Pointon Partners

Balancing the Books: The Importance of Proper “Paper” Trails for Calculation, Claiming and Audit Purposes

Taxpayers should be reminded of keeping up to date and accurate records of their assets, especially when those assets are disposed of. Not only is it an offence to fail to keep accurate records, but keeping these records will assist in calculating your income tax for the financial year as well as potentially off-setting the potential Capital Gains you make which will be relevant in calculating your income. Contemporaneous records are important for claiming deductions, compliance and audit purposes. Contemporaneous records are the strongest evidence in any audit or litigious tax dispute This article will cover three issues that our Taxation Team often encounter and taxpayers should take account of;

  1. Record Keeping for Capital Gains Tax and the Consequences for failure to do so;
  2. The need for proper documentation for loans to be Division 7A compliant; and
  3. Ensuring proper documentation of loan agreements for loans to be recoverable.

Record Keeping for CGT Purposes

What Records must you Keep?

Section 121.20 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 prescribes the records you must keep for every transaction, act, event or circumstances which would reasonably lead to a CGT event. These can/may potentially include:

These records are essential insofar as they will assist you in accurately calculating your assessable income and off-setting any Capital Gains made on other assets you dispose of.

Cost Base

In disposing of your assets, the cost base is an important concept to assess whether you made a capital gains on your asset. Your cost base will usually consist of 5 elements including:

In calculating whether you made a capital gain, the value you receive for disposing of the asset must be offset by the cost base. Any capital losses incurred can be offset against any future capital gains you make.

Example:
Jeffrey purchases a property in 2005 with plans to renovate it and sell later. The following will be relevant for his CGT records.·
Purchase Price:
$500,000·Maintenance Cost: $10,000·

Conveyancing Cost: $5,000·

Renovation Cost: $50,000

The total cost base of the property is $565,000. Jeffrey sells his property in 2007 for $1,000,000. Jeffrey has made a capital gain of $435,000.

How long must you keep records for and consequences of not doing so?

You must keep records until the end of 5 years of the relevant CGT event happening. You must do so regardless of whether you made a capital gain or loss. Failure to do so will result in a fine of 20 penalty units ($3,846.20).

  1. Division 7A Compliance

In the context of division 7A, record keeping is essential if taxpayers want to avoid liability for loans made to them by private companies. Under division 7A, loans that are not covered by an exception are to be treated as dividends meaning that they will be part of your assessable income. It must be noted that under the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, the meaning of loan is wide and includes:

Further to this, a loan will be treated as a divided if:

To ensure that any loans made to shareholders of a private company are not dividends and taxable, taxpayers must ensure that loans made to them are division 7A compliant. This necessarily involves the loan to meet the following requirements:

  1. Debt Recovery and Capital Losses

Further to this, proper documentation of loans should also be observed given the implications related to recovery of debts. Usually, debts are recoverable within 6 years from which a cause of action accrues. This occurs when the debt becomes due and payable. Claims outside of the 6 year period are statute barred and unrecoverable. However different implications arise between written and unwritten contracts.

In the case of written loans, the 6 year period starts when the debt becomes due and payable. For example, when an instalment for a debt is due. In the case of unwritten agreements, the court in Young v Queensland Trustees outlined that it is implied that a loan is immediately payable from the moment the loan was provided. This means that the 6 year period starts from when the money for the loan is provider to the borrower.

There are also important implications in regard to whether the loan is a personal or business loan in the circumstances the loan is unrecoverable. In the case of a business loan, at the time when the loan is unrecoverable and you make a loss on this, this is considered to be a capital loss and may be offset against any future capital gains you make. However any capital losses you make through a personal loan must be disregarded and cannot be used to offset any capital gains you make.

Conclusion

For all of the above reasons, please keep all appropriate documentation for these purposes and for transactions between related parties please ensure that you credit the current document to reflect the transaction. If cannot be emphasised how important this is should an audit or dispute arise in the future.

If you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact Tony Pointon and Andrew Pointon

Owies v JJE Nominees: The trustees consideration of beneficiaries in income distributions and the written reasons conundrum – Further when is a trustee not acting in the best interests of the beneficiaries and can be replaced by the Court

The landmark Victorian Supreme Court appeal case of Owies v JJE Nominees Pty Ltd  (2022) VSCA 142 (Owies) has highlighted  issues relating to the exercise of the power of trustees in discretionary trusts to allocate trust income  with absolute discretion and the duty of the trustee to consider beneficiaries. In our view the law has not been changed by Owies, but the requirement to consider beneficiaries has been highlighted.

Note that most ( almost all ) family discretionary trust deeds do not provide for any beneficiary to have a right to income when the trustee does not exercise a discretion to  distribute as was the case in the Owies trust deed . A normal family discretionary trust Deed will only grant a default right to a beneficiary to capital upon the eventual winding up of the trust. In most instances the Trust Deed will mean that the Trustee retains the income itself when it does not make a decision to distribute. This is normally overcome by the trustee making an income making decision each year and often with a default beneficiary or beneficiaries in the end of year trust distribution minute itself.

Regardless of the odd facts in Owies, the beneficiaries of a trust do need to be considered by the trustee with good faith and genuine consideration regardless of there not being an entitlement to certain beneficiaries when the trustee does not make a decision

Where the beneficiaries have been considered then the Court will only interfere with an income determination when the powers have been exercised without good faith and real and genuine consideration.

The onus is on the beneficiaries to prove that the discretionary power was not exercised in good faith, upon real and genuine consideration and was not in accordance with the purposes of the power for which it was conferred. Note that if the beneficiary is successful in proving its case then the decision of the trustee will become voidable but not void. The beneficiaries will need to further seek at trial the relief they seek from the Court. The Court will not have power to create an order as to whom and how much the income should be distributed without acting upon the beneficiaries’ application. (Owies – para 148).

The highlighted duty to consider these beneficiaries must be read in conjunction with what reasons should be reduced to writing by the trustees to show that they have considered this. The exercise of a discretion by a trustee which does not set out reasons will not be reviewed by a Court when a trustee had not disclosed its reasons as the Court has no power to assess their adequacy.( Karger v Paul (1984) VR 161 , 165-6 ( (McGarvie J ) ) and note that this is long established principle which is recited in the Owies decision.

The absence of written reasons does not however restrict the fact that the trustee must have given the matter properly informed consideration and then exercise real and genuine consideration in its decision. This is described below in the earlier decisions of Re Londonderry Settlement and Re Hay’s Settlement which are referred to in the Owies decision and discussed below. In particular, it should be noted that the primary decision of which beneficiaries and of what class the Trustee must be considering and for the unusual Owies facts it was clearly the default beneficiaries. Most Trustees of discretionary trusts will have no such specific class when making their income distribution resolution at the end of a financial year. The consideration of the takers in default of the capital on vesting will not be a correct substitution.

