Pointon Partners

Corporate Tax Cuts: What Do They Mean For You?

Just over two months have passed since the Federal Government enacted the Treasury Laws Amendment (Enterprise Tax Plan) Act 2017 to reduce the corporate tax rate in Australia. The new company tax rate is 27.5% for the 2016-17 tax year for companies with aggregated annual turnover of less than $10m. The Government plans to progressively reduce the corporate tax rate to 25% for all companies irrespective of their size. Anecdotally it seems that companies may already be factoring in the new company tax rate in calculating how much to pay out to investors in the form of dividends

Who is likely to benefit from the corporate tax cuts?

A number of commentators, however, are questioning the economic rationale behind the amended company tax rate and the extent to which any tangible benefit is provided. The principal reason behind such scepticism is simple: the less tax paid by companies, the more tax paid by their shareholders.

This is attributable to an aspect of Australia’s corporate tax system which has become rarer internationally, being the dividend imputation system, which imputes tax paid by companies to their shareholders. If a company pays tax on its profits of 30%, an equivalent amount is then credited against shareholders’ taxable income (called “franking credits”) so that shareholders don’t have to pay further tax on amounts that have already been taxed at the company level. The purpose of this is to avoid double taxation.

Internationally, the trend has been away from imputation systems in favour of greatly reduced corporate tax rates, e.g. from 30% to 19% in the UK. Some commentators have suggested that Australia should follow this trend.

As a result of Australia’s imputation system, any cut to the corporate tax rate will be accompanied by a corresponding reduction in the amount of franking credits granted to shareholders. Therefore, whatever tax is not paid by companies is eventually recouped from shareholders, provided such profits are distributed to shareholders as dividends.

Non-resident shareholders

Non-resident shareholders, however, are not entitled to a tax offset on franked dividends (but are instead exempt from paying withholding tax on fully franked dividends). This means that whilst non-resident shareholders benefit from the reduced tax rate applying to dividends at the company level, they are not affected by the corresponding reduction in the amount of franking credits that may be attached to dividends. Therefore, they benefit more from the reduction of the corporate tax rate than resident shareholders.

Passive companies may qualify for the new corporate tax rate

To qualify for the reduced company tax rate, it must be demonstrated that the company is carrying on a business[1] for the income year: s 23AA, Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (ITAA97). In a surprising move that has been welcomed by business groups but questioned by key figures including Federal Revenue Minister Kelly O’Dwyer, the ATO has indicated on its website and in a draft tax ruling[2] that passive investment companies may satisfy this requirement, whilst providing the usual caveat that no conclusions can be reached without first considering the particular facts and circumstances of each individual case.

This means that family investment companies that make and retain money from passive investments may be eligible for the company tax cuts. Whilst the ATO’s provisional view may be disputed (and indeed has been by the Minister for Revenue and Financial Services Kelly O’Dwyer), it is nonetheless arguable that companies that engage in passive investing in addition to activities that are clearly carrying on a business may more readily qualify for the reduced corporate tax rates on all of their income.

Note, any companies that have been paying the incorrect amount of tax because they were unaware they qualified for the reduced corporate tax rate may be entitled to a refund for any tax paid at the full 30% corporate tax rate for the 2015-16 tax year (when the corporate tax rate was set at 28.5% for companies with an aggregate annual turnover of less than $2m) and may seek to have their 2016-17 return amended.

Corporate tax rate and the “corporate tax rate for imputation purposes” to be calculated by reference to different years of income

Of particular significance is the fact that the corporate tax rate and the “corporate tax rate for imputation purposes” are to be calculated by reference to different years of income. The corporate tax rate for imputation purposes is to be “worked out on the assumption that the entity’s aggregated turnover for the income year is equal to its aggregated turnover for the previous income year”: section 995-1(1) ITAA97. A simple reading of the provision suggests that the annual aggregate turnover threshold test is to be assessed based on the company’s turnover in the previous income year. On the other hand, for the purpose of determining the applicable corporate tax rate for income tax purposes, the turnover test is to be assessed based on the company’s turnover in the current income year. In many cases, this will lead to the unintended result whereby a company must pay tax at a rate of 30%, but for the same year can only pay franked dividends with an imputation rate equal to the reduced company tax rate of 27.5%. In such a circumstance, a portion of the company’s profits will be taxed twice due to a shortfall in the maximum amount of franking credits that are allowed to be distributed to shareholders. This problem is compounded by the fact that surplus amounts of franking credits may end up being trapped in a company’s franking account unable to be distributed to shareholders.

Compliance issues – over-franking

As the amended corporate tax rate applies retrospectively from the start of the 2016-17 tax year, many companies may have made fully franked distributions and calculated the maximum franking credit on the basis of the 30% tax rate, rather than the amended 27.5% tax rate. However, shareholders who have received such dividends are only entitled to a tax offset to an amount calculated by reference to the amended 27.5% tax rate. Companies are required to give written notice to shareholders of the amended franking credit amount to avoid penalties.

If you wish to discuss any of the issues outlined in this article, please contact Anthony Pointon on (03) 9614 7707.

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[1] Subsection 995-1(1) of the ITAA97 defines a “business” to include “any profession, trade, employment, vocation or calling, but does not include occupation as an employee.”

[2] TR 2017/D2 at footnote 3.

Separating Business And Personal Property, And The Application Of The CGT Roll-Overs

Business owners who undertake arrangements to separate their business and personal assets may be able to avail themselves of CGT roll-overs to disregard or defer the capital gains tax that would otherwise arise. Previously, CGT relief was available if the business owner transferred their business assets to a company. Under the recently introduced small business restructure roll-over, however, business owners can now transfer their business assets to a trust without paying CGT, provided the business has an aggregate annual turnover of less than $2 million.

Importance of separating business and personal property

It is prudent to keep business and personal assets separate for a range of different reasons, including for asset protection and tax mitigation purposes. If business assets are held in your name, it is more likely that personal assets (including assets owned jointly) may be used to recover debts belonging to your business if you are unable to repay them. On the other hand, holding business assets in a separate entity can reduce the exposure of your personal assets to creditors’ claims. If you are unsure whether your assets are adequately protected, consider our Asset Protection Checklist at this link https://pointonpartners.com.au/asset-protection-general-checklist/.

There are also many tax advantages of keeping business and personal assets apart. Business owners, for instance, can benefit from the lower tax rates applying to different asset holding structures such as companies or trusts, and tax incentives and concessions may be available including the Research & Development tax offset and Early Stage Innovation Company investor tax incentives, which are only available to companies.

On the other hand, the 50% CGT discount for assets owned for more than one year is only available if the assets are not held in a company. If such assets are not used as part of the business, the CGT small business concessions will not apply either. There may also be adverse tax consequences if personal use assets are held by a company. Division 7A of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (ITAA97), for instance, can operate to treat the provision of assets of a private company to a shareholder (or an associate) for personal use or enjoyment as a receipt of income for tax purposes. These assets would normally not be subject to tax.

Finally, it is more difficult to work out an individual’s tax return if business and personal assets are mixed. This may lead to wrangles with the tax office if it is later determined that a person has not been correctly reporting their tax obligations. There are therefore good reasons for keeping personal assets and the assets of a business separate.

How to separate business and personal property

The most effective method for separating business assets from personal assets is by setting up an entity such as a company or a trust. The assets of the business are then transferred to that entity. The entity has a separate legal identity to the owner of the business and therefore creates a buffer between the assets of the business and the personal assets of the owner. Whilst the process of setting up and maintaining a company may involve increased administrative and compliance costs, the benefits may be considerable later down the track.

