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NSW Court of Appeal finds Uber liable for $81m Payroll Tax Assessment

On 1 August 2025, the New South Wales Court of Appeal overturned the Supreme Court’s earlier decision to relieve Uber of six payroll tax assessments amounting to $81,515,923 and which we covered in an article late last year here. These assessments related to payments Uber received from riders using the Uber app on their phones with a portion of those payments remitted to the drivers that carried on the driving service.

Executive Summary

  1. This is a significant decision given the implications that it has on the extensive use of contractors by many businesses.
  2. The fundamental issue to be determined is whether a business is supplying a service to a contractor (no payroll liability to the business) or whether the contractor is supplying services to the business (payroll liability to the business). Here it was determined that the Uber contractors were supplying a service to the business of Uber.
  3. As such, it is likely that we will see revenue authorities in all States and Territories with similar pieces of legislation to begin to ramp up collecting revenue from businesses with similar structures to Uber.

Background

The Uber Driver/Rider service works through two apps, the Driver App and the Rider App, of which drivers and riders can use to connect with each other. Much like a taxi fare, the rider is charged a fare for the provision of the driving service provided by the designated driver on the app. The fare is received by Uber who takes a portion of the fare (20% to 25%) with the rest being passed on to the driver. The below diagram displays how this arrangement works for the parties involved:

As noted in our earlier article, the Chief Commissioner issued payroll tax assessment which amounted to $81 million for the 2015 to 2020 financial years for the amounts remitted back to the drivers.

Decision

Several issues were covered by the Court of Appeal in regard to this decision, however the three main issues may be summarised as follows:

  1. Whether driving was a service supplied by drivers to Uber “under” the driver contracts for the purpose of section 32(1)(b) of the Payroll Tax Act 2007 (NSW) (PTA). The sub issues considered here consisted of the following:
    1. Was driving a service supplied to Uber?
    2. Was the driving service “supplied” under the driving contracts?
  2. Whether amounts collected by Uber from riders and remitted to drivers are “for or in relation to the performance of work within section 35(1) of the PTA;
  3. Whether amounts collected by Uber from riders and remitted to drivers are “paid or payable” by Uber within section 35(1) of the PTA.

Issue 1 – Whether Driving was a Service Supplied by Drivers to Uber “under” the Driver Contracts for the purpose of Section 32(1)(b) of the PTA.

Was driving a service supplied to Uber?

Uber contended that their present case was distinguishable with the High Court’s decision in Accident Compensation Commission v Odco Pty Ltd [1990] HCA 43 on the basis that Uber was not fulfilling any contract that it had with the passengers to provide a ride. The driving service was supplied to the rider alone. Uber was a mere third party arranging for the ride to take place between the driver and rider. As such, Uber stated they were not getting the driver’s service in the same way the agency was in Odco.

Uber also attempted to distinguish their case from Thomas & Naaz where doctors who performed services to patients at medical practices were also held to have provided services to the medical practices in relation to the performance of work. First, Uber stated that the doctors owed the medical practices an obligation to provide the medical services to the patients that attended to the practice. Secondly, the performance of the doctor’s duties to the medical practice required “positive actions” by the medical practitioners on a continual basis while the contract was in force (i.e. the doctors were required, under their contract with the medical practice, to provide medical services to the patients, attending the medical centre, adhering to its protocol and taking leave as permitted).

Uber said that the drivers “were not obliged to use Uber’s software application for drivers, and if they did so, were not obliged to accept trip requests, nor were they obliged to perform requests once accepted. Put simply, unlike the medical practitioners, there was no “positive action” required on the part of the drivers to perform the driving services and other requirements unlike the medical practitioners in Thomas & Naaz.

The Court of Appeal found that the driving service was indeed supplied to Uber. Central to their reasoning was the reaping of a financial benefit by Uber from the provision of the driving service by the driver to the rider. Put simply, the driving service was a service supplied to Uber as it generated a financial benefit for them, that being in the form of the service fee of 20% to 25% that they collected initially. Our Emphasis:

From Uber’s perspective, the exercise of the legal rights described above is not a mere collateral benefit of the contractual relationships it establishes with drivers and riders; it is a (if not primary) purpose of those contractual relationships. Uber’s entitlement to exercise those rights depends on the driver’s performance of the driving service. Without the provision of such a service, Uber’s business could not function. In that sense, drivers clearly “supply” a service to Uber by doing something that is necessary for Uber to derive service fees and to continue its business. That is more than “simply performing an act that assists another” in some sort of Good Samaritan sense. Bearing in mind the purpose of Pt 3, Div 7 of the Payroll Tax Act, the service of driving is plainly a service supplied “to” Uber within the meaning of s32(1)(b).