Genuine consideration it should be noted will require more than just following last year’s distribution as this may indicate no genuine consideration.

The other unusual fact compared to many family discretionary trust arrangements is that one should consider with Owies that the Trust was established by the parents of the default beneficiaries. The parents were continually given large distributions throughout the lifespan of the trust. These facts should be remembered when the Court made its final decision on whether good faith and genuine consideration was being exercised in both the income distribution decision and also whether the Trustee should be removed.

This article will cover:

Facts

As a refresher, the Owies Family Trust consisted of John and Eva who were general beneficiaries and their children, Michael, Deborah and Paul who were the primary beneficiaries of the trust. From 30 June 2011 to 30 June 2018, the corporate trustee distributed the income of the trust in the following manner:

In 2019, 100% of the income was given to John, and Deborah received the South Yarra trust property. Deborah and Paul had taken issue with the way the trust income was distributed given that from 2011 to 2018, they did not receive any of the trust’s income. As a result, they commenced legal action against the corporate trustee and Michael who at the time was the director of the corporate trustee along with Mr Sampson.

Trustee’s Reasons for Distribution

Re Hay’s Settlement provides the steps that trustees must go through when exercising their discretionary powers. First, where there is a class of beneficiaries identified by the trust deed, the trustee must consider which persons or classes of persons are within the definition of this class. Second, in relation to the possible claimants, they must consider whether each distribution/grant is appropriate. Further, this consideration must also be made in good faith. A failure to follow this may invalidate the distribution and the court may set it aside.

This case highlights the evidential issues that beneficiaries of a discretionary trust have in applying to set aside the exercise of a trustee’s power. It is established law that trustees of a discretionary trust are not required to give reasons when they exercise their powers under the trust. The rationale for this is provided in Re Londonderry’s Settlement with the main reason being that any reasons provided may embitter relations between beneficiaries and trustees alike and subject trustees to embarrassment, arguments and quarrels, especially in the context of family trusts.

Unless the trustee provides the reasons voluntarily, the courts cannot examine them and the onus is on the beneficiaries to prove that the discretionary power was not exercised in good faith, upon real and genuine consideration and was not in accordance with the purposes of the power for which it was conferred as noted in Karger. Further, per Curwen v Vanbreck, no adverse inferences may be drawn from the trustees’ refusal to provide reasons.

To prove that a trustee did not exercise their discretionary powers in accordance with the rules set out in Re Hay’s can only be determined through the conduct of the trustee. The onus was satisfied here despite the corporate trustee’s refusal to provide reasons for their distributions. The following reasons were relevant in establishing a lack of real and genuine consideration:

Hence, despite the difficulties in proving that a trustee’s distributions are invalid when they fail to provide reasons for such distributions, the conduct of the trustee in exercising its discretion may provide a valid means for beneficiaries to challenge the distributions as exercised in bad faith or wholly lacking real and genuine consideration.

It is further worth noting the  grounds whereby a trustees decision may be questioned by a Court  as stated by  the High Court  in the Attorney – General ( Cth) v Breckler (1999) 197 CLR 83 ( Breckler) which is stated in Owies at para 87 :

Where a trustee exercises a discretion it may be impugned on a number of different bases such as that it was exercised in bad faith , arbitrarily , capriciously , wantonly , irresponsibly, mischievously ,or irrelevantly to any sensible expectation of the settlor, or without giving a real or genuine consideration to the exercise of the discretion. The exercise of a discretion by the trustees cannot of course be impugned upon the basis that their discretion was unfair, unreasonable, or unwise. Where a discretion is expressed to be absolute it may be that bad faith needs to be shown. The soundness of the exercise of a discretion can be examined where the reasons have been given, but the test is not fairness or reasonableness.

Clause 3(ii) – Default Beneficiaries

Attention should also be drawn to the way the income clause of the trust was framed. In particular, clause 3(ii) read with clause 4 acknowledges that any of the income that is not used for charitable purposes or for the benefit of the General Beneficiaries which include the parents and children, the Trustees will hold the income on trust for the children in equal shares.

Clause 3

(ii) the Trustees shall hold so much of the income of the Trust Fund as the Trustees shall not pay apply or set aside pursuant to the powers contained in paragraph (i) of this Clause in trust for the persons successively described in paragraphs (a) (b) and (c) of Clause 4 hereof as though each date on which such income becomes subject to the Trusts hereof were the Vesting Day specified in the Schedule

Clause 4

As from the Vesting Day the Trustees shall stand possessed of the Trust Fund and the income thereof in trust for such charitable purposes and/or for such of the General Beneficiaries for such interests and in such proportions and for one to the exclusion of the other or others as the Trustees may with the consent of the Guardian by instrument in writing revocable or irrevocable before the Vesting Day appoint PROVIDED ALWAYS that the Trustees shall not without such consent revoke any revocable appointment AND PROVIDED FURTHER that if there is no Guardian alive the Trustees shall have no such power of appointment and in default of and subject to any such appointment in trust –

(a) for such of the Primary Beneficiaries as shall be living on the Vesting Day and attain the age of twenty-one years as tenants-in-common in equal shares absolutely PROVIDED ALWAYS that the children (if any) who shall be living on the Vesting Day of any Primary Beneficiary who dies before the Vesting Day (and the descendants of any of such children or the children of such children who dies before the Vesting Day) shall take as tenants-in-common a share calculated per stirpes which such deceased Primary Beneficiary would have received had he or she survived to the Vesting Day;

(b) if in the events which happen or if for any reason whatsoever any part or parts of the Trust Fund shall not be effectively or validly disposed of by the trusts declared by this Deed or by any Deed from time to time in force varying altering or adding to such trusts the Trustees shall stand possessed of such part or parts of the Trust Fund as aforesaid for the statutory next of kin (excluding the Settlor) who are according to law next of kin of the Guardian first named in the Schedule who are living when the same falls or fall into possession as tenants-in-common in equal shares absolutely and if there shall be no such next of kin upon trust for such charitable purposes as the Trustees may determine any resulting trust to the Settlor being hereby expressly negatived;

…

What this means is that in default of appointment of income or a resolution to accumulate, the deed provided that the net income will be held on trust for each Michael, Deborah and Paul in equal shares. It must be acknowledged that modern trust instruments rarely to never incorporate default beneficiaries. Rather, in most cases the discretionary trust deed will only grant a default right to the trust’s assets in the event of the winding up of the trust. As a result, the manner in which the trust was created is highly unusual.