Application of the CGT roll-over provisions

Individuals who undertake arrangements to separate their business and personal assets would ordinarily face adverse CGT consequences. However, there are a number of CGT roll-over provisions that may be available to allow business owners to defer or disregard the amount of CGT arising.

One example is the recently introduced small business restructure roll-over under Div 328-G of the ITAA97. Under this roll-over, if a person transfers business assets to a company, trust or partnership, they may be able to disregard any capital gains or losses that would otherwise arise as a consequence of the transaction. The pre-CGT status of any assets is also preserved.

Be aware, however, that certain conditions must be satisfied before it can be determined that the roll-over applies, including the requirement that the business has an aggregate annual turnover of less than $2 million. If the business has an aggregate annual turnover of more than $2 million, the business owner may instead elect to apply the Div 122-A roll-over, which provides CGT relief where CGT assets of a business are transferred to a company.

To illustrate the application of these roll-overs, assume a person runs a business as a sole trader. They decide to incorporate the business to take advantage of the 30% tax rate applying to companies and to shrink the pool of assets that may be exposed to creditors’ claims. Accordingly, they dispose of all the business assets to a company and then become the sole shareholder of the company. The business owner may elect to apply the roll-over in Div 328-G or Div 122-A so that they do not have to pay capital gains tax on the transfer of assets to the company.

Usefully, legal and other costs relating to the transfer of assets and company incorporation may be deductible.

It is important to note that other taxes such as stamp duty and GST may apply where assets are transferred, even though the business owner is both the transferor and the owner of the transferee. The “sale of a going concern” GST exemption may be available; however, the business owner’s intention to apply the exemption must be stated in a written agreement prior to the transaction.

If your business does not meet the criteria under the above restructuring roll-over provisions, there may be other CGT concessions available that Pointon Partners can discuss with you.

For more information or to discuss any of the above, please contact Anthony Pointon of our office on (03) 9614 7707

Sham Loans

Sham Loans

The Commissioner of Taxation in two recent tax cases (Millar[1] and Normandy Finance[2]) and Liquidators in BCI Finances[3] (supported by the Commissioner of Taxation), have had success in alleging certain loans were shams. This had the effect that in the tax cases, that the taxpayer failed to discharge its onus of proof that the assessments were excessive. In the case of the Liquidators asserting breach of fiduciary duties by directors of companies whose only creditor was the Tax Office, that certain loans were in fact disguised repatriation of undeclared income, and that interest paid on the sham loans was not deductable. The fact that some of the directors and a “shadow” director had put the companies into a position not in the best interest of the companies, meant that some of the directors and the “shadow” director failed in their fiduciary duties.

Millar

In Millar, the taxpayer was a borrower from Hua Wang Bank in Western Samoa, and their Australian superannuation fund had made a deposit with that bank.  The Commissioner applied the sham doctrine so as to assess the taxpayers on effective early access to their superannuation balance, which access was assessable income.

In relation to Millar, the High Court refused the taxpayer special leave to appeal on 16 November 2016, on the basis that the result in the Full Federal Court was not sufficiently uncertain.  In the Full Federal Court there was a division between Logan J, who concluded that there was no sham in that case, and majority of Pagone and Davies JJ who concluded that the original finding of sham was not an error of law.  However, only Logan J referred to the High Court decision in Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd[4] and quoted therefrom, sham “is an expression which has a well understood legal meaning.  It refers to steps which take the form of a legally effective transaction but which the parties’ intent should not have the apparent, or any, legal consequences”.  Sham requires a common intent of the parties: Snook[5].

Equuscorp

In Equuscorp, the assignees of a debt originally owed by Investors in a “tax effective” investment scheme, were held to have enforceable rights against the borrowers as the loans to them were not shams notwithstanding that the lender had “no money to lend”.  The High Court in that case relied on the fact that the investors borrowing the money accepted that they had been loaned the money because it discharged their obligation to the manager of the scheme, to provide the funds required.  This was notwithstanding that, in the end, the investors did not obtain their tax deduction for their investment as promoted by the scheme, presumably due to the application of the general anti-avoidance provision, Part IVA.

Lender’s Rights

It is to be remembered that a finding of sham would render the lender’s rights in the loan document unenforceable as such (at least in this jurisdiction), not just undermine the characterisation of the transaction for the taxpayers/borrower. In Millar and BCI Finances, there was no direct evidence of the lenders’ intention, but only an inference drawn as to the lenders’ complicit purpose.

Raftland

All three judges in the Full Federal Court in Millar referred to the later decision of the High Court in Raftland[6].  Raftland was tax case where as always, the onus is on the taxpayer to prove that an assessment is excessive.  What this means is that whereas in ordinary civil litigation, whilst a party making a serious accusation such as sham is not required by the Briginshaw principle[7], to prove their allegation at a level beyond that normally required i.e. beyond the level of on the balance of probabilities[8], but it does require a court to show great care in finding that they are satisfied the matter so proved.  In tax cases on the other hand, if the Commissioner makes a serious allegation such sham, the burden of disproving the Commissioner’s allegation still rests on the taxpayer.  Some might think this would have put some special obligation on the Commissioner as a “model litigant” not to make allegations of sham in circumstances where his anti-avoidance armoury such as the anti-avoidance provision, Part IVA could be applied[9].  However in none of Raftland, Millar nor Normandy Finance did the Commissioner apply Part IVA, but simply relied on making the assertion of sham.  Of course, he was successful in those cases with his sham argument, however, had he not been successful, and failed to run a potentially successful Part IVA argument, he would not have done the Revenue any favours.

Raftland was controversial as the High Court found that the trust resolution in that case was a sham notwithstanding that the tax scheme would only work if the resolution was effective to make the selected beneficiary “presently entitled” to the income of the trust. However, as the scheme also involved changing control of the beneficiary so that the former controllers of the beneficiary would only ever get $250,000, rather than the whole of the trust income, the High Court concluded in effect that the disparity between the legal effect of the resolution and the “fiscal” effect, taking into account all the evidence of various actors’ intentions, was such that the resolution was a sham[10]. In Millar, the full Federal Court was divided as to the significance of the intention of the adviser to the scheme (who was not a party to the documents), compared to the intention of the parties.

Whilst Logan J said in Millar that the intention of the legal adviser in Raftland was part of the reason for the decision in Raftland[11], but he noted in Millar that the finding of the Tribunal as the intention of the taxpayers was the end of the matter, as the accountant/promotor (Mr Vanda Gould) was not that agent for the taxpayers[12]. However, Pagone[13] & Davies JJ held that Mr Gould’s intention in Millar was important, as they said the intention of the legal adviser was in Raftland[14].

Normandy Finance

In Normandy Finance the corporate taxpayers borrowed money from Hua Wang Bank initially without a written agreement.  The Commissioner asserted in the Full Federal Court, that a subsequently drawn written agreement (providing for interest) was a sham and as the taxpayer said, it was the written agreement which governed their relations, the question was whether the written agreement was a sham not whether whatever oral agreement was originally in existence when the funds were advanced, was a sham.

At first instance, Edmonds J held that the original oral loan was not a sham, but that the only evidence as to whether interest was payable on the loan was a subsequently drawn loan agreement, which he held to be a sham, and so the interest was not deductible even though the loan itself was not[15]. The Commissioner asserted that the loan was in fact assessable income, but from the decision of the Full Federal Court is not entirely clear whether the funds lent had their origin in undisclosed income of an Australian resident.

