When executors should stand firm: Court rejects “extravagant” TFM claim with heavy costs consequences
Executors are often placed under pressure to settle Testator’s Family Maintenance (TFM) claims to avoid the cost and uncertainty of litigation. A recent Victorian Supreme Court decision shows that not all claims warrant compromise and that courts are willing to protect estates against opportunistic litigation.
In Lennan v Chao (No 2) [2025] VSC 513, the plaintiff, a former domestic partner of the deceased, sought further provision from an estate worth around $2.8 million despite already receiving a $378,000 superannuation benefit from the deceased.
The plaintiff was in stable employment, earning a steady income, and had strong savings of more than $500,000. The Court found that he was financially secure, not maintained by the deceased during her lifetime, and that their relationship was relatively short. The plaintiff himself described much of it as “five years of dating.” His claim was dismissed after a four day trial.
When costs were argued, the Court went further, describing the plaintiff’s case as an “extravagant claim.” The plaintiff had asked that the executors’ costs be paid from the estate. The Court rejected that outright. Instead, it ordered him to pay the executors’ costs personally (likely significant, at least $200,000) on a standard basis until the date of the defendants’ offer of compromise, and on an indemnity basis afterwards. The Court held that it was unreasonable to reject an offer of $150,000 plus costs. Had he accepted, the combined benefit he would have received from the deceased would have been almost identical to the “statutory legacy” (the guaranteed minimum amount the law provides to a surviving spouse or domestic partner if someone dies without a will).
Importantly, no other beneficiaries had any competing financial need, which further underscored that the claim lacked merit. The Court also noted that the plaintiff was not impecunious and could meet an adverse costs order, removing one of the common risks executors face when defending TFM claims.
The decision highlights the heavy costs consequences that can flow from pressing a weak TFM claim and turning down a sensible settlement offer.
What does this mean for executors?
- Do not fear defending weak claims. Since the 2014 reforms, there is no special leniency. Unsuccessful claimants should expect to pay costs.
- Use Calderbank letters and offers of compromise strategically. A well-pitched offer can provide real protection and may justify indemnity costs if unreasonably rejected.
- Need is central. Claimants in TFM matters in Victoria, even domestic partners, must show genuine financial need. A comfortable financial position can fatally undermine a claim.
Many TFM claims are, of course, best resolved through a pragmatic settlement to minimise cost and uncertainty. But this case shows that executors should not feel compelled to settle where the claim is weak.
Executors should not feel compelled to settle every TFM claim. Even where no other beneficiaries are in financial need, a claim can and should be defended if the claimant is financially secure, the relationship was limited, and there is no real evidence of need. In those circumstances, a sensible Calderbank offer can protect the estate and beneficiaries from the heavy costs consequences of litigation.
If you are acting as an executor and are facing a family provision claim in Victoria, we would be pleased to discuss your options and how best to protect the estate and the wishes of the deceased. Please feel free to contact us for advice tailored to your circumstances.
Challenging the validity of a will in Victoria: what you need to know
When a loved one dies, disputes can arise not only about the distribution of their estate but also about the legal validity of their will. Unlike family provision claims which seek to alter the distribution of an estate by adjusting the entitlements set out in the will (discussed in our previous article available here), challenges to the validity of a will focus on whether the will should be admitted to probate at all.
If a challenge to the validity of a will is successful, estate is distributed according to an earlier valid will or, if none exists, under the laws of intestacy.
This article outlines the key legal grounds for challenging the validity of a will and the process involved.
Who can challenge the validity of a will?
A challenge to the validity of a will can generally be brought by any person who has an interest in the estate.
This may include:
- A beneficiary named in a prior will but who does not receive provision, or receives lesser provision, under the later will; or
- A person who would benefit if the will were declared invalid (importantly, this may include persons such as nieces and nephews who would not be “eligible persons” entitled to make a family provision claim.
Grounds for challenging the validity of a will
A will’s validity may be challenged on several legal grounds in Victoria. The most common are outlined below.
- Lack of testamentary capacity
The law requires that a person making a will (the testator) must understand what a will is, what assets they own, and who may have a claim on their estate. If the testator was suffering from a medical condition such as dementia at the time the will was made, it may be found that they lacked the necessary capacity.
This ground is commonly established by expert medical evidence.
- Lack of ‘knowledge and approval’
Even if a testator had “testamentary capacity”, they must also have known and approved the contents of the will. This is particularly important where “suspicious circumstances” exist, such as a significant change in the will shortly before death, or where a person who benefits from the will was involved in its preparation. In such cases the court may require the person to uphold the will to prove that the testator fully understood and approved its terms.
- Undue influence
A will must be made freely and voluntarily. If the testator was subjected to pressure, manipulation or coercion, the will may be invalid due to undue influence. These claims are often made where a testator was isolated, dependent on other or in a vulnerable position. However courts require compelling evidence to support such claims. The mere fact that a beneficiary received a substantial benefit is not sufficient.
- Fraud or forgery
If a will was forged, fabricated or signed based on deliberate representations, it may be declared invalid. These cases are rare but very serious. Where fraud is proven, the will is treated as if it was never made. However where fraud is alleged, but not proven, serious consequences may follow for the person making the allegation.
- Failure to comply with legal formalities
Under the Wills Act 1997 (Vic) (Act), a will must be in writing, signed by the testator and witnessed by at least two people. If these formalities are not met, the will may be declared invalid unless the Court is satisfied the informal will was intended by the testator to operate as their final will. In those circumstances the Court may admit the document as an informal will under section 9 of the Act.