Removal of the Trustee

In deciding to remove a trustee from their position, the Court noted the following passage from Miller v Cameron (1936) 54 CLR 572:

The jurisdiction to remove a trustee is exercised with a view to the interests of the beneficiaries, to the security of the trust property and to an efficient and satisfactory execution of the trusts and a faithful and sound exercise of the powers conferred upon the trustee. In deciding to remove a trustee the Court forms a judgement based upon considerations, possibly large in number and varied in character, which combine to show that the welfare of the beneficiaries is opposed to his continued occupation to the office.

Here, the continued management of the trust by the corporate trustee was opposed to the welfare of the beneficiaries, Deborah and Paul. The court found that the trustee has over a number of years failed to act impartially and failed to give real and genuine consideration to the interests of Deborah and Paul as seen through the failure of the trustee to make any distributions to Deborah and Paul from 2011 to 2018. The following reasons provided demonstrated how the continual management of the trust by the corporate trustee was opposed to the interests of Deborah and Paul.

The relationship between the primary beneficiaries and directors of the corporate trustee were “irreconcilably damaged”. For example, although the trial judge found that Mr Sampson had acted in good faith in regard to the invalid variations, this was no basis to conclude that he would act in good faith in the future. The court found that Mr Sampson had continually aligned himself with John, Eva and Michael. This is shown in the December 2017 proposal which reflected the wishes of the parents for Michael to retain his control of the trust. Additionally, he had complied with Eva’s instructions not to provide trust documents to Paul even though he knew that Paul was entitled to such documents. As a result, his discretion was constantly altered by the interests of the parents and Michael.

The relationship with Michael and the remaining primary beneficiaries was even more strained. The court said the silent call made to Deborah by Michael because he did not believe she had been in hospital was quoted to be “disturbing and reveals a high degree of suspicion”. In conjunction with the fact that the trust was principally for the benefit of Michael, Eva and Paul, it was contrary to the welfare of the primary beneficiaries that Michael and Mr Sampson remain in control given their relationship with the other primary beneficiaries. Hence, the trustee was removed on this basis.

Registration of Michael for Eva’s Shares

Another interesting point to note down was the observation made by the plurality at [31]. The court found that the 2017 variation made by Michael and Mr Sampson was invalid as Mr Sampson was not acting in his capacity as a validly appointed director. Prior to the variation being made on the 17 December 2017, Mr Sampson had been appointed by resolution made by John and by Michael who was acting in his capacity as attorney for Eva. The trial judge held that Michael was not registered for Eva’s shares in the corporate trustee and could not vote on her behalf in making Mr Sampson director. Resultantly, Mr Sampson was not validly appointed as a director. Note that this was corrected by a later director appointment procedure, but this is an interesting legal point.

Conclusion – Practical Considerations

A   The income distribution decision

Owies has highlighted the duty for a Trustee to make due enquiry of specific relevant beneficiaries if they do exist for that trust or more generally of beneficiaries where they do not. Owies has not been overly helpful in determining who are the relevant beneficiaries from the inevitable long list of beneficiaries in a discretionary trust deed as most trusts do not have a set of beneficiaries who are takers in default of income. You may start with the takers in default for the capital of the trust but you will be probably legally incorrect and a more studied view of the facts by the trustee is needed. Note that there may be none although the prior recipients of income are always worth consideration.

The Trustees should note the rule in Karger that the Court will only examine the Trustee’s reasons for an income distribution (or other decision) if and only if the Trustee has provided written reasons for it and therefore the Trustee should make all appropriate enquiries of the needs of beneficiaries but be very careful in writing any reasons for its decision. It is up to the Trustee to make the trust decision and not the Court.  The principles expressed in Karger have not been disturbed by Owies.

The key takeaways here are that reasonable enquires need to be made of the beneficiaries before deciding to distribute income, however by providing written reasons, the trustee will be opening up a potential avenue for redress by the beneficiaries should they be dissatisfied with the distribution as seen in this case.

Should the trustee provide written reasons for their distributions and even when they do not, they need to ensure that their reasons if analysed by a Court they would indicate that the powers of the trustee were exercised in good faith and in real and genuine consideration in accordance with the core beneficiaries of the trust. A failure to do so may open up an avenue of redress for beneficiaries regardless of the onus being upon the beneficiary to prove this.

Note that if a beneficiary does show that the trustee has made an unreasonable decision then it is important for the beneficiary to also show the Court where the distribution should have gone.

We note further that under trust law, the beneficiaries will be entitled to very little documentation from the trustee. All they will be entitled to is the trust deed and some trust account information. Litigation may allow further documentation to be discovered.

In accordance with the rules set out in Re Hay’s, the following is a useful procedure for a trustee to consider:

  1. If there is a class of beneficiaries, ensure that the individuals that can potentially receive the trust distributions are within the criteria of beneficiaries set out in the trust deed;
  2. Ensure that the grants to each beneficiary are appropriate. This step necessitates that a reasonable enquiry be made for each potential beneficiary; and
  3. Ensure that the power is being exercised in good faith and for the purposes as denoted by the trust deed.

Note that a similar procedure in respect of a capital distribution by a trustee would need to be followed in respect of potential capital entitled beneficiaries.

B The Court Decision to Remove the Trustee

We repeat the quoted positon above and note that in these facts the Court decided to remove the trustee:

“The jurisdiction to remove a trustee is exercised with a view to the interests of the beneficiaries, to the security of the trust property and to an efficient and satisfactory execution of the trusts and a faithful and sound exercise of the powers conferred upon the trustee. In deciding to remove a trustee the Court forms a judgement based upon considerations, possibly large in number and varied in character, which combine to show that the welfare of the beneficiaries is opposed to his continued occupation to the office.”

If you are acting as a trustee, or are an advisor to a trustee or are a beneficiary who believes has not been adequately allowed for in an income or capital distribution, you should carefully consider these issues.

If you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact Tony Pointon and Andrew Pointon.

The Three Silos for Tax-Efficient Business Restructuring

In the context of small businesses, a restructure can afford significant advantages ranging from decreased operational costs, increased efficiency and communication as well as simplifying management. Often these restructures involve the disposal of major assets which may incur CGT consequences for the business resulting in an inefficient restructure. In this regard, there are mechanisms available to businesses to reduce your tax liability for restructures. This article will discuss three groups of the most common exemptions our Taxation team uses to maximise the efficiency of business restructures including:

  1. Relief under Subdivision 152

152-A: Conditions for Relief

Subdivision 152 applies on the condition that a CGT event happens in relation to a CGT asset, the event results in a gain and commonly either:

Further to this, the CGT asset disposed of must be an active asset. This means that the asset must be used or held ready to use in the course of carrying on a business by you, an affiliate or an entity that is connected with you.

Once the above conditions are satisfied, you are afforded the suite of relief covered under subdivision 152 assuming you meet the requirements in each individual section.