Again, the Full Court split with Logan J finding for the taxpayers[16], and Jagot and Davies JJ finding for the Commissioner. However, the intention of Mr Gould, who was again the accountant/promotor[17] was not relevant, as the principal behind the borrower and lender entities was Mr Gould’s client, Mr Townsing, who understood the detail of the transactions his companies entered into[18].

BCI Finances

As noted above, in BCI Finances the Commissioner was not a party, but supported the Liquidators of companies that were creditors of the Commissioner.  In BCI Finances, certain funds were placed on deposit with Israeli banks from which BCI Finances and related companies made borrowings.  There was evidence that the funds placed on deposit with the Israeli bank were undisclosed income of some of the principals.  The taxpayers went to great length to prevent the Commissioner from becoming aware of the deposits with the Israeli banks.  Gleeson J found that the documents provided by the taxpayers to the ATO “were designed to conceal the totality of the arrangements between those applicants and the Israeli banks (whatever was the totality of those arrangements) and hence the documents were shams”.

However, had the loan from the Israeli banks been on standard terms, for instance simply specifying that the bank could offset any security that it held against the borrower’s liability in the event of the borrower’s default, and there just happened to be such security, is not clear that a mutual shaming intent would be present even if the taxpayer went to great lengths not to tell the Commissioner about the back-to-back nature of the borrowings, and details concerning the security.  It is not clear whether the Commissioner asserted Part IVA against BCI Finances or only sham.

Interest Offset Accounts

It should be readily apparent that not all back-to-back loan arrangements are shams. For instance for some thirty years, the Commissioner has accepted home loan interest offset accounts.  That is, where a borrower of a home loan maintains a deposit account with the bank which is provided as security for default by the borrower, and upon which the interest rate for the borrower is reduced due to the non-payment of interest to the lender under the interest offset arrangement.

Intention to repay a loan

In relation to whether an oral loan or a loan evidenced by a document is a sham, there is some confusion as to whether an mutual intention of the parties that the loan not be repaid is a sufficient finding of fact to not have to make a finding of sham, as on one level, this is said not to be a loan (but a disguise for some other transaction). However, where there is a document which represents to outsiders that the amount is to be repaid, there may need to be a finding of sham[19].

It is also interesting to note the justification for the sham loan findings in cases such as Millar, by the subsequent conduct of the parties, in the context of arguments about sham trust.

SHAM TRUSTS

It is to be remembered that the trust in Rafland was not found to be a sham, only the trustee resolution[20].

It has now become clearer that subsequent conduct of a party in relation to a trust should only be categorised as being in breach of trust if the original intention of the settlor and the trustee was that a trust be formed. So perhaps subsequent inconsistent behaviour in the context of a loan, may be in breach of the loan agreement, rather than evidence of a sham loan? Take for example, a documented loan by a parent to an adult child. Whilst both parties may have intended that the loan be repaid when it was made, it would not be uncommon for the child to not comply with its terms, nor for the parent not to enforce its terms, without having reached any further agreement.

A v A

It was stated by the English High Court in A v A[21] that a trust “which is not initially a sham cannot subsequently become a sham”.[22] The view of Justice Munby was that the only way a properly created trust which is not a sham could become a sham subsequently is if all the beneficiaries were, with the requisite intention, to join together with the trustees for the purpose of that sham.[23]

Reynolds

In comparison, the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Reynolds [24] in finding that the trust in that case was not a sham, noted that a finding that a properly created and executed trust was sham would be an extreme finding because of the effect it has on the interests of beneficiaries.[25]Therefore, caution would need to be exercised when determining if acts or omissions provide compelling evidence at a high level to justify the conclusion that the trust is a sham.[26]

In Reynolds there was an absence of resolutions or minutes, no annual accounts, intermingling of financial arrangements and no record of decisions. This evidence of poor administration was held not to establish an intention that the trust operated as a sham but rather may be evidence of a breach of trust.[27]Further, it now seems clear that in the trust context, the mutual intention must be between the trustee and the settlor[28].  Otherwise the consequences for the “innocent party” trustee would be visited upon them, when they were not a party to the arrangement.

Clearly this is highly important in the case of an alleged sham loan, as if it was not so, and if the shaming intention was only known to the borrower, then the lender might not be able to enforce its loan (at least in this jurisdiction).

Clayton v Clayton

Subsequent to Reynolds, the recent New Zealand Supreme Court decision in Clayton v Clayton [2016] NZSC 29 again declined to find the trust in question was a sham, as the husband settlor who was also the trustee, intended the trust to be valid. However, like in the well-known Australian family law case of Kennon v Spry[29], the husband’s power of appointment was treated as though it was an asset valued the same as the value of the trust itself[30].

Re Esteem Settlement

In the Jersey case of Re Esteem Settlement[31], it was said a sham trust, not only covers a case where the trustee merely went along with the original intention of the settlor, but also if the trustee is reckless by going along with the settlor by not knowing or caring what the trustee is signing, he is taken to have the necessary intention to create a sham.[32]

The court in A v A agreed with the approach above from Re Esteem Settlement that “reckless indifference will be taken to constitute the necessary intention”.[33]

Conclusion

Whilst it is to be hoped that the Commissioner’s recent successes in arguing sham do not become commonplace, lawyers and accountants advising clients may be well advised to ensure their clients are sufficiently aware of what the documentation prepared for them requires them to do in their capacity e.g. as a trustee or director of a trustee company. After all, at a practical level, if the client disregards the legal form, the Commissioner may be inclined to do the same?

If you wish to discuss this article, please contact the writer Anthony Pointon on (03) 961 7707.

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[1] [2016] FCAFC 94

[2] [2016] FCAFC 180

[3] [2016] FCA 1351

[4] (2004) 218 CLR 471

[5] [1967] 2 QB 786

[6] (2008) 238 CLR 516

[7] (1938) 60 CLR 336

[8] “a court will not find that a transaction is a sham if another inference is at least equally open: Sharrment (1988) 18 FCR 516; there is a “strong and natural presumption against holding a provision or a document a sham”: National Westminster Bank Plc v Jones [2001] BCLC 98 at [59]. A finding of sham would have serious consequences for lawyers involved in the drafting of the documents if they were knowingly involved in the improper purpose of the documents. For a case where a lawyer was found to be liable in advising to phoenix companies, see Somerville (2009) 77 NSWLR 110.

[9] For instance, where there is a loan from a non-resident company to taxpayers in Australia that may be associates of the shareholders in the non-resident company, the Commissioner should pursue s47A and Div. 7A if the loan agreements are not on Div. 7A complying terms. Also, a purported loan may be outstanding for so long, notwithstanding that it is recorded yearly in the debtors accounts as owing, as perhaps not being a loan on the basis that there was never an intention to repay?

[10] Pagone J writing extra-judicially “Sham Trusts Revisited” STEP Hong Kong 9 Oct 2014. It is interesting that his paper didn’t refer to what many would consider to be the starting point in modern times, to the issue of sham trust in Abdel Rahman v. Chase Bank (CI) Trust Company Limited and others, a decision of the Jersey Royal Court of Jersey [1991] JLR 103. The result in Raftland sits uncomfortably with the UK authorities which say that a document will not be a sham if it is intended to have its legal effect, regardless of the tax motives of the parties: see Pagone ibid at pp11-12. That paper also appears to raise for discussion e.g. whether resolutions to make beneficiaries presently entitled but to not pay out the entitled for year after year, may raise the question after Raftland, of whether the resolution is a sham resolution?