How to challenge the validity of a will
Challenges to a will’s validity are brought in the Supreme Court of Victoria. If probate has not been granted, the challenger may file a caveat with the Court to prevent a grant from being issued until the dispute is resolved.
If probate has already been granted, the challenger must apply to have the grant revoked. The process is procedurally more complex and generally requires more substantial evidence.
In all cases, evidence is critical. Suspicion alone is insufficient. Key evidence may include medical records, the solicitor’s file, and affidavits from relevant witnesses. In cases involving questions of capacity, expert reports from medical practitioners are often required.
Timing and legal costs
There is no statutory time limit for challenging the validity of a will. However, delay can severely prejudice the outcome, particularly if estate assets have already been distributed. Early advice is essential.
Parties should also be aware that legal costs can be significant. If a challenge is unsuccessful, the Court may order the challenger to pay not only their own legal costs but also those of the estate or other parties.
Final thoughts
Challenging the validity of a Will is a complex and often sensitive matter. In appropriate cases, however, such challenges are vital to ensure that the testator’s true intentions are carried out and that the estate is not administered under a Will made without capacity or under pressure.
If you have concerns about the validity of a will, or are defending one from challenge, Pointon Partners has deep experience in probate litigation and contested estates.
We welcome enquiries and can assist in navigating these disputes with clarity and discretion.
Contact Carl Millington for a confidential no-obligation discussion
Challenging a will in Victoria: understanding Family Provision claims
When a loved one passes away, disputes over their will can add further stress to an already emotional time. In Victoria, if you believe you’ve been unfairly left out of a will, or not adequately provided for, you may be eligible to make a Family Provision claim.
Who can make a Family Provision claim?
Not everyone can challenge a will. Under Victorian law, only ‘eligible persons’ can apply.
These include:
- A spouse or domestic partner of the deceased (including same-sex partners)
- A child of the deceased (including adult or adopted children);
- Stepchildren, or someone else treated as a child of the deceased;
- Former spouses or partners of the deceased(in some circumstances); and
- Another person who was financially dependent on the deceased.
Every case is unique, and relationships can be complex. If you’re unsure whether you qualify, it’s worth seeking early legal advice.
What will the Court consider?
The Courts won’t simply rewrite wills. Their role is to carefully assess whether adequate provision was made for the applicant’s proper maintenance and support. In doing so, the Courts considers a range of factors, including:
- The nature and length of your relationship with the deceased;
- The deceased’s reasons for making the will in the way they did;
- Your current and future financial needs;
- The size and nature of the deceased’s estate;
- Any obligations or moral duties the deceased owed to you
- Any contributions you made to the deceased’s welfare or estate; and
- The competing needs and claims of other beneficiaries.
The goal is to achieve fairness, taking into account all the circumstances, not merely to divide the estate equally among, for example, children of the deceased.
Time limits matter
In Victoria, a Family Provision claim must be filed within six months of the grant of probate or letters of administration.
Extensions are possible in limited cases, but they’re not guaranteed and can increase legal costs, so it’s important to act quickly.
What’s the process like?
Most Family Provision claims are resolved without a trial.
A key part of the process is mediation, which is a compulsory element of the process. In the County Court mediation happens after the parties have submitted “position papers” summarizing their cases.
Mediation is a structured negotiation facilitated by an independent mediator, offering both sides a chance to reach a resolution without the stress, cost, or delay of a court hearing.
At mediation, parties often reach a private, confidential agreement that works for everyone involved. It is generally faster, more cost-effective, and more flexible than going to trial, and allows the parties some control over the outcome.
How much does it cost?
Legal costs vary depending on complexity of the matter, and the Court in which the claim is brought.
For most claims, it is appropriate to issue in the County Court of Victoria. Claims in the County Court are generally quicker, less formal and more cost-effective.
To give you an idea of the costs in a County Court Family Provision claim, the total cost up to and including mediation typically ranges between $25,000 and $40,000.
We understand this is a significant investment, so we offer:
- Clear, transparent fee estimates up front;
- Flexible fee arrangements, including deferred payment arrangements; and
- ‘No win, no fee’ options in appropriate cases.
In many cases, if your claim is successful or has merit, your legal costs can be recovered from the estate.
Let’s talk
If you believe you have been unfairly left out of a will, our team is here to here to help. We’re here to guide you through the process with clear advice, strong representation, and compassionate support.
Contact Carl Millington for a confidential no-obligation discussion
Repainting and Recarpeting Clauses in Retail Leases: What Every Landlord and Tenant Needs to Know
Disputes commonly arise between landlords and tenants in relation to obligations imposed on the tenant to repaint and recarpet the premises.
A recent decision from the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) sheds light on this issue, clarifying the relationship between lease obligations and the landlord’s duty to maintain the premises under section 52 of the Retail Leases Act 2003 (the Act).
What was decided?
In Deng and Deng Pty Ltd v McPhee and Anor [2024] VCAT 1025, the Tribunal examined a tenant’s responsibility to repaint and recarpet the premises at certain fixed intervals specified in the lease.
The lease required the tenant to repaint the premises internally every 3 years and externally every 5 years. The tenant was also required to recarpet the premises every 5 years.
The landlord argued the tenant’s failure to comply with these obligations constituted a breach, justifying the landlord locking the tenant out of the premises and terminating the lease.