The exemption subdivisions  can be used in any order that you choose . For example you can choose the 15 year exemption under 152 – B by itself. You may choose to rollover the gain under 152 – E because you do not wish to retire yet and the asset will have a cost base set back at the time of the original asset purchase together with its time of acquisition. Many combinations are possible.

The application of the provisions to assets used in the business by other controlled entities is important to also consider.

We now set out summary thoughts on the subdivisions :

152-B: 15 Year Exemption

This section enables an entity that meets the specified requirements to disregard all capital gains made on an active asset in relation to an individual’s retirement. This is a particularly appealing exemption due to the following:

As a result, this exemption is the most generous in subdivision 152 and is afforded priority over the other types of relief under the subdivision. The exemption applies to individuals on the following conditions:

Assuming that there is a company or trust, additional conditions apply in respect of the active assets being 80 per cent of the assets of the entity. As well as proving the basic conditions in 152-A and owning an active asset for 15 years, companies and trusts must also show that there is a significant individual present in the company or trust and either that significant individual was permanently incapacitated or the individual was over 55 and the disposal occurred in relation to their retirement.

152-C: 50% Reduction

Once the basic requirements in 152-A are satisfied, this exemption will apply. In contrast to 152-B, there is no requirement that there be a significant individual present.

Given that this reduction halves any capital gains made on an active asset, it also applies following the CGT discount in section 115. This effectively means that if you do not qualify for the exemption under 152-B, the capital gains you are liable for may be reduced to 25%. Unlike the discount afforded under 115, you do not need to hold the asset for 12 months.

152-D: Small Business Retirement Exemption

This section allows the taxpayer to disregard all or part of the capital gain made from a CGT asset. Although the wording of this provision acknowledges it is related to retirement purposes, there is no actual need for the taxpayer to retire. An individual who is say 30 may claim the exemption, assuming that they put it to their super. However there is a lifetime limit of $500,000. This exemption applies on the following:

Companies or trusts can choose to disregard the amount if:

Taxpayers over the age of 55 may claim the exemption without the need to put the claimed amounts into their super.

152-E: Rollover

Subdivision 152-E enables business owners to postpone the taxation of a capital gain, it does not exempt your capital gains unlike the other exemptions offered in section 152. Aside from meeting the requirement of a small business entity or net asset test seen above, although not explicitly stated, the application of this provision pivots on whether a replacement asset has been acquired by the business owner. The replacement asset must be acquired within the two year period after the capital gain is made. As a result, taxpayers may elect to apply this roll over even when they haven’t acquired a replacement asset yet.

It should be noted that if no mention of the capital gain is made on the tax return for that financial year, then implicitly the tax payer has chosen to apply the roll over relief. It is recommended that since taxpayers bear the onus in appealing the excessiveness of an amended assessment by the ATO, taxpayers should supply a supplementary document indicating that they have elected to receive the roll over relief under subdivision 152-E.

There are two circumstances that necessarily follow from a business electing the roll over relief:

In addition to the roll over relief, assuming the 15 year ownership exemption does not apply to your asset, business owners can also apply the other exemptions under section 152 and 115 to reduce the capital gain made after the roll-over is applied.

Example 1

James is the owner of a chain of bakeries whose aggregate turnover is always less than $10 million. He decides to dispose of some of his industrial ovens he bought 10 months ago and makes a capital gain of $4,500,000 on October 2023. As a result of this, James decides to open a new bakery location which costs him $500,000.

Since James is an individual and is an Australian citizen, he can elect to receive a 50% discount on his capital gains made under section 115. Further, James can also choose to receive an additional 50% discount on his capital gains made under subdivision 152-C. This brings the capital gains he made to $1,125,000. James then elects to roll-over this.

As CGT event J6 occurs as James has acquired a replacement asset, James’ capital gains on October 2025 for the sale of the industrial ovens in $625,000. If he is under the age of 55, he can claim $500,000 and puts that into his super. The capital gains he has to declare on that financial year is $125,000.

  1. Roll-Over under Subdivision 328-G

These provisions offer a much larger turnover of $10 mil to satisfy the small business entity test compared to the relief offered under the small business provisions of s 152.

Prior to the introduction of 328-G, roll-over relief was available in limited circumstances for business restructures from a trust to another identical trust or to a partnerships of trusts.

Separation of parts of the business is possible.

The splitting of assets to different trusts within the same family but controlled by different family members can be considered.

No rollover was available for a restructure that transfers business assets from a company or trust to a partnership of its existing shareholders or unitholders or the sole shareholder or unitholder.

Hence, this roll-over is particularly attractive if a company or trust wanting to transition to a sole trader or partnership of its existing shareholders or unitholders. Normally business risks need to be considered of course and the shareholders are preferably other companies or are trusts.

Interestingly where the provisions of safe harbour (discussed below) are not required to be met but all other criteria are met, the provisions can be considered for restructures prior to a capital raising as is set out in the example given in LCR 2016/3.

What is needed to satisfy the rollover?

The restructure must involve a small business or entities that are connected or affiliated with the small business.

It is necessary to note that since 1 July 2016, the threshold of a small business has been increased for a business with a turnover of $2 million for a financial year to $10 million. The restructure must also not change the ultimate economic ownership of the transferred assets.

This means that the individual/s who directly, indirectly or beneficially own the asset must not change. The assets transferred must be active assets, which will include CGT assets, trading stock, revenue assets or depreciating assets.

Note that real property may be an active asset when used in a business but it is not always so.  An asset that is leased to a connected entity or affiliate for use in its business may still be an active asset. It is the use of the asset in that entity’s business that will determine the active asset status of the asset.

Further in respect of shares as active assets, they may be active assets where they meet the 80% test (market value of the company active assets and financial instruments and cash make up at least 80% of the market value of the company assets. Note the definition of active assets is defined in section 152-40 for the purposes of this section and the extended definition is in section 152.40 (3).  Further, the transferor and transferee must meet residency requirements under 328-445 and each of those parties must elect to apply the roll-over.

Notably, the restructure must be a genuine restructure of an ongoing business. This is the most contentious part of proving that 328G applies given each restructure will be assessed on a case by case basis. The ITAA 1997 does not provide any guidance on what this means, however the explanatory memorandum and guidance provided by the Tax Office offers insight on what constitutes a genuine restructure and we discuss this below.

Further there must be no change in the ultimate economic ownership which is a concept relating to ultimate economic ownership and control rather than actual legal ownership and we discuss this below. Ownership is interest includes legal or equitable interest under section 118.130 in respect of property and also a share, option, right or similar interest issued by the company in respect of a share.