[11] At [3]

[12] At [8]

[13] Whose judgment interestingly, did not cite his own paper on the topic. In contrast, in his very recent decision in Full Federal Court in Chevron [2017] FCAFC 62 he dismissed Gordon J’s extra-judicial suggestion that deeply retrospective legislation may be unconstitutional. Whilst there may be different views as to whether a judgment should cite the judge’s own extra-judicial work (as to which an analysis of Kirby J in the High Court might be directed), one view is that it assists understanding whether the judge had a pre-conceived view and therefore a potential bias in determining the issue judicially, although this is probably an issue for the judge to declare his extra-judicial writings to the parties before he hears the case. In any event, even if this has been done, the public may know nothing of it as the parties have not objected to his hearing the case, and it may be that it would be helpful for the reader of a judgment to know such background? After all, Pagone J’s 9 Oct 2014 paper was at least the fourth reincarnation of the same paper, pointing to some deep interest in Raftland, perhaps one could go so far as to say that he was implicitly critical of the High Court’s decision? Of course, extra-judicial writing can be extremely influential on other members of the same court, if not higher up the judicial hierarchy. One is reminded of Gzell J’s multiple articles on pre-CGT treaties and CGT, which found favour in Undershaft [2009] FCA 41 and Virgin Holdings [2008] FCA 1503.

[14] Pagone J at [45]; Davies J at [82]

[15] [2015] FCA 1420 at [112]

[16] Logan J has since written extra-judicially about Edmonds J decision at first instance, “What is the point of having Part IVA? (in the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936), Tax Institute, Nat. Conv. 15 March 2017.

[17] It will be recalled that Hill J’s decision on Part IVA in Consolidated Press (2001) was that the taxpayer’s intention was attributed from the advisers to the scheme, because the parties would not have understood the detail of what they had done. Interestingly, the ATO did not purse that line thereafter, perhaps because Part IVA is an objective test, whereas what the taxpayers thought they were doing, or what the advisers said, is the subjective purpose. Having said that, the subjective purpose of parties in anyway involved in a tax scheme, must for part of the factual matrix against which the objective purpose can be determined.

[18] It is noteworthy, that Logan J did not dispute Edmond J’s analysis at first instance, that Raftland was not dependent on the intention of the legal adviser (at [32]), whereas Jagot & Davies JJ did not comment on Raftland at all.

[19] It is worthy of note that in the Div. 7A context, there is a statutory provision which is somewhat of a “sleeper” at present, but in the writer view, will become a potentially huge problem i.e. s109R allows the Commissioner to disregard a loan repayment in working out whether the minimum loan repayment conditions have been meet, if he forms the view that a re-borrowing was to be used to make a repayment. This is a statutory recognition of the practical possibility that notwithstanding the formal loan agreement, it may be the case the Div. 7A loan may not be able to be repaid in the statutory period (7 years for an unsecured loan).

[20] In Fitzroy Services [2013] FCA 471 at [34] Edmonds J found that the loan itself was not a sham, but the interest on those loans was not deductible as the nexus with the production of income was not proven. Again, in that case, the Commissioner did not assert Part IVA in the alternative to sham.

[21] [2007] EWHC 99.

[22]Ibid at [42].

[23] Ibid at [44].

[24]Official Assignee in Bankruptcy in the Property of Reynolds v Wilson and Harvey and another [2008] NZCA 122.

[25] Ibid at [77]

[26] Ibid

[27] Ibid at [92]

[28] For a survey of the cases see A v A at [32]-[58]

[29] [2008] HCA 56

[30] The Court discussed the lower courts’ findings of “illusory trust” but was inclined to view their finding as being one that the settlor/trustee/husband intended to create a valid trust, but may have failed to do so if the trust deed provided such wide powers to him, that it failed to retain the “irreducible core” of trust duties to constitute a valid trust (referring to Armitage v Nurse) at [130]. Note there was no allegation of sham in Kennon v Spry. Also note the Court in Clayton did not refer to the decision in Raftland.

[31] 2003 JLR 188 at [58]

[32] Re Esteem Settlement at [58]

[33] Op cit at [52]. The Court also made it clear that there is not one concept of trust for Chancellery purposes and one for family law purposes.

If you don’t tell your client to get tax advice, you may be found negligent

Lawyers and advisors who don’t advise their clients to obtain tax advice may be found liable for professional negligence.

This is what happened in Ralston v Jurisich [2017] NSWCA 63.

In that case, a lawyer’s failure to advise his client on the tax consequences of a share buy-back agreement or, alternatively, advise her to obtain tax advice from a specialist tax lawyer, cost his client in excess of $600,000 in tax. As a result, the District Court of New South Wales, confirmed on appeal to the New South Wales Court of Appeal, held the lawyer liable to compensate his client to the tune of $740,000.

What happened?                                              

The basic facts of the case are as follows.

Mrs Jurisich was a shareholder of a company together with her mother and brother. It came to light that the company had potential problems in relation to its tax affairs, and a voluntary winding up was proposed. Mrs Jurisich, however, was concerned that she would not realise the full value of her shares in the company in the event of a winding up and, further, of the potential delay that would be occasioned by it. She subsequently decided it would be better “to simply sell her shares back to the company.” She sought the advice of her solicitor, Mr Ratner, who agreed that a buy-back would be a good idea, and a buy-back agreement was then executed. Mrs Jurisich received $1,308,285 for her shares, however, $608,172 of that amount had to be paid to the tax office. On the other hand, had Mrs Jurisich participated in the voluntary winding up, the amount she would have received would not have been subject to tax.

Mrs Jurisich commenced proceedings against Mr Ratner and his fellow partners and argued that Mr Ratner should have advised her of the tax consequences of proceeding by way of buy-back as opposed to proceeding by way of liquidation or, alternatively, he should have advised her to seek specialist tax advice on the subject.

Both the District Court of New South Wales and the New South Wales Court of Appeal agreed and awarded Mrs Jurisich $739,873, being equivalent to the amount of tax she was required to pay, plus interest and a proportion of the accounting fees she incurred for advice in relation to the tax liability.

Implications of the decision

The case provides a stern warning to lawyers and advisors as it shows that the law imposes a duty on them to ensure that clients are fully informed of the tax risks associated with their transactions.

The decision is interesting in light of the very different outcome in the UK Court of Appeal case of Mehjoo v Harben Barker (a firm) & Anor [2014] EWCA Civ 358, which overturned the decision of the High Court of England & Wales (a link to our discussion of the High Court decision can be found here: https://pointonpartners.com.au/taxation-update/) in holding that a firm of high street chartered accountants that advised in general tax matters did not have an obligation to refer a tax “mitigation” matter to a specialist.

In that case, the subject of the advice was considered to be outside the remit of the accountants’ retainer, despite the fact the accountants advised on general tax matters. In Ralston v Jurisich, it was more or less assumed that Mr Ratner had a duty to ensure Mrs Jurisich was informed of the tax risks of the buy-back. This was in spite of the fact that Mr Ratner was not expressly asked to advise on tax matters. It would therefore appear that the scope of liability for failing to refer clients to specialist tax advisors is significantly broader in Australia than in the UK.