The tenant contested this, and applied to the Tribunal for an order preventing the landlord from locking it out. The tenant argued the obligations in the lease were inconsistent with section 52 of the Act, which places responsibility on landlords to maintain premises in the condition they were in when the lease began.
Under section 94 of the Act, where a provision of a lease is inconsistent with a provision of the Act, the provision in the lease is void.
The Tribunal’s findings
- Repainting and recarpeting clauses are not necessarily inconsistent with section 52
The Tribunal clarified that repainting and recarpeting obligations, as outlined in the lease, do not conflict with section 52. Why? Because these obligations were not tied to the condition of the premises when the lease started. Instead, they are standalone requirements that arise at specific intervals, irrespective of the premises’ condition.
- Capital nature of obligations
The Tribunal found that obligations to repaint or recarpet at regular fixed intervals are of a capital nature. They are not considered maintenance tasks aimed at keeping the premises consistent with their initial condition.These obligations fall within the exceptions for capital costs under section 41(2)(a) of the Act, meaning they are not subject to the same limitations as maintenance obligations.
Practical implications for Landlords and Tenants
- For landlords
The decision makes clear that landlords can include clauses requiring tenants to repaint and recarpet without contravening the Act. However, clarity in lease drafting is essential to avoid disputes and ensure that capital costs are passed on to the tenant, protecting the value of your asset.
In particular care should be taken to ensure that the relevant conditions apply at fixed intervals, irrespective of the condition of the premises.
- For tenants
Ensure you understand any repainting, recarpeting or other similar obligations in your lease, and whether the clauses imposing those obligations are properly drafted and enforceable. These obligations can require significant expenditure, and the Tribunal’s decision confirms that properly drafted clauses of this kind are likely to be enforceable even if they appear to overlap with the landlord’s duty to maintain the premises under the Act.
Tenant entitled to terminate commercial lease after landlord fails to investigate potential structural defects: Brotherhood of St Laurence v Sarina Investments Pty Ltd [2024] VSCA 46
Who should read this article?
Commercial landlords and tenants. The article will also be relevant to commercial property managers who are often the first port-of-call when these issues arise.
In a nutshell: what do you need to know?
Victoria’s highest Court has found that a landlord’s failure to investigate structural integrity concerns raised by the tenant and supported by independent engineering evidence, entitled the tenant to terminate a commercial lease.
This is a tenant-friendly decision. Landlords and their agents cannot simply ignore requests by tenants to investigate potential structural issues or maintenance concerns. Doing so could result in a tenant terminating the lease, even if it is ultimately found the premises were always structurally sound.
While each case will turn on its own facts, tenants should be aware of the increased leverage this decision may provide to:
- make sure concerns are properly investigated and necessary maintenance and repair work gets done;
- walk away from a lease where there are or may be structural defects in the premises; and/or
- negotiate with landlords, either during the term of the relevant lease, or after its termination.
The facts
- The tenant leased commercial office space, including an outdoor terrace, from the landlord.
- Clause 14.4(a) of the lease required the landlord to maintain the building in a “structurally sound condition”.
- In January 2020, the tenant discovered exterior damage to the premises, including loose concrete that had fallen from the building’s roof onto the terrace.
- The tenant restricted access to the terrace and notified the landlord who promised to investigate.
- On 18 March 2020, having not heard back from the landlord, the tenant obtained an engineering report which stated;
- loose render, tiles and grout were a hazard which may cause injury to users of the terrace; and
- a structural engineer should be engaged for further investigations to determine the precise cause of the damage.
- On 23 March 2020 the tenant directed staff not to attend the premises because of concerns regarding the structural integrity of the building.
- The tenant continued to follow up and put the landlord on notice of its obligations to provide a safe workplace for its employees under OH&S laws.
- In October 2020, having heard nothing from the landlord, the tenant engaged solicitors who wrote to the landlord asserting a breach of the maintenance obligations in the lease, and requested written confirmation that the premises were structurally sound.
- In November 2020, the landlord undertook remediation works and engaged the same engineer to provide a second report. The second engineering report confirmed the damage to the terrace had been repaired. It also repeated its recommendation for a structural engineer to be engaged to investigate the cause of the movement and cracking which had caused the damage.
- Despite the engineer’s findings, the landlord did not engage a structural engineer.
- On 5 February 2021, the tenant obtained a third engineering report from the same engineer which stated:
A report confirming that the building is safe for staff to return to work can’t be provided when the cause of these significant cracks remains unknown.
- On 3 March 2021, the tenant’s solicitors wrote to the landlord and asserted that its failure to action the recommendations in the engineering reports (including to obtain structural engineering advice) was a repudiation of the lease, entitling it to terminate the lease. The tenant vacated the premises.
- In May 2021, after the lease had been terminated, the landlord engaged a structural engineer whose report found there were no structural issues with the building, the terrace damage having been caused by a lack of expansion joints.
- The landlord then issued County Court proceedings against the tenant for lost rent.
- The landlord succeeded at trial, and the tenant was ordered to pay approximately $350,000, together with interest and legal costs.
- The tenant appealed the decision.
The Court of Appeal decision
The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal, holding that the tenant was entitled to terminate the lease and the return of the proceeds of its bank guarantee, which had been drawn upon by the landlord.
Key findings of the joint decision include:
- A duty to maintain has a “pre-emptive or preventative element”, and can be distinguished from a duty to repair which only arises upon the occurrence of a defect.