Ultimate Economic Ownership

The ultimate economic owners of the asset must remain unchanged following the transfer. The ultimate economic owners of an asset according to the exposure draft are the individuals who, directly or indirectly, beneficially own an asset. If there is more than one individual who is are the ultimate economic owners (E.g. A fixed trust), there is an additional requirement that each of those individual’s shares must be unchanged maintaining a proportionate ownership in the asset.

The situation is a bit more complicated for discretionary trusts given that the beneficiaries do not have an interest in the asset until the trustee exercises their discretion. The ITAA 1997 in s328- G provides for this in the context of family trusts where a transaction will not be taken to change the ultimate economic ownership of assets where immediately before or after the transaction took effect, the assets were included in the property of a discretionary trust that was a family trust and every individual who just before or just after the transfer took effect, had the ultimate economic ownership of the asset was a member of the family group of that trust. An operating family trust election is preferable for both trusts in our view.

What is a Genuine Restructure of an Ongoing Business?

Subdivision 328-G operates on the condition that the transaction, which involves the transfer of the asset, is part of a genuine restructure of an ongoing business and also meets the other criteria of section 328 – 430.

Whether a transaction is a genuine restructure of an ongoing business is a question of fact.

The requirements for the small business restructure rollover do also include a further provision of safe harbour under section 328 G Section 328 – 435 if:

In the event that the taxpayer does not satisfy the requirements in the safe harbour, the tax office has provided guidance on which transactions may constitute a genuine restructure of an ongoing business with ATO’s guidance provided under LCR 2016/3 that should be read in conjunction with LCR 2016/2 .
The primary consideration is whether the transaction is expected to deliver benefits to small business owners in respect of their efficient conduct of the business. The following are features which indicate that a transaction is part of a genuine restructure of an ongoing business:

Tax considerations are relevant considerations to an extent. LCR 2016/3 indicates that a business subject to significant tax rates may restructure their business such that a lower tax rate applies to them. However, where the restructure is significantly or wholly motivated by tax implications, then this would not be a genuine restructure of an ongoing business. For example a restructure intended to eliminate an impending or existing tax liability.

There are other factors which would indicate to the ATO that the restructure is not part of a genuine restructure. These include:

Example 2

Craig is the sole shareholder of Company X that wholly owns two businesses. Craig incorporates a new company, Company Y, and transfers all the active assets of the restaurants from Company X to Company Y.

Two years later Craig wants to retire soon and wants to leave his business to his two children. He effects a transfer of the two businesses to his two children.

Per the factors above, this is not a genuine restructure of an ongoing business. The restructure occurs during the course of Craig winding down his business and to transfer his wealth and assets between generations to his children. The safe harbour rule also does not apply as the transaction occurred within the three year period under s 328.435.

  1. Rollover under s 122A and B

These are the original rollovers and are used either alone or together to achieve the desired restructure. Subdivision 122A and B is applicable to restructures which involve the disposal or creation of assets by an individual, trustee or partner/s in a partnership to a wholly-owned company. Where the relevant party effects a transfer, that party must own all the shares in the company. These roll overs are useful for SMEs who want to incorporate and to minimise the tax liabilities arising from incorporation.

To apply for a rollover under this subdivision, the following conditions must be followed:

Applicable CGT event

Section 122-15 provides for the circumstances in which the rollover is available. As such, a company or partner may apply if either of the following occur:

Applicable Asset

Section 122.25 denotes what assets are precluded from the roll over. These include but are not limited to collectable or personal use assets, decorations awarded for valour or brave conduct, an asset that becomes a trading stock of the company just after the disposal or creation and assets that becomes a registered emission units and precluded assets. Precluded assets are depreciating assets, trading stock, an interest in the copyright in a film or a registered emissions unit.

Substantially Similar Consideration

The market value of the shares received by the taxpayer must be substantially the same as the market value of the transferred asset/s.

Non-Redeemable Shares

The shares received by the transferor must be non-redeemable. This means that the transferee company must not be able to buy back the shares from the transferor.

Subject to Tax

During the year of the disposal or creation of the asset, the company cannot be exempt from tax.

Tax Resident

Both parties must be residents. If this is not the case, then the transfer must effect “taxable Australian property”.

Whole Ownership

Immediately following the transfer, the transferor must own all the shares in the company.

Restructures often provide a better method to progress the business of yourself or your client. We have conducted many hundreds of restructures for our clients and are very happy to discuss your particular needs.  If you have any queries, please contact Tony Pointon  (CTA) and Andrew Pointon of our office.

Prescriptions for Payroll Tax: Navigating Payroll Tax Liability in Medical Practice Agreements

Medical practice owners should be aware that agreements entered into with medical practitioners for the use of shared administrative and medical support services as well as the use of rooms may attract payroll tax liability. On 14 March 2023, the NSW Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicants in Thomas and Naaz Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue which found that a medical practice was an employer of the medical practitioners and therefore liable under the relevant payroll tax provisions.

Background

The applicants operated three medical practices across Western Sydney employing nurses, receptionists and other administrative staff. The medical practitioners working at the medical practices did so in accordance with a written agreement which was supplemented by some informal arrangements. Typically, the medical practices bulk billed for the services they offered. This meant that payments from Medicare were paid directly into the applicant’s bank account. The applicants paid 70% of the proceeds to the practitioners and retained the other 30% as a fee for the provision of the services provided to the practitioners.

The primary issue here is whether the payments made to the practitioners attracted any payroll tax liability.

Decision

At first instance, the Tribunal had found that the practitioners not only provided services to the patients, but also to the applicant. The following provisions of the agreement between the practice and practitioners were found to be instrumental in this finding:

The Tribunal found that as a result of the above evidence, the applicant was deemed to be an employer and the medical practitioners were therefore employees. As a result, the payments of 70% of the Medicare benefits were deemed by section 35 of the Payroll Tax Act 2007 (NSW) to be deemed wages and attracted payroll tax liability.

The NSW Court of Appeal found that these were findings of fact rather than questions of law which the Court had no jurisdiction to appeal. Hence the appeal was dismissed

On the other hand, three of the medical practitioners did not attract any payroll tax liability. At [67] the Court of Appeal stated although “quite artificial”, the fact that the relevant practitioners received the relevant benefits instead of the practice and remitted 30% of the payments to the practice, this did not in fact attract any payroll tax. The Court outlined that one of the elements in which the provisions operate is the making of a payment by the deemed employer to the employee, not the other way around. Hence the payment by the employees, the practitioners, to the practice did not enliven the relevant payroll tax provisions and no liability arose.

Implications

Although a NSW decision, given the uniformity of the Payroll Tax legislation across Australia, practitioners in other states such as Victoria should be cautious in how they operate their practices. Given the ambit of the payroll tax provisions, any payments made to medical practitioners may attract payroll tax.

