (2017 Enterprise Incentives No. 2) Bill 2017 (Bill), which was passed by the senate on 11 September 2017.
The imposition of personal liability on company directors for company debts in insolvent trading circumstances has historically been criticised as a significant factor in a director’s decision to seek the appointment of a voluntary administrator, even in circumstances where the company may have good prospects of a successful restructure or turn around.
The Bill, among other things, establishes a safe harbour for company directors against the imposition of personal liability for insolvent trading under section 588G of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Act) in certain circumstances.
Operation of Safe Harbour Provision
A new clause 588GA will be inserted into the Act which sets out that a director will not be personally liable for debts incurred by the company while the company was insolvent, where it can be shown that:
- The Directors were taking or developing a course of action that was reasonably likely to achieve a better outcome for the company than could be achieved by putting the company in administration or liquidation; and
- The debts were incurred directly or indirectly in connection with this course of action.
The protection will apply from the time that a director, after beginning to suspect that the company may face a solvency issue, starts to develop a course of action and will cease if the course of action is not acted upon in a reasonable time, where the director or company stops taking this course of action or where the course of action stops being reasonably likely to achieve a better outcome than an immediate formal appointment.
In determining whether a course of action is reasonably likely to lead to a better result, regard may be had to (inter alia) whether the director properly informed himself of the company’s financial position, whether the director is developing or implementing a plan for restructuring the company to improve its financial position or whether the director has engaged a suitably qualified person to provide advice in respect of a restructure.
The question of who is a suitably qualified advisor will be assessed on a case by case basis having regard to the nature, size, complexity and financial position of the company and the independence, experience, professional qualifications and professional memberships of the advisor.
Even if it eventuates that the Company is unable to turn-around and becomes subject to a formal insolvency process, the directors will still have the benefit of the safe harbour provision, subject to compliance with certain obligations.
Limitations on Safe Harbour
The safe harbour carve out cannot be relied upon by a director in circumstances where the company failed to maintain proper books and records, failed to pay employee entitlements when they fell due or failed to file documents as required by taxation laws, and such failure was not in substantial compliance with these general requirements, or there was more than one failure in the preceding 12 months.
Importantly, this protection does not extend beyond the civil liability espoused in section 588G of the Act, and a director will still be liable for a breach of directors’ duties or failing to comply with any applicable continuous disclosure obligations.
Looking Forward
The operation of the safe harbour will drastically change the way that directors approach a company’s solvency issues. These changes will encourage directors to give consideration as to how they can attempt to restructure or turnaround the company without the concern of being held personally liable for company debts incurred at or after this time.
Pointon Partners has a number of experienced and qualified lawyers in the insolvency, restructuring and turn around space. If you have any queries as to the operation of the safe harbour or wish to discuss undertaking a restructure or turn around, please contact Michael Bishop or Daniel Rathner of our office on (03) 9614 7707.
Court Of Appeal Examines What Constitutes A Supporting Affidavit In An Application To Set Aside A Statutory Demand
In the recent case of Imagebuild Group Pty Ltd v Fokust Pty Ltd [2017] VSCA 131, the Court of Appeal considered whether a ‘supporting affidavit’ had been sworn, served and filed within the time limit prescribed by section 459G of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (“Act”).
On 10 February 2017, Fokust Pty Ltd sent Imagebuild Group Pty Ltd (Imagebuild) a statutory demand in relation to a judgment debt. Upon receipt of the demand Imagebuild had 21 days to pay the debt or apply to court to have the statutory demand set aside. Pursuant to section 449G of the Act any application would need to be supported by an affidavit, served within the 21 day period, setting out why the statutory demand should be set aside.
On 3 March 2017, Imagebuild commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court seeking an order that the statutory demand be set aside. Accompanying the originating process was an affidavit sworn by the practice manager of Imagebuild’s solicitor (the Affidavit). The Affidavit exhibited an unsworn affidavit by Imagebuild’s director setting out the grounds upon which the statutory demand should be set aside. The Affidavit also explained that the director of Imagebuild was not in a position to swear the affidavit until 6 March 2017, being 3 days after the expiry of the 21 day period.
At issue was whether the Affidavit constituted a supporting affidavit for the purposes of s459G of the Act.
The Supreme Court found that although the Affidavit explained why a supporting affidavit had not been sworn, filed and served within the twenty one day period, it was of itself not a supporting affidavit for the purposes of the Act. The Supreme Court accordingly declined to set aside the statutory demand.
Imagebuild appealed to the Court of Appeal.
Decision on appeal
It was accepted by the parties that an affidavit cannot be a supporting affidavit under section 459G if its effect is to state that a supporting affidavit will be sworn in the future. Counsel of Imagebuild argued that the Affidavit went further than this and sufficiently raised the matters to be relied upon in making the application to set aside the statutory demand (primarily because the director’s proposed affidavit was exhibited to the Affidavit).
Despite the above submissions, the Court of Appeal echoed the Supreme Court’s reasoning and held that the Affidavit was not a ‘supporting affidavit’ pursuant to section 459G. Whelan JA noted that “An affidavit filed and served within the specified time which asserts that a supporting affidavit will be sworn, or may be sworn, but not within time, and which explains the delay, is not itself a supporting affidavit.” Whelan JA added that the Affidavit could have constituted a supporting affidavit if it had actually verified the contents of the as yet unsworn affidavit of the Director of Imagebuild.
The case serves as a reminder of the importance of responding to statutory demands in a timely manner and complying strictly with the requirements of the Act.
For more information or to discuss any of the above, please contact us on (03) 9614 7707.