- “[91] … once it is accepted that the maintenance obligation includes preventative measures, and that these vary in the circumstances of each case, these preventative measures may include investigating reasonably suspected defects. This may include obtaining expert reports in appropriate circumstances to determine whether remedial works are required. This does not require reading additional words into the maintenance covenant; rather, this obligation is inherent to a duty to maintain.”
- “[96] To comply with the maintenance covenant in these circumstances, we consider that was obliged within a reasonable time after receipt of the first report, to investigate those reasonable concerns. Such investigation was needed to attempt to determine if the roof slab was in sound structural condition and whether any preventative measures needed to be taken to ensure it remained in a structurally sound condition.”
- “[97] [The landlord] did not do so. Indeed, in response to being put on notice of possible structural defects, failed to undertake any further investigations until the Lease was terminated. And it only obtained a report from a structural engineer after the litigation was underway.”
- The breach of the maintenance covenant was sufficiently serious to justify termination of the lease. It related to structural soundness and therefore safety. It had subsisted for a substantial duration.
- The consequence of the breach was also significant in light of all of the landlord’s conduct, the totality of which had been described by the trial Judge as a “sad story of rank discourtesy”. The Court held that the tenant could not have had any comfort its concerns would be addressed by the landlord.
It is unknown whether the landlord intends to apply for special leave to appeal the decision to the High Court of Australia.
Please contact Carl Millington with any query regarding this article or leasing disputes generally.
VCAT decision provides clarity for retail landlords and tenants: Beware of mixed rent review clauses
VCAT’s recent decision in Q St Kilda Tenancy Pty Ltd v Kane (Building and Property) [2023] 75 provides helpful guidance for retail landlords and tenants concerning rent reviews and the operation of section 35(2) of the Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) (RLA).
This case concerned the lease of a serviced apartment, originally run as part of a Quest franchise. The lease provided for an initial term of 5 years, with options for 3 further five year terms.
Importantly, the lease provided that upon the exercise by the tenant of an option for a further term, the rent would increase by CPI, but any such increase was “capped” at 4% (Rent Review Clause).
Shortly after the tenant exercised its option for a second further term, the tenant applied to VCAT alleging the Rent Review Clause was void and seeking market rent review to fix the rent for the second further term.
The tenant originally argued the Rent Review Clause was a ‘ratchet’ clause prohibited by s 35(3) of the RLA. However this argument was subsequently abandoned, and at the hearing the tenant argued that the Rent Review Clause was a “mixed” rent review clause prohibited by section 35(2) of the RLA.
Section 35(2) of the RLA provides:
The basis or formula on which a rent review is to be made must be one of the following:
(a) a fixed percentage;
(b) an independently published index of prices or wages ;
(c) a fixed annual amount;
(d) the current market rent of the retail premises;
(e) a basis or formula prescribed by the regulations.
The tenant argued that the Rent Review Clause had two separate ‘”limbs” and was a mixture of a fixed percentage and CPI.
Member Nash agreed and adopted a strict construction of section 35(2) holding at [31]:
I consider that the wording of refers to more than one method or formula for calculating the rent as it requires an assessment of rent after the application of the CPI and then an assessment of that rent to ensure it is not greater than an increase of 4%, and if it is, it is then limited to a 4% increase, which is an alternative calculation; it is not the application of the CPI formula but the application of fixed percentage. Any rent review which involves having regard to more than one method of rent review calculation must fall foul of the terms of s 35(2).
The consequence of Member Nash’s findings was that a market rent review was ordered under s 35(7) of the RLA. This was so despite the “cap” on CPI in the Rent Review Clause was drafted by the tenant, was solely for its benefit and was consistent with the consumer protection public policy underlying the RLA.
The decision emphasises the importance of ensuring retail leases include only one prescribed method under s 35(2) of the RLA when establishing rent for a further term.
For retail tenants with leases incorporating similar rent review clauses, it presents a potential opportunity to seek a market rent review, or to negotiate a rent reduction.
Post script: Following the decision, the landlord successfully applied for an order for possession of the premises relying on unrelated breaches of the lease by the tenant. The tenant’s application for relief against forfeiture was dismissed and the landlord has retaken possession.
Pointon Partners acted for the landlord in this case, including the subsequent application for possession.
Please contact David Mazzeo or Carl Millington with any query regarding the above.
Hands off my deposit… at least for now: creative special condition modifying the operation of statutory deposit release rules deemed void
Vendors in real estate transactions are motivated to have their deposits released as early as possible. This motivation is particularly strong in relation to sales of high-value development sites, which are often sold on terms where settlement may be scheduled many years into the future.
A recent decision of the Victorian Supreme Court[1] has confirmed a special condition seeking to modify the operation of the deposit release rules set out in section 27 of the Sale of Land Act 1962 (Vic) (the Act), and which required the purchaser to automatically consent to the early release of the deposit within 5 business days of receipt of the vendor’s request was void.
Facts
The plaintiff (the purchaser) and the defendant (the vendor) entered into a contract of sale (the contract), pursuant to which the plaintiff agreed to purchase a development site from the vendor for $176,000,000. The purchaser paid a deposit of $17,600,000.
Under the contract, settlement was to occur on the earlier of the rezoning of the land, or 13 September 2028.
The contract included the following special condition:
- The Purchaser must, within 5 Business Days of receipt, sign, date and return any statement given under section 27 of the Sale of Land Act which complies with General Condition 12(a).
On 25 July 2022, the vendor sent the purchaser a section 27 statement (the s 27 statement) which contained the particulars required by s 27(3) of the Act.