It is also interesting to consider whether Mrs Jurisich could have sought in alternate proceedings an order for rectification to unwind the buy-back agreement, which would mean the tax would no longer have to be paid to the ATO. In saying this, we draw parallels between the facts in this case and those in HWG Holdings Pty Ltd v Fairlie Court [2015] VSC 519. There the taxpayers also entered into a buy-back agreement, this time under a mistaken assumption that one party could obtain a franking tax offset as a result of the arrangement. However, the party was not entitled to the offset because it had not held the relevant shares for the statutory 45 day period. Four years later, upon realising the mistake, the parties sought an order of rectification from the Court. The Court, obligingly, agreed to make an order declaring the buy-back agreement void so that it was as if the taxpayers had never entered into the arrangement.

It is not possible to provide a definitive answer as to whether rectification would have been available to Mrs Jurisich. It would certainly have produced a more favourable outcome for her lawyer, Mr Ratner. However, practical difficulties, including the murkiness of the case law on rectification, may have made the prospects of success more remote. This is not to discount the possibility, however, that Mr Ratner or his insurer could have influenced Mrs Jurisich – by covering the cost of the proceeding – to seek an order for rectification by the court as a legitimate means of averting the damage and thereby escaping liability. This could have also produced a more favourable outcome for Mrs Jurisich if, in the circumstances, Mr Ratner did not have the level of insurance cover or the financial means to compensate Mrs Jurisich to the full extent of her loss.

If you have any queries in relation to this tax update, please contact Anthony Pointon on (03) 9614 7707.

Navigating out of the ‘valley of death’ with the aid of ESIC funding

Have you considered investing in an Early Stage Innovation Company (ESIC)? Investing in an ESIC can sound in a reduction in your overall tax bill provided the relevant statutory requirements are met.

The tax breaks arising on investments in ESICs, which were introduced last year, are contained in Division 360-A of ITAA 97. They provide investors in qualifying ESICs with the following tax incentives:

This is a boon for both investors in and founders of innovative start-ups, who may otherwise struggle to raise the capital they need to steer their business out of the high risk period between initial funding and the generating of revenue (referred to in the EM which introduced the Bill, as the ‘valley of death’) when companies often flounder under mounting cash flow pressures. Note that any one ESIC investor cannot end up with more than 30% of the ESIC.

As such, if you have:

your company will meet the Early Stage Limb, and investors in your company may be eligible for the tax offset and modified CGT treatment if it is also meets the Innovation Limb discussed below.

It is recommended that start-up companies undertake steps to qualify as ESICs as early as possible to ensure ESIC investors can start investing in the company in a timely manner. Satisfying the eligibility criteria can be a time-consuming process and can require considerable planning – and potentially some capital outlay – before a company can promote its ESIC status when pitching to investors.

Are you ESIC ready?

To qualify as an ESIC, the company will need to:

The Innovation Limb encompasses two alternate tests, a Points Based Test and a Principles Based Test. The former is an objective test and therefore offers greater certainty than the later test, which is based on subjective criteria.

The Points Based Test will be made out if a company has achieved at least 100 points in accordance with the following criteria:

o   more than half of the company’s total expenses (75 points); or

o   between 15 percent and half of the company’s total expenses (50 points).

o   received funding support under the Australian Government’s “Entrepreneurs’ Programme” (75 points); or

o   completed or is undertaking a qualifying “accelerator program” (50 points).

o   a patent or plant breeder’s right (50 points); or

o   an innovation patent  or registered design (25 points)

The Points Based Test is more readily a self-assessment test.

The Principles Based Test will be satisfied if:

  1. the company is genuinely seeking to develop and commercialise new, or significantly improved, products, processes, services or marketing or organisational methods;
  1. the business has high growth potential;
  1. the business is scalable;
  1. the company can potentially expand to a broader than local market, including global markets, through its business; and
  1. the company has potential competitive advantages.

The Points Based Test appears to favour scientific-related innovation (e.g. development of new inventions and designs), due to the extra points attached to patents, plant breeders rights and registered designs, protected by registration. This is in contrast to non-scientific related innovation of products and services that are instead protected without registration, under Australian copyright law (e.g. the development of software), or that are marketing strategies or trade secrets (e.g. novel business plans), which are not recognised under the Points Based Test, and therefore need to use the Principles Based Test.  However, companies that need to rely on the Principles Based Test are likely to have incurred less expenditure to get to that stage than those able to rely on the Points Based Test.

It appears from the ESIC database (www.esic.directory/) that many pending ESICs are software and marketing focused rather than strictly scientific.

Due to the subjective nature of the Principles Based Test, prospective innovation companies may need to seek a private ruling from the Commissioner about whether their circumstances meet the test.

Reliance on a private ruling from the ATO may involve a drawn out process (around 2 months according to the co-founder of Epic Delivery, one of the first companies to acquire ESIC status) involving back and forth communication. It is noted, however, that the lag time should decrease over time as more ESIC applications are made and the ATO has had a chance to streamline the process.

Ultimately, the success of getting a private ruling will come down to the ATO’s particular approach to interpreting the financial information and evaluating the business model of the company.

As regards the $50,000 minimum investment by a third party criterion under the Points Based Test, whilst this investor is not entitled to the tax offset and CGT exemption (because at that stage the company is not an ESIC), as a “mezzanine” investor, it would usually be the case that they are buying in at a lower price than those investing later and who are entitled to the tax concessions.

Companies can only claim ESIC status for a finite period (between three to six years). Accordingly, start-ups must plan for and establish their ESIC eligibility early so that they can offer investors the tax offset and CGT exemption as soon as possible and maintain their ESIC status for a reasonable length of time.

It is worthwhile noting there is no restriction on how investor funds are used by ESICs – they can be used for innovation purposes or otherwise. However, if the company is relying on the R&D deductions criterion in the points-based test, it must remain conscious of the fact that a significant amount of the expenses of the company must be for R&D purposes.

Companies which satisfy the eligibility criteria may benefit immensely from the tax incentives by making it easier for them to obtain seed funding. The tax incentives also provide an excellent opportunity for investors to contribute to growth and innovation in the Australian economy whilst also easing their overall tax burden.

If you wish to discuss whether your company may be an ESIC or if you are considering investing in an ESIC and would like further information, please contact Anthony Pointonon (03) 9614 7707.

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Note, non-sophisticated or “retail” investors (the definition of a sophisticated investor is contained in s 708 of the Corporations Act 2001) are only entitled to the tax offset of up to $50,000 if they invest no more than $50,000 in ESICs in an income year. A sophisticated investor is not limited to the amount of their investment although their offset is capped at $200,000.

For more information on the R&D tax incentive, see the following link: https://www.ato.gov.au/Business/Research-and-development-tax-incentive/.

For more information on the Entrepreneurs’ Programme, see the following link: https://www.business.gov.au/assistance/entrepreneurs-programme-summary.

There is no clear guidance on what constitutes an accelerator programme, although generally speaking it is a programme which provides access to expert guidance and grants to help businesses commercialise their novel products, processes and services. A list of providers of such programmes can be found e.g. at: https://blog.thefetch.com/startup-incubators-and-accelerators-in-australia/. It is important to note, however, that the accelerator programme must meet the criteria contained in section 360-45 to qualify.

Note that additional criteria may be added by the regulations in the future.

Are You Being Genuine? Small Business Roll-Over Relief For “Genuine” Restructures

Under the Small Business Restructure Roll-over (Div 328-G) , which was introduced to much fanfare last year, small business owners are allowed to change the legal structure of their businesses without incurring a capital gains tax liability to a trust, provided that the economic ownership of the business does not materially change. This is an important legal change as there is no other roll-over that allows you to change from any structure to a trust.