Overview of the Insolvency Practice Schedule – enhancing the rights of a creditor in an external administration
Introduction
The Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations) Schedule (Schedule), which was introduced as a schedule to the Corporations Act 2001(Cth) (Act) in February 2016, will become fully operative in the next few months.
As at 1 March 2017, a portion of this schedule has become operative, primarily in relation to new registration, insurance and disclosure requirements for liquidators.
Part 3 of the Schedule will become operative on 1 September 2017, and will increase the role of the creditors in the in the conduct of an external administration of a debtor company by granting the creditors increased rights and powers which can be exercised against an external administrator who has been appointed in a liquidation, administration or under a Deed of Company Arrangement (External Administrator).
Set out below are some of the key powers afforded to creditors in an external administration which come into effect on 1 September 2017:
- Right to request information – s70-40 and s70-45
Creditors of the company will be able to request that the External Administrator provide information, produce a document or provide a report in respect of a matter relating to the external administration. This power can be exercised by an individual creditor, or by creditors as a whole.
The External Administrator will generally be required to comply with such a request within 5 business days, unless:
(a) the information, report or document is not relevant to the external administration;
(b) in complying with the request the administrator would breach his or her duties in the external administration; or
(c) it would otherwise be unreasonable for the External Administrator to comply with the request.
Further, in circumstances where a liquidator has been appointed to the company, the Insolvency Practice Rules (Corporations) 2016 (Rules) will require the liquidator to advise the creditors as to the likelihood of creditors receiving a dividend in the winding up within three months from the commencement of the liquidation.
These provisions establish a process for creditors to obtain information relevant to the external administration and as to their potential return in the winding up relatively early on in the external administration.
- Committees of Inspection – s80-15 to s80-70
All creditor’s committees will be known as “Committees of Inspection”.
Creditors will be afforded the power to resolve that a committee of inspection be formed to monitor and assist with the external administration process. The creditors can appoint and remove members of the committee of inspection by resolution, or (subject to some exceptions as set out in the Rules) as of right, where a creditor, or a group of creditors collectively, represent at least 10% of the outstanding company debt.
The committee of inspection can advise and assist the External Administrator, monitor the conduct of the administration and give directions to the External Administrator to which the External Administrator must have regard. While the External Administrator is not required to comply with such a direction, he or she will be required to provide the committee with the reasons for non-compliance.
Members of the committee may also seek specialist advice in respect of the conduct of the external administration, with the consent of the External Administrator or the Court.
The establishment of and powers granted to the committee of inspection may allow creditors greater oversight of and participation in the external administration.
- Application for Court Inspection – s90-10 to s90-20
The Schedule also appears to redefine the basis upon which a creditor can request Court review of the external administration, with a creditor being able to apply to the Court to make an inquiry into the external administration if the creditor has concerns as to the manner in which the administration is being conducted.
In making such an inquiry, the Court will have regard to whether the External Administrator is faithfully performing his or her duties, whether any action by or inaction of an External Administrator complies with the requirements of the Act, the Schedule and the Rules, or whether a party has suffered or is likely to suffer loss or damage due to such action or inaction.
The Court has broad powers to make orders in respect of such an inquiry, including determining any question arising in the external administration, removing the external administrator, or making orders for remuneration in favour of the company or its creditors.
Conclusion
On and from 1 September 2017, the above provisions of the Schedule will become operative and accordingly creditors will have extra powers at their disposal in terms of their participation in external administrations.
If you are a creditor in an external administration and have any queries about your rights, powers or functions in participating in the external administration please do not hesitate to contact us on (03) 9614 7707 with any queries.
How an $8 PPSR security registration could have saved $50m of GE money
A major Personal Properties Security Act (PPSA) ruling in Forge Group Power Pty Limited (in liquidation)(receivers and managers appointed) (Forge) v General Electric International Inc (General Electric) [2016] NSWSC 52 has highlighted for those involved in leasing, renting, hiring or otherwise lending assets, the importance of registering their security interest in those assets.
The PPSA
The PPSA commenced operation on 30 January 2012 and introduced a new national code for determining priorities between parties holding security interests in personal property. The PPSA establishes a Personal Property Securites Register (PPSR), on which security interests can be “perfected” by registering an instrument called a financing statement. The PPSA expands the concept of security interests by including the interest of a lessor of goods under a PPS lease which, as in this case, is a lease of goods for more than a year.
The case
In March 2013, General Electric leased four mobile turbine generators (Turbines), described as “power stations on wheels”, to Forge.
Shortly after the Turbines had been delivered to Forge’s premises at Port Hedland, Forge went into voluntary administration and a month later, into liquidation.
General Electric had not registered an interest in the Turbines on the PPSR.
The Court held that the leasing arrangement between Forge and General Electric was a PPS lease, meaning that General Electric’s interest in the Turbines was a security interest capable of being registered on the PPSR to secure its interest in priority to others.
Forge’s liquidators sought declarations that under s 267(2) of the PPSA, the interest of General Electric in the Turbines had vested in Forge immediately before their appointment of administrators, and that their right or title to, or interest in, the Turbines was superior to that of General Electric.
The Court held in Forge’s favour, allowing the $50m worth of assets to be sold; the proceeds being utilised for Forge’s creditors.
Significance
The failure of General Electric to register their security interest in the assets and pay the requisite $8 registration fee led to their loss of $50m in assets.
When liquidators, receivers or administrators are appointed to a company, security priority interests in assets can be called into question. Clients who own assets that are rented, leased, borrowed or otherwise held offsite by a third party should turn their minds to whether the arrangement is correctly documented, as well as to whether a security interest in those assets should be registered on the PPSR to protect their interest in priority to others.
If you have any queries regarding the above please contact Nicholas Brand or Ben Drysdale of our office on (03) 9614 7707.