On 1 August 2022, the purchaser sent the vendor a notice under s 27(6) of the Act stating it was not satisfied with the particulars in the s 27 statement and would not authorize the release of the deposit.
On 19 August 2022, the vendor sent a rescission notice (the rescission notice) relying on the purchaser’s failure to sign, date and return the s 27 statement as required by special condition 4.8.
Upon receipt of the rescission notice, the purchaser commenced the proceeding seeking declarations that the rescission notice was void, and further, that it was not in default of special condition 4.8.
The Decision
A. Did the purchaser breach special condition 4.8?
His Honour Justice Riordan held:
- special condition 4.8 required the plaintiff to sign and return the s 27 statement providing the statement complied with general condition 12;
- general condition 12.1(a) contemplated the release of the deposit on the provision of stipulated particulars ‘to the satisfaction of the purchaser’;
- the obligations under special condition 4.8 on the purchaser to sign, date and return the s 27 statement only arose if the particulars were to the satisfaction of the purchaser; and
- because the purchaser had notified the vendor that it was not satisfied with the particulars in the s 27 statement, the obligation in special condition 4.8 to sign, date and return the statement did not arise.
B. Is there an implied requirement of ‘reasonableness’ in s 27(6) of the Act?
His Honour rejected the vendor’s submission that that the purchaser’s lack of satisfaction with the particulars specified in the s 27 notice was subject to an implied requirement of reasonableness, citing McEwan v Theologegis & Anor[2], where it was held:
Section 27(4) concerns itself with whether “the purchaser is satisfied”, not whether “a reasonable purchaser would be satisfied” or “the purchaser is satisfied on reasonable grounds”. Subsection (6) is likewise concerned with the situation where “the purchaser is not satisfied”. It does not matter that the purchaser may be proceeding on erroneous facts or assumptions; only that he or she be satisfied or not satisfied of the relevant matters.
C. Was the special condition void under s 28 of the Act?
Section 28 of the Act provides:
- Where any contract for the sale of land contains provisions in contravention of this Division –
- those provisions shall be void and of no effect; and
- the contract shall be voidable by the purchaser at any time before completion and any person who had paid under the contract shall be entitled to recover it.
Riordan J found that by conferring on the vendor additional rights for the release of the deposit which diluted the protection provided by s 27, the clause was in contravention of the Division, and therefore void under section 28(1).
In reaching that conclusion, His Honour had reference to the fact that:
- under s 27, the only consequence of a failure to respond to a notice issued under s 27(3) is a deemed authorization for the release of the deposit;
- under special condition 4.8, failure to respond was a breach of contract entitling the vendor to exercise rights under the contract’s default provisions; and
- the contract could have been terminated by the vendor under special condition 4.8 prior to the expiry of the ordinary 28 day response period, effectively permitting the vendor to circumvent the scheme.
Key takeaways
This decision serves as a useful reminder for vendors, purchasers and professional advisers in the property space. Creative drafting that modifies the operation of the statutory deposit scheme will likely be void.
Purchasers should ensure they understand:
- their rights under ss 27 and 28 of the Act, as well as any potential risks, so that an informed decision regarding whether to release the deposit can be made;
- that a failure to respond to a notice given under section 27(3) within the 28 day time period will allow the deposit to be released; and
- there is no requirement that a notice issued under s 27(6) be made on reasonable grounds, only that the reasons given for the lack of satisfaction be referable to the matters listed in s 27(4).
While it was not an issue in this case, there are potentially disastrous consequences for vendors under s 28(1)(b) of the Act, which permits a purchaser to walk away and recover all moneys paid under a contract in circumstances where a contract contains provisions in contravention of Division 3 of the Act, which concerns treatment of deposits.
Please contact Pointon Partners’ disputes or property lawyers with any query in relation to this article.
[1] GLP Batesford Holdings Pty Ltd v 68 Bridge Road Land Pty Ltd [2022] VSC 614.
[2] [2004] VSC 244 at [27].
An expensive lesson: prospective purchasers lose $168,000 deposit after failing to comply with subject to finance clause
Buying a property can be one of the biggest and most important transactions you make during your lifetime and it is important you seek professional advice to protect your interests.
A decision of the Victorian Supreme Court[1] handed down on 5 August 2021 demonstrates the potentially disastrous consequences when a subject to finance clause is not complied with.
Why is this case important?
This case provides a useful reminder of the applicable principles, and what can happen when things go wrong.
Purchasers should:
- Not assume they have an automatic right to walk away from the contract if they cannot obtain finance to settle the property within the loan approval period.
- Seek professional advice before making an offer subject to finance.
- Carefully understand and comply with the requirements of the contract and keep records.
- Be aware lenders’ loan approval timelines can be longer than anticipated and take these into account when making an offer that is subject to finance.
- Apply for any extension to the loan approval period well in advance of its expiry and make sure there is a legally enforceable agreement to extend the period.
- Actively follow up brokers and lenders as to the status of the loan application.
- Seek specialist advice as soon as it becomes apparent there may be issues.
- Ensure that if finance is not able to be obtained, the contract is brought to an end correctly to ensure they are entitled to return of their deposit.
Vendors should:
- Consider adding special conditions to bolster their rights when a contract is subject to finance.
- Seek professional advice as to whether a subject to finance clause (and any associated special conditions) have been complied with prior to agreeing to return a deposit. You may be entitled to retain the deposit, or in a strong position to negotiate to retain some of it.