This article discusses why you may restructure and when this roll-over may be used.

Why restructure?

A restructure is generally warranted due to a need to adapt to changing circumstances and sometimes because it was not thought through on initial establishment.

A small business entity (including an individual) may wish to change the legal structure of their business for any of the following reasons:

As is always good practice, personal assets and, where possible, assets used in your business should be kept separate from trading risk, and company and trust structures always offer greater asset protection than businesses operating as sole traders or partnerships.

What requirements you need to satisfy

To qualify for the roll-over, the restructure must involve a small business (a business with a turnover of less than $2 million) or an entity that is connected or affiliated with a small business[1].

Further, the assets that are transferred as part of the restructure must be active assets that are:

Additionally, the roll-over will only apply where a restructure does not “materially” change the “ultimate economic ownership” of the transferred assets, including each individual’s share of the economic ownership where there is more than one economic owner. The question of what is a material change in ultimate economic ownership is less than clear. For instance, is a 98% change in the economic ownership of assets material for the purposes of the roll-over or will it be considered material if only 80% of the ownership changes? Evidently, there is no clear-cut answer to this question.

Notably, this is the first CGT roll-over relief that has allowed restructures from companies to discretionary trusts. However, read in context, it appears to only deal with the transfer of business assets of an entity and not a transfer of shares or units[2]. This view is consistent with the position of the Commissioner as set out in his Law Companion Guidelines (referred to below).

Restructure must be “genuine”

The most contentious part of the roll-over rules is the requirement that the transfer of assets form part of a “genuine restructure of an ongoing business”. This is an integrity measure that is likely to catch out many small business owners who are considering a restructure[3].

The question is, what actually constitutes a genuine restructure of an ongoing business? In contrast to s 83-175, which provides a definition of the term “genuine redundancy payment” and sets out conditions that need to be met under that definition, there is no attempt to explain what is meant by the term “genuine restructure” in the Act[4]. Instead, the task of elucidating the term has been left to the Explanatory Memorandum (“EM”) that accompanied the Bill for the roll-over[5].

It is notable that according to the EM, the genuine restructure test was intended to be broad “to cover the wide range of fact situations to which the roll-over will apply”. The EM nonetheless attempts to narrow down the scope of the test by setting out circumstances that are deemed to satisfy the test and ones which do not.

The Commissioner has taken up and built upon the approach set out in the EM in the ATO Law Companion Guidelines (see LCG 2016/3 “Small Business Restructure Roll-over: genuine restructure of an ongoing business and related matters”).[6]

According to the Guidelines, features that point to a transfer of assets forming part of a genuine restructure of an ongoing business include:

o   facilitate growth, innovation and diversification;

o   adapt to changed conditions; or

o   reduce administrative burdens, compliance costs and/or cash flow impediments;

According to the Commissioner, features which indicate that a restructure is not genuine include:

These features are either stated in or are otherwise consistent with the general tenor of the EM.

Whilst the Commissioner states that restructures that are contrived or unduly tax driven may lead to the conclusion that the genuine restructure requirement is not satisfied, the Commissioner nonetheless acknowledges that tax considerations are factors that can be taken into account. For example, it is permissible for a sole trader subject to the highest marginal rate to move to a company structure to access the lower corporate tax rate.

However, the line between those tax considerations that can be taken into account under the condition and those which cannot is unclear. As such, if tax considerations are a major reason why a restructure is sought, care must be taken to ensure that this does not disqualify your business from availing itself of the roll-over[7].

It is necessary to note, however, that a court interpreting the legislation is only entitled to refer to the extrinsic materials (such as the EM) if it considers the words in the legislation ambiguous. Further, the courts will often divine the meaning of ambiguous words by looking at the way they have been interpreted in other cases, before consulting the EM. They will seldom, if at all, consider the guidelines and public rulings[8] issued by the Commissioner. It therefore remains to be seen whether the courts choose to adopt the same approach taken in the EM and the ATO Guidelines.

Rather than follow the position in the EM, the courts may choose to develop their approach to the genuine restructure test by reference to the safe harbour rule that has been included with the roll-over. This is because the courts will generally interpret words used in legislation by reference to the text and structure of the legislation rather than, as noted above, through recourse to extrinsic materials.

The safe harbour rule was included in the legislation as an attempt to provide small business owners with some certainty in satisfying the genuine restructure condition. Under the safe harbour rule, the genuine restructure condition will be taken to be satisfied if, for three years[9] following the restructure:

  1. there is no change in the ultimate economic ownership of the significant assets of the business;
  2. those assets continue to be active assets of the business; and
  3. there is no material use of those assets for private purposes.

As can be seen, the three conditions contained in the safe harbour rule are much more limited than the indicia said to evidence a genuine restructure used in the EM. If the courts’ approach to the genuine restructure test is drawn from and informed by only the three conditions, the roll-over may apply to a wider range of circumstances and will be more favourable to small business owners. We will have to wait for a case to come before the courts.

Non-CGT tax implications

The EM and the Commissioner warn that small business owners still need to take into account consequences not affected by the roll-over, such as stamp duty or GST, when contemplating a restructure.

If you are interested in finding out more about the Small Business Restructure Roll-over or would like any other advice regarding your tax affairs, please contact Anthony Pointon, Robert Gordon or Jonathan Slade.

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[1] This means that the rollover can apply where there is a restructure involving an entity that is not carrying on a business but is holding assets that are used by a related entity that is small business.

[2] Whilst there is no express prohibition, there is a reference in the EM to relief for the transfer of shares being dealt with by Div 615.

[3] As was the case when, responding to considerable public anger, Parliament sought to ameliorate the harshness of Div 7A by providing the Commissioner with a discretion to overlook “honest mistakes” (s109RB), words chosen like “genuine restructure” leave the Commissioner in a position to deny relief where his view might not accord with the politicians’ expectations of the amendments to the law they passed.

[4] One could be forgiven for thinking that the use of the work “genuine” might simply be the opposite to “sham”: for recent examples concerning whether a loan was a sham as opposed to “genuine”, see Millar [2015[ FCAFC 94 at [46] & [83} & Normandy Finance [2016] FCAFC 180 at [66].

[5] That is more than can be said of the EM that accompanied the introduction of the demerger roll-over in 2002 with respect to the meaning of “genuine demergers” in s 45B. The absence of any substantial explanation of that term caused considerable confusion amongst taxpayers and their advisers as to the scope of the roll-over. It is a telling fact that the term “genuine” is no longer included in the wording of the demerger roll-over provision.

[6] LCG 2016/3 is a binding Public Ruling, which means that the Commissioner is obliged to provide taxpayers the treatment specified in the Ruling if it ends up being more favourable to the taxpayer than the law actually provides.

[7] In any event, as the general anti-avoidance provision (Part IVA) disregards restructures where the dominant purpose of a party to the restructure is to avoid tax, as a minimum, the restructure under Div 328-G must have a non-tax purpose(s) which, viewed objectively, outweighs any tax purpose.

[8] Unless it is alleged by the taxpayer that the Commissioner has not given the taxpayer the benefit of the ruling. In contrast, the AAT, as it is an administrative tribunal rather than a court, will consider the Commissioner’s rulings as it stands “in the shoes of the Commissioner”.

[9] One would have thought that if the restructure met the conditions of the safe harbour but the owner then receives an unexpected offer to sell, which is taken up within the 3 years, the Commissioner should nonetheless consider the restructure to have been genuine.