Hence practice owners are encouraged to review their existing agreements with their medical practitioners and are advised to structure their agreements accordingly to this decision to avoid liability.

If you have any queries, please contact Tony Pointon and Andrew Pointon of our office.

ATO Decision Impact of High Court Carter decision – Disclaiming an interest in a discretionary trust must be done before 30 June

The High Court case of Commissioner of Taxation v Carter [2022] HCA 10 confirmed that the right to trust income is decided by the Trustee on or before 30 June of any year and any retrospective disclaiming is of no effect  in respect of income taxation liability. It is noted that this is the effect of the construction of section 97 of the Income Taxation Act 1936 that deals with trust income.

The provision set out the entitlement to income and with entitlement comes the taxation liability. This is regardless of the receipt of the income by the beneficiary, although at law the beneficiary should be able to legally recover the amount. Practical issues concerning recovery of a beneficiary  entitlement from the trustee  may mean this becomes an unhappy situation for the beneficiary where the process of taking action itself or the recovery of money becomes problematical. The tax debt will be real and recoverable by the Commissioner against the beneficiary regardless of the beneficiary being able to access  the money.

Generally the beneficiary of a trust is connected by family to the trustee and will be aware of the decision of the trustee and their entitlement. A problem will however arise if the trustee does not advise the beneficiary.  This may happen inadvertently or during family disputes.

If you believe there is a significant risk of receiving an entitlement, but not likely to receive the entitlement, being reasonably able to access the money upon request or sure that the taxation liability is to be paid, you may wish to consider disclaiming an interest in the trust.

Further, if you believe that you are a beneficiary who has not been paid their entitlement then you may consider taking legal action for recovery against the Trustee. This will especially be the case when the beneficiary first becomes aware of the beneficiary entitlement  but is unhappy with the explanation of the Trustee as to how the taxation liability is proposed to be or is being attended to. If the taxation liability arises and remains unpaid against the beneficiaries expectations, the beneficiary will be personally liable and must take action against the Trustee.

The position does differ from the position of disclaimer for  inherited interests in wills for capital gains tax  whereby the right can be disclaimed when a beneficiary first becomes aware of the right. An effective disclaimer must be intentional and show unequivocally that the nominated life or remainder owner rejects their interest. The right to disclaim is lost if that person has engaged in positive conduct indicating an acceptance of their interest. The right may also be lost if it is not exercised within a reasonable time, in that someone who remains silent beyond the time when they may be expected to disclaim the interest may be presumed to have accepted it. If a life or remainder owner effectively disclaims their interest, they are retrospectively disentitled to it.. Further the beneficiaries may even change their entitlements to the will prior to the administration being complete – see TR 2006/14 .

Summary

The High Court held that disclaimers of the right to trust income did not operate retrospectively so as to disapply s 97(1) of the ITAA 1936.

While the majority did acknowledge that unfairness can arise where a beneficiary is not aware of its entitlement to trust income, their Honours noted that this is a function of the operation of Division 6 and the fact that subsection 97(1) is drafted to tax a beneficiary by reference to present entitlement not receipt. The High Court noted that this is similar to the apparent unfairness identified in Bamford, the High Court in that case recognising that this arises because subsection 97(1) taxes a beneficiary on a share of the trust’s net income, not the distributable income to which they are entitled, and does so regardless of whether distributable income is received.

The ATO view of the decision is set out in their Decision Impact Statement .

The High Court decision settles an important practical question as to how trust income is to be brought to tax when relevant trust entitlements are disclaimed in a legally effective manner sometime after financial year end.

It tells us that such disclaimers do not disturb what would otherwise be the tax result. Beneficiaries who have an interest in, or entitlement to, trust income should now take this into account if they were otherwise considering not accepting that interest or entitlement and instead looking to disclaim it.

Background

In the 2014 income year, the trustee of the Whitby Trust failed to appoint or accumulate the income of the trust. As a result, one-fifth of the income of the trust was distributed to each of the 5 primary beneficiaries (the “respondents’) pursuant to a default distribution clause (cl 3.7) in the trust deed. The combined operation of the relevant clauses of the trust deed was that “immediately prior to the end of the last day” of the 2014 income year, one-fifth of the income of the Whitby Trust was held on trust for each of the respondents.

In October 2015, the ATO issued amended assessments for the 2014 income year, assessing each respondent on one-fifth of the Whitby Trust’s income on the basis that they were “presently entitled” to that income within the meaning of s 97(1) of the ITAA 1936.

After an unsuccessful attempt (In November 2015) to disclaim the default distributions, the respondents executed further disclaimers (“the Third Disclaimers”) in September 2016. These disclaimers disclaimed any and all right title and interest conferred by the trust deed to any income and, without limiting the generality of that disclaimer, any and all right title and interest conferred by cl 3.7.

The respondents objected to the amended assessments. One of their contentions was that, by virtue of the Third Disclaimers, they had each validly disclaimed the default distribution.

In The Trustee for the Whitby Trust and FCT [2019] AATA 5637, the AAT decided that the Third Disclaimers were ineffective. However, in Carter v FCT [2020] FCAFC 150, the Full Court of the Federal Court allowed the respondents’ appeal, finding that the Third Disclaimers operated retrospectively so as to disapply s 97(1) in respect of the 2014 income year. The sole issue for the High Court was whether the Full Federal Court had erred in coming to that conclusion.

Decision

The High Court unanimously allowed the ATO’s appeal, finding that the Third Disclaimers did not operate retrospectively so as to disapply s 97(1).

This followed from the High Court’s finding that a beneficiary’s present entitlement under s 97(1) – the present legal right to demand and receive payment of a share of the income of a trust estate – is to be determined immediately prior to the end of a year of income by reference to the legal relationships then in existence. In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the respondents’ contention that events after the end of the income year, which may affect or alter those legal relationships, may be considered in determining a beneficiary’s present entitlement.

The Court reached this conclusion by analysing the words of s 97(1).

The phrase “is presently entitled to a share of the income of the trust estate” in s 97(1) is expressed in the present tense. “It is directed to the position existing immediately before the end of the income year for the stated purpose of identifying the beneficiaries who are to be assessed with the income of the trust – namely, those beneficiaries of the trust who, as well as having an interest in the income of the trust which is vested both in interest and in possession, have a present legal right to demand and receive payment of the income.”

The criterion for liability looks to the right to receive an amount of distributable income, not the receipt. That position is expressly reinforced in s 95A(1) which makes clear that a present entitlement of a beneficiary under s 97(1) does not depend upon receipt of the income.

The fact that s 97(1) is directed to identifying the legal right of the beneficiary immediately prior to the end of the year of income is important. The “taxation liability of the beneficiaries is determined by ascertaining the proportion of the distributable income of the trust estate to which each beneficiary is presently entitled just prior to midnight at the end of the year of income and then applying that proportion to the ‘net income of the trust estate”.