- Think carefully before accepting a part payment of a deposit when a contract is to be subject to finance.
Facts
The plaintiff (vendor) was the owner of a residential property in Albert Park (property). In March 2020 the defendants (purchasers) entered into a contract of sale (contract) to purchase the property for $1.68m.
The deposit payable by the purchasers under the contract was $168,000. The purchasers made a part payment of $10,000 towards the deposit and the parties agreed the $158,000 balance would be paid ‘once finance approved’.
The contract included a subject to finance clause, which stipulated that finance was to be obtained by 10 April 2020. The lender named in the contract was HSBC.
General condition 14 of the contract provided:
- Loan
14.1 If the particulars of sale specify that this contract is subject to a loan being approved, this contract is subject to the lender approving the loan on the security of the property by the approval date or any later date allowed by the vendor.
14.2 The purchaser may end the contract if the loan is not approved by the approval date, but only if the purchaser:
(a) immediately applied for the loan; and
(b) did everything reasonably required to obtain approval of the loan; and
(c) serves written notice ending the contract on the vendor within 2 clear business days after the approval date or any late date allowed by the vendor; and
(d) is not is default under any other condition of this contract when the notice is given.
14.3 All money must be immediately refunded to the purchaser if the contract is ended.
The purchasers were unable to obtain finance by 10 April 2020, but were granted an extension of time by the vendor until 20 April 2020. The purchasers sought, but were not granted, an additional extension of the loan approval date to 4 May 2020.
On 28 April 2020 the purchasers purported to terminate the contract by email (the Termination Email) and demanded repayment of the $10,000 payment made towards the deposit.
On 4 May 2020 the vendor served a default notice on the purchasers in relation to their failure to pay the balance of the deposit.
Subsequently the vendor notified the purchasers he accepted their repudiation of the contract – the purchasers having shown an intent to no longer be bound by the contract by purporting to terminate it.
The vendor then commenced the proceeding seeking orders that the purchasers pay the balance of the deposit and forfeit the $10,000 already paid pursuant to s 49(1) of the Property Law Act 1958 (PLA).
The purchasers argued at the hearing the vendor had represented, in correspondence sent on his behalf, that he was prepared to extend the loan approval period, and consequently, the vendor was estopped from treating the Termination Email as out of time.
The outcome
His Honour Justice McDonald held:
- The Termination Email was sent outside of the strict timeframe provided by General Condition 14.2(c) and could not terminate the contract.
- The purchasers did not apply to HSBC, the lender named in the contract, for finance but applied (through a broker) with another lender, and therefore did not comply with their obligations under 14.2(b) to do everything reasonably required to obtain approval of the loan.
- The contract became unconditional on or after 22 April 2020 (2 business days after the loan approval date as extended by express agreement).
- The vendor did not make any ‘clear’ representation to the purchasers that the loan approval date would be extended. All that the evidence established was that the purchasers believed that negotiations were ongoing. This was not enough for the vendor to be estopped from treating the Termination Email as out of time.
- The vendor was entitled to accept the purchasers’ repudiation of the contract.
- The balance of the deposit was due and payable by 20 May 2020 when the vendor accepted the purchasers’ repudiation of the contract.
Exercise of discretion to return the deposit
By the time of the trial, the vendor had resold the property for $20,000 less than the amount payable under the contract.
In considering whether to exercise his discretion under s 49(2) of the PLA and order that the purchasers were entitled to return of the deposit notwithstanding their failure to comply with the subject to finance clause, His Honour held:
- The purchasers must “do more than establish that forfeiture of the deposit would result in a financial windfall to the vendor, as will usually be the case”.
- The exercise of the discretion to return a deposit is “the exception rather than the rule”, and is conditioned by recognition of the “critical function of a deposit being an earnest for contractual performance”.
- In all of the circumstances the purchasers had failed to establish the exercise of the discretion was justified.
Accordingly, the purchasers were ordered to pay the sum of $158,000 to the vendor and will likely have to pay interest and the legal costs of both parties in addition to that amount.
Had the purchasers applied for finance with the lender specified in accordance with the provisions of the contract, been rejected and terminated the contract within the specified period, all of this may have been avoided.
Pointon Partners’ property and disputes teams are well place to provide advice in relation to disputes regarding the sale of land.
Please contact Carl Millington if you have any queries regarding this article.
[1] Pearl v Nannegari & Ors [2021] VSC 468
Living in a ‘material’ world: off-the-plan purchasers score convincing win over apartment developer in s 9AC(2) case
A decision of the Victorian Supreme Court[1] handed down on 9 August 2021 has highlighted the rights of off-the-plan purchasers to rescind contracts pursuant to s 9AC(2) of the Sale of Land Act 1962 (Act) when changes are made to the proposed plan of subdivision after the contract is signed and which materially affect their lot.
Why is this case important?
It is common-place in the period between signing the contract and settlement for changes to the plan to occur. Such changes can occur for numerous reasons (for example changes required by council, or by structural engineers) and in many cases may seriously impact the amenity and value of a particular lot.
Purchasers should carefully review any amendments to the proposed plan, including seeking professional advice where appropriate, to ensure they identify any changes and understand their options.
Similarly, developers should understand the potential consequences of making amendments to a plan, in order to appropriately manage risk and avoid potentially costly disputes.