Australian Tax Residence for Companies Revisited by High Court after 43 years

For the first time in 43 years, Australia’s ultimate appeal court (the High Court of Australia) has decided a case on the issue of “central management and control” of certain foreign incorporated companies: Bywater Investments Limited v FC of T; Hwa Wang Bank Ltd v FC of T [2016] HCA 45. Central management and control is a common law concept, so UK case law is important. We reported on the decision at first instance in our 4 Feb 2015 Taxation Update.

As the appellant companies had conceded that they were carrying on business in Australia, the companies would be Australian tax residents if their “central management and control” was in Australia.

The last time the High Court dealt with that issue was the decision of Gibbs J in Esquire Nominees Limited v FC of T [1972] 129 CLR 177 affirmed as to the central management and control point by the full High Court. There the Norfolk Island board of the Norfolk Island company actually considered recommendations of the Australian accountants to the Australian parent company, considered and implemented them. However, because their decisions were found have been in the best interests of the company and they would not have done anything which would be unlawful, the central management and control was found to be in Norfolk Island.

For present purposes it should be noted that the plurality in Bywater said at [82], the appellants contended that, since Esquire Nominees was decided, that “there has been a general accepted understanding in Courts and within the academy that the central management control of a company is taken to be an exercise where the company’s board meets to exercise its constitutional functions, and therefore that the company will be taken to be residents abroad even if the board does no more than mechanically implement instructions given by residents of Australia”. (The writer understands the usual expression “academy” in this context was intended to refer to academics as a group).

The High Court in Bywater found that all decisions of the foreign incorporated companies in that case were in fact made by Mr Vanda Gould in Sydney, on the basis that the offshore directors where simply “rubber stamping” his instructions, or that no board meetings were held at all.

Whilst based on the authority of Esquire Nominees, the decision in Bywater is not surprising given the original findings of facts about Mr Gould, the applicants’ submission as to the threat of uncertainty and litigation if its understanding of Esquire Nominees was not accepted, which the High Court said at [80] were “exaggerated”, the case still sends a clear message that the question of “central management control” is always a question of fact not answered by simply holding board meetings outside Australia.

UK Wake Up Calls

Indeed it may have been assumed that the status quo following Esquire Nominees was as the applicants submitted in Bywater, at least until the UK Inland Revenue started to test the tax residency status of foreign companies that claim to be tax residents outside the UK in the mid-1990s.  Perhaps this first became apparent with the decision of the Special Commissioner in Untelrab Limited v McGregor (Inspector of Taxes) [1996] STC (SCD) 1.  Whilst the Special Commissioners held that the company in that case was resident in Bermuda and applied Esquire Nominees, what was noteworthy was the depth of analysis of the evidence of the activities of the company over a six year period, including cross-examination of the offshore directors.  It is noted that the decision in Untelrab was footnoted by the High Court in Bywater at footnote [132].

The next “wakeup call” coming from the UK was the criminal prosecutions in R v Dimsey; R v Allen, [2000] QB 744where the defendants were jailed for “conspiracy to cheat the Public Revenue” in circumstances where Mr Dimsey (a solicitor in Jersey as a director of Jersey and other haven companies) acting on the instructions of his client Mr Allen in the UK, who was not an actual director, but rather a “shadow” director.  R v Dimsey; R v Allen were not referred to by the High Court in Bywater as those cases were criminal cases.

Subsequently, in Wood v Holden (HMIT) [2006] EWCA Civ 26, the Esquire Nominees principle was confirmed, that the place where a board of directors exercises its duties (properly), will be the place of its “central management and control” (in that case, The Netherlands), even where the controlling shareholders, or advisers recommend or even expect the board to reach certain decisions, and those persons are elsewhere (UK). In that case, the directors carried out their duties responsibly.

Another UK case which if sufficient attention had been paid to it, might have sent a further warning about complacency in the corporate governance of offshore subsidiaries of Australian resident parties, was the UK First Tier Tribunal decision in Laerstate BV v Revenue & Customs [2009] UKFTT 209 (TC), where a Dutch company was found to be tax resident of the UK again, demonstrating the detailed enquiry into the decision making process of the directors (and for a period, a “shadow” director), and again referring to Esquire Nominees with approval, but with a somewhat more detailed emphasis on whether the director who did not own the company, had sufficient information before him to be able to make an informed decision. Note, Laerstate was not footnoted in Bywater.

The High Court also distinguished trading and finance companies from special purpose companies, in relation to the impact of the authority of Esquire Nominees, which company only had to implement one transaction. What that probably means is that trading and finance companies’ boards will have to meet far more often to make the high level decisions of the company. However, the High Court couldn’t be taken to be suggesting that the delegation of day to day decisions to management (or indeed to one director) would invariably mean that the board’s authority had been usurped. However, having a board protocol and a clear rule as to delineation of day to day management from high level board type decisions, should make it clear to management that they need the board’s authority to carry out other than day to day operations. So in essence, an offshore company needs to be governed in the same fashion as a listed company (with a clear delineation between the functions of the board compared to managers), rather than the fusion that takes place in an owner run small private Australian company.

The reality is that as the ATO had not apparently challenged the tax residence of foreign subsidiaries of Australian companies (at least as is apparent from reported Court and Tribunal decisions after 1972 and before 2011 (in Crown Insurance)), the UK warnings after the UK Inland Revenue became active in the area, sounded by Untelrab, R v Dimsey; R v Allen, Wood v Holden, and Larestate, may not have been sufficiently heard in Australia, and so a sense of complacency may have developed.

Some Suggestions

Whilst pure formalistic responses will not be enough, it is certainly the case that ensuring that directors do met to consider proposals put forward by the parent company or individual owners (rather than have an Australian resident director or “shadow” director bind or act on the company’s behalf and only inform the board after the fact), and the directors have sufficient information in front of them to make an informed decision (as well as the Esquire Nominees baseline- only acting in the best interests of the company and not doing anything which would be unlawful), will go a long way to solving the problems that may flow from more vigorous ATO enquiry as to the “central management & control” of foreign companies doing business in Australia or which are majority owned by Australian residents.

As the onus of proof will always be on the company that claims it is a non-resident, ensuring that the persons chosen to be directors of such companies have the knowledge, skill and diligence to carry out their duties, and have sufficient credibility that they can give evidence in an Australian Court or Tribunal (which may not be permitted to be by video-link, but by travelling to Australia), of how they have fulfilled that role, will be extremely important if the foreign company is challenged. At a practical level, this will invariably increase the cost of having that function performed by a non-resident director.

Pointon Partners have special expertise in International Tax.

If you have any queries in relation to this tax update, please contact the writer Robert Gordon, or Anthony Pointon.

Australian Diverted Profits Tax (“DPT”)

Australia has followed the UK path of pre-empting the implementation of the OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) final reports dated 5 October 2015 which deals with international tax avoidance alleged against by the likes of Google and Amazon. The UK introduced its Diverted Profits Tax with effect from 1 April 2015. In Australia, this has happened by:

a) introducing essentially the first limb of the UK DPT relating to “Avoided PE’s” by non-residents, by amendments to the general anti-avoidance provisions (Part IVA) (the amendments commonly known as the Multinational Anti-Avoidance Law (“MAAL”) ) effective 1 January 2016, and

b) by proposing the introduction of the second limb of the UK DPT as a tax, standing outside the Australian Income Tax Assessment Acts, with proposed start-up date being 1 July 2017. Like the second limb of UK DPT, the Australian DPT will apply to residents transferring profits, assets or risks offshore, through related party transactions that lack economic substance, giving rise to an “Effective Tax Mismatch”.