Was the driving service “supplied” under the driver contracts?

Uber accepted that while having access to the Driver App gave the drivers a chance to “drive for gain” and that this chance stems from the driver contracts, this was merely a practical opportunity and not a legal arrangement between Uber and the driver. The contract merely opened the door for drivers to drive for the riders, it does not legally bind the drivers to drive for Uber. The drivers voluntarily chose to do so out of their own whim, and were not compelled by a contract. For example, Uber compared itself to an internet company which allows users to receive job offers (as a freelancer/contractor) and that this does not mean the internet company is receiving the work the freelancer/contractor does as a result.

The Court found that section 32(1)(b) refers to “a contract under which a person… has supplied to … service”. The word “under” here describes a relationship between two subject-matters, a contract and a supply of services. As such, the necessary question to ask here is when the driver is performing the driving service for the rider, is that service something Uber is getting from the driver as part of that contract.

In considering this, the Court noted that the purpose of Div 7 of the PTA does not provide any reason to construe the word “under” as capturing only services which the contract confers the legal right, or imposes a legal obligation, to perform. This is so given the extended definition of contract in section 31 includes arrangements or undertakings, whether formal or informal and whether express or implied. Hence, the main question to ask here is whether the person supplying the service does so on a similar basis to ordinary employees, with the consideration that casual employees are ordinary employees, but at common law they need not have a contractual right, not a contractual obligation to work at any particular time at all, much like the Uber drivers.

With this in mind, a significant aspect on which employees (including casual employees) supply their services is that it confers on them the right to be paid. In considering the text, context and purpose of Div 7, the Court found that the words, “a contract under which…” in section 32(1) of the PTA extends to a contract:

In applying this construction, in particular with point 2 and 3 above, the Court found that the driver contracts are clearly contracts under which Uber has the driving service supplied to it and that drivers have no reason to perform the driving service except to be paid, and they perform the service in the context of the driver contracts.

Issue 2 – Whether amounts collected by Uber from riders and remitted to drivers are “for or in relation to the performance” of work within section 35(1)

To reiterate, the trial judge found that the payments remitted to the drivers from Uber were not for or in relation to the performance of work. Central to this reasoning was the fact that there was “no element of reciprocity or calibration between the driver and Uber or the rider and Uber with respect to the money paid by the rider.” Essentially, those elements only existed between the driver and rider with the conclusion reached that what Uber paid the drivers is in relation to the payment Uber received, not in relation to the work itself.

The Court stated that the trial judge failed to deal with the “nub of the issue” being that they did not consider the nature and strength of the required relationship between the amounts paid or payable on the one hand and the performance of work under the contract on the other. In considering the authorities such as Odco and Smith’s Snackfood, the plurality found that the relevant connection be that the services supplied must be work related.

Applying this to the case at hand, the payments made by Uber to the drivers were related to the work performed in transporting the riders. The payments were calculated in regard to the driving service minus the service fee deducted by Uber when they remitted the payment back to the driver. Hence, there is a direct relationship between the provision of the driving services by the drivers and the amounts payable by Uber.

Issue 3 – Whether amounts collected by Uber from riders and remitted to drivers are “paid or payable” by Uber within section 35(1) of the PTA

The Court found that the trial judge erred in finding that there was no connection between the payments made by Uber to the Drivers and the driving service done by the Driver and that Uber operated as a mere payment collection agent.

Uber’s initial argument was that the definition of “paid” found in the PTA contemplated the fact that the payment must be quid pro quo. That quid pro quo relationship cannot be found between Uber and the drivers and therefore, “the remitting of that amount by the employer (Uber) to the employee (the Driver) is not part of the employer’s payroll, and is not “paid” or “payable” by the employer in the sense used in section 35(1).” Uber merely complied with its obligations to remit to the driver the funds that had been earned by the drivers from riders and merely collected on behalf of the driver.