The other relevant criteria in s 97(1) – that a beneficiary is not under any legal disability and is a resident – reinforce the conclusion that a beneficiary’s present entitlement is determined immediately before the end of the income year.

The Court added that if the respondents’ contention – that the question of present entitlement may be resolved after the end of the income year (and in some cases, such as the present, more than one year later) – was accepted, that would lead to uncertainties for the ATO, trustees, beneficiaries and perhaps even settlors, which would “not be fair, convenient or efficient”.

Presumption of assent

The Court also rejected the respondents’ contention that they were not presently entitled to the income within the meaning of s 97(1) because the presumption of assent – that the donee (the beneficiary) assents to a gift – is an evidentiary presumption or inference that may be rebutted and that the Third Disclaimers were evidence of the rebuttal.

The Court said that the presumption of assent is a presumption of law and Div 6 of Pt III of the ITAA 1936 (the main provisions assessing trust income), in particular the criterion of “is presently entitled” in s 97(1), “is consistent with, and operates on, the presumption of law of assent”. On the facts in this case, that presumption applied immediately before the end of the 2014 income year to the operation at law of cl 3.7 (the default distribution clause) of the trust deed.

Edelman J went further on this issue and said that the parties in this case had wrongly assumed that the creation or increase in value of equitable rights is incomplete until affirmed by the beneficiary. “Since it is now recognised that title can pass without assent of the donee, the ‘presumption’ of implied assent is a fiction without any purpose at common law. There would be no basis to extend the ‘presumption’ to equity, even if an analogy between common law and equitable rights could be drawn.”

Pointon Partners has expertise in aiding clients in discussions with the ATO or in dispute with the ATO.

Division 7A – Where to from now for Trusts creating sub-trusts for corporate beneficiaries?

Other than complying legacy sub-trusts created prior to 1 July 2022, it is highly arguable that creating new sub-trusts between Trusts and companies is not sensible.

If you wish to pay your income or capital to a corporate beneficiary of the Trust then you should preferably pay it out to the company and therefore delete the creation of a sub-trust or alternatively enter into a complying Division 7A loan agreement. You may also create a separate sub-trust for an asset that is not used by the Trust.

Legacy sub-trusts can continue but note the Option 1 and Option 2 arrangements set out in PSLA 2010 / 4 are now withdrawn as of 1 July 2022.

The use of a corporate beneficiary by a Trust is still very much possible, however retaining the monies in the Trust  has been problematical since 2010 and the ability to retain any distribution made after 1 July 2022 in the Trust that is used for the benefit of the Trust in any way is now considered to be financial accommodation by the ATO.

Going forward, for a sub-trust of a Trust for the benefit of a company created after 1 July 2022 you will need to invest the funds in a specific income-producing asset or investment which is not used by the Trust in any way otherwise it will be considered to be financial accommodation according to TD 2022/1. This will include where a commercial interest rate is paid by the Trust on the sub-trust as if the money or sub-trust asset is used by the Trust for itself then it is considered to be financial accommodation.

The ATO released in February TD 2022/D1 Income tax: Division 7A: when will an unpaid present entitlement or amount held on sub-trust become the provision of ‘financial accommodation’? and it set out a number of examples that are self-explanatory relating to the ATO’s proposed new approach to Div 7A and unpaid present entitlements (UPEs).

Following the February 2022 release of Draft TD 2022/D1 the ATO has now withdrawn TR 2010/3, its previous ruling on the matter. The withdrawn Ruling treated a UPE that was not called for by a corporate beneficiary as a Div 7A loan unless the funds were held on sub-trust for the beneficiary’s sole benefit.

Further Practice Statement PS LA 2010/4 withdrawn on 1 July 2022 outlined 3 safe harbour investment options to prevent a Div 7A loan arising:

Option 1: invest the funds on an interest-only 7-year loan at the Div 7A benchmark interest rate;

Option 2: invest the funds on an interest only 10-year loan at a prescribed interest rate; or

Option 3: invest the funds in a specific income-producing asset or investment.

A key component of the ATO’s revised approach (which will apply to present entitlements created after 30 June 2022) is that a Div 7A loan can arise if a sub-trust fund is on commercial terms, with a return paid to the fund (i.e. Options 1 and 2 will no longer be acceptable).

The ATO confirmed that taxpayers can continue to rely on the withdrawn documents in respect of trust entitlements conferred before 1 July 2022, even if the sub-trust or a further complying loan is put in place after 30 June 2022.

Pointon Partners has extensive experience with assisting clients with matters that are being investigated or queried by the Taxation Office. If the ATO is querying an existing sub-trust arrangement we are happy to assist.

State Taxation Series: Issue #10 – Congestion Levy – Further tax relief

The State Revenue Office of Victoria has announced various tax relief measures this year, ranging from a waiver of liquor licence fees, duty concessions for commercial or industrial properties in regional Victoria, deferral of land tax and a full waiver of payroll tax.

These tax relief measures have been outlined in Issues 7 and 9 of our State Taxation Series.

On 10 September 2020, the Victorian Government announced further coronavirus tax and fee relief measures.

The further coronavirus relief announced relates to congestion levy and vacant residential land tax.

This Issue however will focus only on the further tax relief announced by the Victorian Government in relation to congestion levy.

Congestion Levy waiver and extension

The further relief measures announced on 10 September 2020 implements a 25% waiver of 2020 congestion levy liabilities.

Further, the due date for payment of any balance of congestion levy liabilities applicable have now been extended to 31 March 2021.

Congestion Levy concessions and further issues

While the 25% waiver of congestion levy liabilities for the 2020 year is a welcome move by the Victorian Government, it remains extremely difficult to reconcile the significant impost that still stands.

This is particularly amplified when appreciated that the majority, if not all carpark owners in both Category 1 and Category 2 levy areas have almost had no ability to derive revenue from carparks due to the government restrictions prohibiting travel outside a 5 kilometer radius for Victorians living in Metropolitan Melbourne.

This is clearly an opportune moment for all affected Victorian car park owners who remain liable to pay congestion levy to look into the concessions available under the Congestion Levy Act 2005 (Vic).

Separately, it also may well be the opportunity to reconsider the applicability of the judgment by the Victorian Court of Appeal in Secure Parking Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue [2017] VSCA 68 on the basis that the decision in that case as to whether a space was “set aside” for parking whether or not it is in use, in reference to the particular legislative definitions need not necessarily hold in circumstances where the imposition of severe government restrictions have fundamentally curtailed movement outside a 5 kilometer radius, including in most cases, the once ordinary task of parking a vehicle within a carpark situated in Melbourne CBD or its surrounds.