Purchasers and developers alike must be aware that special conditions included in off-the-plan contracts, for example those that seek to define what is and is not a material amendment to a proposed plan, are void. Whether a lot is materially affected by a change to the plan is solely for the Court to determine.
Purchasers should not rely on s 9AC(2) without seeking appropriate professional advice as getting it wrong may have serious consequences. Associate Judge Matthews’ judgment makes it clear she would not have exercised her discretion to order return of the purchasers’ deposits had she decided the amendments were immaterial.
The law
A vendor must advise a purchaser under an off-the-plan contract of an amendment to a proposed plan of subdivision within 14 days.
Where the proposed amendment will ‘materially affect’ the purchaser’s lot, a purchaser can rescind the contract within 14 days of being advised of the proposed amendment pursuant to s 9AC(2) of the Act and is entitled to the immediate refund of the deposit pursuant to s 9AF(1) of the Act.
Whether a proposed amendment ‘materially affects’ a lot is determined on a case by case basis and is not ‘black and white’.
Facts
The plaintiffs (purchasers) were purchasers of apartments in a development being undertaken by the defendant (developer) at West Footscray. The apartments were purchased ‘off-the-plan’.
The contracts were signed and deposits paid in early 2018. In 2021 the developer’s solicitors sent the purchasers an amended plan of subdivision (Amended Plan).
The plaintiffs alleged the Amended Plan resulted in, among other things:
- A reduction in size and change in shape of the master bedroom in each lot (which were directly on top of each other on the ground and first floors of the development);
- A reduction in size of a ‘light court’ resulting in a reduction of available natural light in the master bedrooms of lot;
- A reduction in common property available to each of the lots, following a creation of a reserve to be vested in the council;
- The transfer of certain common property from an owners’ corporation the purchasers were members of, to one that they were not; and
- Changes to the car-parking arrangements for the apartments.
After receiving the Amended Plan, the purchasers wrote to the developer’s solicitor rescinding the contracts pursuant to s 9AC(2) of the Act.
The developer refused to accept that the purchasers were entitled to rescind the contracts and refused to return the deposits.
The purchasers then issued proceedings pursuant to s 49(1) of the Property Law Act 1958 (PLA) asking the Court to determine whether the contracts had been validly rescinded.
The outcome
The Court considered each change shown in the Amended Plan individually.
A. Changes to the size and shape of master bedroom
It was common ground that the size of the master bedrooms had been reduced in the Amended Plan. The developer’s evidence was that this was necessary to accommodate a structural wall that was not included in the original plan which had been based on architectural, rather than structural drawings. This reduced the overall size of the lots from approximately 95m2 to 91m2, a reduction of approximately 4.4%.
Each of the contracts included the following, relatively common, special condition (as well as other developer-friendly special conditions permitting amendments to be made to the plan):
7.6 Purchaser’s acknowledgment
The purchaser acknowledges and agrees that an amendment made to the Plan which alters the area of the property by 5% or less will not be regarded as an amendment which materially affects the property.
Prior to the trial, the developer’s solicitor conceded:
- to the extent that SC 7.6 sought to preclude the Court’s consideration of materiality of the changes shown in the Amended Plan, it was void pursuant to s 14 of the Act; and
- the acknowledgment itself was irrelevant as it is for the Court to determine the materiality of any changes the plan.
Nevertheless, the developer maintained that the reduction in size did not materially affect the lot, relying on previous cases[2] and asserting that a reduction in size which did not exceed 5% was ‘tolerable’.
After consideration of all of the evidence (and in particular a comparison of the original and Amended Plans), Her Honour Associate Justice Matthews held:
If the overall reduction in size to the subject property is at least 4 m2, it is also apparent that this size reduction applies exclusively, or at the very least mostly, to the size of the master bedroom. A reduction in size of that amount, to a master bedroom that could hardly be described as palatial prior to the change, is clearly material.
Accordingly, the reduction in size of the master bedroom was sufficient to enable the purchasers to rescind the contracts.
B. ‘Light court’ amendments
The purchasers contended that the size of a ‘light court’ through which natural light would come into the master bedroom had also been reduced in the Amended Plan. Her Honour agreed and found that, combined with the change in shape of the master bedroom, this would result in reduced natural light.
Her Honour again held that these changes materially affected the purchasers and entitled them to rescind the contracts.
C. Council reserve amendments
The Amended Plan showed the creation of a council reserve on land which had been common property in the original plan. The developer’s evidence was that during the construction process, the council had agreed to take over responsibility for the relevant land, which was previously the subject of a drainage easement, with it being excised from the title and vested in council.
Again, the developer did not dispute the plan had been amended, only that changes did not materially affect the purchasers’ lots.
Her Honour disagreed, holding that the ‘lack of exclusivity alone’ resulting from the creation of the Council reserve materially affected the purchasers’ lots and consequently, they could rescind the contracts.
D. OC2 amendments
The Amended Plan showed a newly created and relatively small roof terrace which was shown as ‘Common Property 2’ (Roof Terrace) for the benefit of members of OC2. The purchasers were not members of OC2. In the original plan, the Roof Terrace was shown as ‘Common Property 1’ for the benefit of OC1. The purchasers were members of OC1.
The developer asserted that at the time the contracts were signed the Roof Terrace was intended to be inaccessible, but during the construction process was converted and made accessible to members of OC2 exclusively. The lots having access to the Roof Terrace were occupied by participants in the National Disability Insurance Scheme.
The developer’s position was that because the Roof Terrace was initially going to be inaccessible to any residents, the changes were not material.