Pre-emption of the BEPS initiative is likely to result in unrelieved double taxation.
Both Australian limbs affect only “Significant Global Entities” (annual global consolidation accounting profits of A$1B). In contrast, the UK DPT affects taxpayers who are not SMEs (i.e. >250 employees > €50 million turnover > €43 million net assets)
Unlike both limbs of the UK DPT, the MAAL is not a tax separate to income tax, and by virtue of the provision of s4(2) of the International Agreements Act 1953, is an express treaty override by Part IVA.  Since that provision has been in existence since Part IVA was introduced in 1981, it was well known to Australia’s treaty partners in entering treaties or revising treaties from that date.  Indeed, it made sense to tackle the issue of Avoided PE in the Australian domestic law with the effect that any additional Australian tax raised by the measure should be creditable in the non-resident taxpayer’s home jurisdiction under treaty provisions.
The proposed introduction of the second limb of the UK DPT as an Australian DPT is completely different to the MAAL, as it expressly purports not to be an income tax (presumably relying on the logic of the UK Court of Appeal decision in Bricom Holdings), and would arguably not be creditable in the non-resident taxpayer’s home jurisdiction under treaty provisions.
Also, the MAAL may be seen as simply bringing forward the implementation of amendments to bilateral treaties recommended by BEPS action item 7, and as already implemented in the new Australia/Germany treaty.  If indeed a Multilateral Tax Treaty is entered into under BEPS action item 15, which covers Avoided PE’s, and most of Australia’s treaty partners become parties to such a Multilateral Tax Treaty, the introduction of the MAAL will ultimately prove not to be as controversial as the Australian DPT.
Just like the criticism of the UK DPT, the Australian commentators have been likewise vocal concerning the Australian DPT for the reasons noted above, and also for the reason that the Effective Tax Mismatch requirement (that the non-resident receiving the Australian diverted profits be taxed at least at a level of 80% of Australia’s now relatively high 30% corporate tax rate, compared to the UK’s now competitive 20% corporate tax rate), means that many non-resident jurisdictions including the UK itself, now have a corporate tax rate which would still give rise to an Effective Tax Mismatch.
The three examples given by the Australian Treasury in its document “Implementing a Diverted Profits Tax”, are all arguably able to be countered under existing Australian law, with the implication that the introduction of the Australian DPT at a penal 40% tax rate (UK DPT rate 25%) is a heavy handed response to frustrations in raising the tax the Government thinks should be raised, on a timely basis.
Both Australian limbs could easily be recalibrated down from the Significant Global Entity threshold in the future, to impact even SMEs. There is likely to be some refinement in the final form of the DPT, after consultation.
Pointon Partners have special expertise in international tax.  If you have any queries regarding the above please contact Robert Gordon of our office on (03) 9614 7707.

Australian Diverted Profits Tax (“DPT”)

Australia has followed the UK path of pre-empting the implementation of the OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) final reports dated 5 October 2015 which deals with international tax avoidance alleged against by the likes of Google and Amazon. The UK introduced its Diverted Profits Tax with effect from 1 April 2015. In Australia, this has happened by:

a) introducing essentially the first limb of the UK DPT relating to “Avoided PE’s” by non-residents, by amendments to the general anti-avoidance provisions (Part IVA) (the amendments commonly known as the Multinational Anti-Avoidance Law (“MAAL”) ) effective 1 January 2016, and

b) by proposing the introduction of the second limb of the UK DPT as a tax, standing outside the Australian Income Tax Assessment Acts, with proposed start-up date being 1 July 2017. Like the second limb of UK DPT, the Australian DPT will apply to residents transferring profits, assets or risks offshore, through related party transactions that lack economic substance, giving rise to an “Effective Tax Mismatch”.

Pre-emption of the BEPS initiative is likely to result in unrelieved double taxation.

Both Australian limbs affect only “Significant Global Entities” (annual global consolidation accounting profits of A$1B). In contrast, the UK DPT affects taxpayers who are not SMEs (i.e. >250 employees > €50 million turnover > €43 million net assets)

Unlike both limbs of the UK DPT, the MAAL is not a tax separate to income tax, and by virtue of the provision of s4(2) of the International Agreements Act 1953, is an express treaty override by Part IVA.  Since that provision has been in existence since Part IVA was introduced in 1981, it was well known to Australia’s treaty partners in entering treaties or revising treaties from that date.  Indeed, it made sense to tackle the issue of Avoided PE in the Australian domestic law with the effect that any additional Australian tax raised by the measure should be creditable in the non-resident taxpayer’s home jurisdiction under treaty provisions.

The proposed introduction of the second limb of the UK DPT as an Australian DPT is completely different to the MAAL, as it expressly purports not to be an income tax (presumably relying on the logic of the UK Court of Appeal decision in Bricom Holdings), and would arguably not be creditable in the non-resident taxpayer’s home jurisdiction under treaty provisions.

Also, the MAAL may be seen as simply bringing forward the implementation of amendments to bilateral treaties recommended by BEPS action item 7, and as already implemented in the new Australia/Germany treaty.  If indeed a Multilateral Tax Treaty is entered into under BEPS action item 15, which covers Avoided PE’s, and most of Australia’s treaty partners become parties to such a Multilateral Tax Treaty, the introduction of the MAAL will ultimately prove not to be as controversial as the Australian DPT.

Just like the criticism of the UK DPT, the Australian commentators have been likewise vocal concerning the Australian DPT for the reasons noted above, and also for the reason that the Effective Tax Mismatch requirement (that the non-resident receiving the Australian diverted profits be taxed at least at a level of 80% of Australia’s now relatively high 30% corporate tax rate, compared to the UK’s now competitive 20% corporate tax rate), means that many non-resident jurisdictions including the UK itself, now have a corporate tax rate which would still give rise to an Effective Tax Mismatch.

The three examples given by the Australian Treasury in its document “Implementing a Diverted Profits Tax”, are all arguably able to be countered under existing Australian law, with the implication that the introduction of the Australian DPT at a penal 40% tax rate (UK DPT rate 25%) is a heavy handed response to frustrations in raising the tax the Government thinks should be raised, on a timely basis.

Both Australian limbs could easily be recalibrated down from the Significant Global Entity threshold in the future, to impact even SMEs. There is likely to be some refinement in the final form of the DPT, after consultation.

Pointon Partners have special expertise in international tax.  If you have any queries regarding the above please contact Robert Gordon of our office on (03) 9614 7707.

Increasing use of tax-transparent entities by private groups due to BEPS

Abstract: To date, the effect of the base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) project is that Australian-owned private companies whose business could be affected by ecommerce are largely able to avoid high rates of foreign taxation. This allows significant deferral of Australian tax liability until the profits from the overseas activities are ultimately released into the hands of Australian resident individuals. This would often involve the use of tax haven subsidiaries of an Australian company, selling into a world market, without a taxable presence in the country of the customer. The result of implementation of one or more of the action items of the BEPS project may create a situation where Australian private companies’ non-resident subsidiaries will increasingly become liable to more foreign taxes than in the past. This article examines the tax-transparent entities that might be available to owners of Australian-owned private companies in several countries, and compares the pros and cons of each.

To see the article published in The Tax Specialist journal of the Taxation Institute, click on the link here