Should you wish to enquire further on the congestion levy waiver, concessions applicable or any other matter relating to the further tax relief measures, please contact David Mazzeo on (03) 9614 7707 to discuss further.

Land Tax Update: Further pandemic land tax relief for landlords and landowners

You will note that our recently published Issue 9 of the State Taxation Series looked into land tax relief during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Shortly after Issue 9 was published, the Victorian Government announced further land tax relief for landlords on 20 August 2020 as part of its extension of the commercial and residential tenancy relief schemes until 31 December 2020.

The further land tax relief measures are as follows:

1. Further land tax reduction for landlords.

In overview, this further relief is an increase in the land tax waiver to 50% from 25%.

Information published on the SRO website indicates that eligible landlords who satisfy the following criteria can apply for a 50% waiver of the property’s 2020 land tax:

  1. Landlords of residential and commercial properties who provide a 50% or more outright rent waiver; and
  2. The rent waiver is for at least 3 months’ rent.

2. New 25% waiver for owner occupiers of commercial properties

The announcement on 20 August 2020 also introduced a new 25% land tax waiver for owner-occupiers of commercial properties.

To qualify for this new land tax waiver of 25%, published information on the SRO’s website indicates that the owner occupier’s business must satisfy the conditions in either of these two categories:

  1. For a licensed pub, club or restaurant under a general, full club or on-premises liquor licence:
  1. For other businesses:

You will be required to apply for this further relief, even if you have previously applied for a 25% waiver.

However, applications have been temporarily suspended while the system is being updated with the additional relief measures announced by the Victorian Government.

In the meantime, if you have not already registered for My Land Tax, you will need to register and subscribe to land tax updates to be notified when applications can be lodged.

Should you require any assistance further understanding these measures, assistance with leasing, land tax relief, COVID-19 rent relief, or other matters, please contact David Mazzeo of our firm on (03) 9614 7707.

State Taxation Series: Issue #9 – Pandemic land tax relief for landlords and landowners

Issue 9 of our State Taxation Series looks into land tax relief during the COVID-19 pandemic, more particularly, land tax reduction and the deferral of land tax for the 2020 year.

The Victorian government has implemented relief measures for land tax to support businesses and individuals during this trying period.

Understanding the relief measures is vital not just in appreciating the measures per se, but to enable yourself or your business to take the requisite steps in claiming the appropriate land tax relief available.

1. Land tax reduction

Most landlords will, if not already, have been contacted by their tenants requesting for rent relief, be it in the form of a rent waiver or a deferral of rent.

In light of this, both landlords and tenants alike will be well aware of the various rent relief measures implemented by the Victorian government under the COVID-19 Omnibus (Emergency Measures) (Commercial Leases and Licences) Regulations 2020 (Vic).

Unfortunately, it is not as widely appreciated that flowing from such rent relief being afforded, landlords are entitled to a land tax reduction.

On the outset, commercial and residential landlords are eligible for a land tax reduction only if the property has been tenanted since before 29 March 2020.

Commercial and residential landlords who provide tenants with coronavirus rent relief consistent with the principles of the Support to Landlords and Tenants Package are able to claim a 25% reduction on the relevant property’s land tax for the 2020 year.

Specifically, rent relief provided to tenants between 29 March 2020 and 29 September 2020 must be at least 25% of the 2020 proportional land tax liability (exclusive of absentee owner surcharge, if any) for that property. It should be noted that a landlord will not be eligible if only a deferral, not a reduction of rent is provided.

Commercial and residential landlords are also eligible to the land tax reduction for the 2020 year if they are unable to secure a tenant because of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Commercial landlords need to be particularly aware that the land tax reduction will only apply if the tenant satisfies the following criteria (to be provided in the form of a declaration from their tenant):

Licensed pub, club or restaurant under a general, full club or on-premises liquor licence:

    1. At the premises level, their turnover was no greater than $50 million in the 2018-2019 financial year, or their expected turnover in the 2019 – 2020 financial year is less than $50 million; and
    2. Their turnover at that premises has reduced by at least 30% since March 2020

Other commercial tenants:

    1. They have an annual aggregated turnover of up to $50 million; and
    2. They are eligible for, and participating in, the Commonwealth Government’s JobKeeper Payment.

In order to receive this land tax reduction, eligible residential and commercial landlords must apply for the land tax reduction through the SRO’s My Land Tax portal.

2. Land tax deferral

Separately, Victorian land owners with at least one non-residential property have the option of deferring their land tax payments for the 2020 land tax assessments until 31 March 2021.

Please note however, this land tax deferral will only apply to land owners whose total taxable landholdings are below $1 million.

You will be notified by the SRO that your 2020 land tax assessment has been deferred for payment until 31 March 2021. No application is needed for this deferral.

Should you require any assistance further understanding these measures, assistance with leasing, land tax relief, COVID-19 rent relief, or other matters, please contact David Mazzeo of our firm on (03) 9614 7707.

If you are facing a similar issue, see our page on land tax disputes.

State Taxation Series: Issue #8 – Stamp Duty Reforms – Should You Hold Your Breath?

In 1989, former Prime Minister Paul Keating boasted for being able to garner public support for difficult reforms when he pronounced:

“I’ll guarantee if you walk into any pet shop in Australia, the resident galah will be talking about micro-economic policy.”

Thirty years on, with the initial headwinds of the COVID-19 pandemic momentarily passing, stamp duty appears to be the talk of the town for the resident galah and various state revenue offices in Australia.

The recent push by several states to replace stamp duty with some sort of a land tax for all residential properties appears to be driven by micro-economic reform to get rid of an anachronistic tax that unfairly restricts mobility in the housing market, particularly when contextualised in the current COVID-19 economy.

The enactment of stamp duty legislation can be traced back to the Stamp Duties Act 1879 (Vic).

If the age of stamp duty legislation in Victoria is any indicator, it becomes evident that there may be some truth when stamp duty is characterised as an anachronistic impost or an inefficient method of taxation.

However, for those who intend to purchase property and are hoping for the removal of stamp duty in the near future, it may be worth holding your breath. There are many unavoidable factors, ranging from the magnitude of the reform required, unpopularity of the implementation of a broader land tax and the significant trauma that would result in the state taxation revenue base.

Seemingly, the discussed upheaval of state taxation laws and stamp duty is unlikely to be implemented with any immediacy.

In the meantime, it is imperative to be aware of the various stamp duty exemptions and concessions that are available in Victoria, with the most common listed below:

Should you be eligible for a stamp duty exemption or concession above and would like to enquire, or have been charged duty for a transaction that you believe should not be liable to stamp duty, please contact Tony Pointon, Amelita Hensman or Andrew Pointon on (03) 9614 7707 if you wish to discuss further.