The purchasers contended that the purchasers (and other members of OC1) had been materially affected by the loss of use of the Roof Terrace (including the loss of chance of the use of Roof Terrace should it become accessible at some future time).
Her Honour agreed with the purchasers and found the change was material, entitling the purchasers to rescind in accordance with s 9AC(2).
E. Parking amendments
The Amended Plan also varied the parking arrangements for the purchasers’ lots by:
- changing the allocated parking space for one of the lots from the top level of a car-stacker to the bottom level; and
- reducing the size of a standalone allocated parking space by approximately 11%.
Her Honour found that, on the limited evidence led at trial, these amendments were not material and consequently the purchasers were not entitled to rescind the contracts in reliance upon them.
Conclusion
Given the very strict timeframes set out in the Act it is imperative that advice is obtained quickly.
Pointon Partners acts for both purchasers and developers in the off-the-plan space and are well placed to advise in relation to these issues.
Please contact Carl Millington if you have any queries regarding this article.
[1] Burger & Ors v Longboat Holdings Group2 Pty Ltd [2021] VSC 469
[2] Such as the commonly cited Birch v Robek [2014] VCC 68
Your builder gives you a quote, but no written building contract, and you agree to proceed. Where do you stand?
It’s surprisingly common for home owners to engage builders to undertake domestic building works without that arrangement being supported by a written building contract.
Sometimes the only documentary support is a written quotation, which may not be compliant.
Home owners may be tempted to agree to go ahead in such circumstances and not “rock the boat” by requiring the contract to be documented properly for any number of reasons – they are tired of searching for an appropriate building practitioner, perhaps because their inquiries go unanswered, or they want the work done by a particular point in time because of family arrangements or a looming holiday period, or they may not even know of the compliance requirements for domestic building contracts.
So what are the rights and obligations of owners and builders in such a situation?
Domestic building contracts in respect of which the value of the work done exceeds $10,000, known as ‘major’ domestic building contracts, must be in writing. And there are other requirements.
Section 31(1) of the Domestic Building Contracts Act provides in part that a builder must not enter into a major domestic building contract unless the contract sets out in full all the terms of the contract, has a detailed description of the works to be carried out, includes the plans and specifications, and states the names and addresses of parties, the registration number of the builder, the start and end date of the build period, and the contract price.
Significantly, section 31(2) of the Act provides that ‘a major domestic building contract is of no effect unless it is signed by the builder and the building owner (or their authorised agents)’.
So if there’s no signed, written contract such as to comply with section 31(1), what does it mean to say the contract between the builder and the owner is of ‘no effect’?
This issue has come before the Courts and VCAT on several occasions in the past[1]. In essence, it means that:
- Such a contract is ineffective to confer any rights, or impose any liabilities or obligations on the parties from the outset.
- Even though the contract is of no effect, the builder still has a legal entitlement to be paid on a ‘quantum meruit’ basis – the fair value of the work carried out on behalf of the owner[2]. In that regard, the contract price can be relevant, but will not be determinative of that value.
- Any sum awarded to a builder under quantum meruit must be reduced by the cost of rectifying any defects in the building work.
- Given that the contract is of no effect, neither party has an entitlement to claim damages from the other party in the event of a repudiation of the contract. So if an owner terminates the contract as a result of an alleged substantial breach by the builder, the builder cannot sue for damages, even if the owner’s termination was wrongful. Likewise, an owner’s claim for works alleged to have been agreed to be done, but which were not done, cannot be maintained.
VCAT has also observed that it would be incongruous if a builder who failed to ensure that he had complied with section 31(1) could be paid more on a quantum meruit basis than the original price agreed to by the owner and the builder. In other words, the builder’s rights to recover a fair value for the work done may be curtailed by the contract price, even if the fair value exceeds the contract price[3].
From a risk management perspective, documenting a building contract in accordance with section 31(1) is a must for owners and builders alike. It’s all too easy for builders to fall into the trap of believing the costs and inconvenience of regulatory compliance is too much of a disruption to the smooth running of a business. But the consequences of not documenting a contract properly can far outweigh any such illusory benefits. In Fatopolous, one of the cases referred to above, the builder claimed in excess of $90,000 as fair value for the work done, but was awarded just $48,550. And that amount was then reduced by some $2,000 to cover the cost of rectifying defective works. Such disputes can often lead to substantial legal costs for both parties. In addition, the failure to document a building contract in accordance with section 31(1) can leave a builder exposed to a penalty of 50 penalty units, or (at the time of writing) $8,261.00.
Similarly, owners should insist on ensuring their rights are protected by a written, compliant contract. Domestic building projects are typically lengthy and expensive. Owners can only benefit by having their relationships with builders documented properly, so as to minimise uncertainty.
Please contact our Dispute Resolution Team if you would like further advice on this or any other building or property related matter.
[1] For example Drossos & Anor. v. Marvel Homes Pty Ltd [2014] VSC 384, Fotopoulos v. Landmark Building Design Pty Ltd [2020] VCAT 1130, Tist Pty Ltd v. Foti [2021] VCAT 29 at [53]-[60].
[2] VCAT has jurisdiction to make such an order under s. 53(2)(b)(iii) Domestic Building Contracts Act. See, for example, Fotopoulos v. Landmark Building Design Pty Ltd [2020] VCAT 1130 at [35].
[3] See Fotopoulos v. Landmark Building Design Pty Ltd [2020] VCAT 1130 at [37]-[42].