The Court rejected this argument and found that Uber found no clear reason to depart from Thomas & Naaz and Optical Superstore with the strength of the similarities between these two cases and the facts of this case being fatal to Uber. In assessing these authorities, two points emerged which strongly indicated that payments collected by Uber and remitted back to the drivers were paid/payable by Uber within section 35(1) of the PTA:

  1. The PTA does not contemplate the flow of money in question and whether that money is beneficially owned by the recipient. There is no limitation on the words “paid or payable” within the PTA that indicates otherwise; and
  2. The words, “for or in relation to the performance of work” show that there has to be a connection between the funds provided and the performance of work.

Here, the Court said that Uber played a significant role in organising rides and setting dates. The Uber rides are organised through the Uber app with the payments being calculated by Uber itself. Their involvement in the arrangement between the driver’s provision of their service to the riders strongly indicated a close degree of connection between the funds provided and the driving service. Additionally, the fact that the drivers beneficially owned part of the money collected by Uber did not dispel the notion that the payments from Uber to the drivers were “paid or payable” by Uber pursuant to the PTA. The similarities of the circumstances of this case to Optical Superstore and Thomas & Naaz, where the employees also beneficially owned the monies, much like how the drivers did, indicated to the Court that there was no reason to depart from the reasoning in those cases.

Implications

  1. This is a significant decision given the implications that it has on the extensive use of contractors by many businesses.
  2. The fundamental issue to be determined is whether a business is supplying a service to a contractor (no payroll liability to the business) or whether the contractor is supplying services to the business (payroll liability to the business). Here it was determined that the Uber contractors were supplying a service to the business of Uber.
  3. As such, it is likely that we will see revenue authorities in all States and Territories with similar pieces of legislation to begin to ramp up collecting revenue from businesses with similar structures to Uber.
  4. The Court’s rejection of the trial judge’s reasoning will likely make it easier for State Revenue authorities to consider how their relevant payroll tax acts may apply to similar circumstances, especially in Victoria which shares many similarities with its NSW equivalent.
  5. As such, business arrangements that are analogous to this case may need to review their arrangements, and also be aware of potential liabilities in payroll and WorkCover that may be assessed to them.

We are happy to review for risk assessment purposes a business you may have concerns in respect of.

Should you wish to discuss the above, please contact Tony Pointon and Andrew Pointon of our Taxation Team.

If you are facing a similar issue, see our page on payroll tax disputes.

Mid-August Tax Update

This article provides an update on key developments in taxation law for accountants and participants in the tax advice industry for mid-August. This update in summary covers:

  1. Federal Court’s rejection of Taxpayer’s claim for approximately $20m in deductions;
  2. Whether payment for Long Service Leave incurred in Income Year;
  3. Businessman failed to prove assessments were excessive for failing to keep proper records; and
  4. Successful Poker Player failed to account for $9.25m in deposits were not assessable income.

Further, these cases highlight the importance of record keeping, and unfortunately for some of these taxpayers, their credibility in the Tribunal and Federal Court.

1 – South Seas Holdings Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2025] FCA 848 – Taxpayer’s Claim for Interest and Management Fees Denied.

A group of companies controlled by Vanda Gould were denied deductions for interest and management fees by the Federal Court. These companies included:

The disputed deductions included interest of $18,478,736, and, management fees totalling $1,142,000 between 2001 and 2014. These payments were made to entities that were effectively controlled by Vanda Gould. The taxpayers argued that:

The Federal Court found the evidence provided by Vanda Gould lacked any credibility, noting that “the account of Mr Gould as to these two matters to be entirely unconvincing and one which exposed Mr Gould’s own past contrivances as to his financial affairs in the context of family law proceedings… the following matters provide further support for the conclusions I have reached as to the lack of credibility in Mr Gould’s evidence based upon those parts of his testimony that concerned the interest and management fee deductions claimed by the taxpayers”.

The Court noted that the taxpayer did not incur the interest and management fee obligations and that their books of accounts did not reflect the commercial reality of the underlying transactions. Rather, they said that Mr Gould had merely directed the flow of the funds through companies that he controlled to minimise his tax liabilities. The deductions for the interest were framed in a way that produced little or no taxable income for the companies.

2 – Bennetts v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2025] ARTA 1092 – Interest for contributions from Long Service Leave not derived prior to Taxpayer being Beneficially Entitled

The issue in this case was the timing for tax purposes in regard to the taxpayer deriving interest on contributions made pursuant to the Construction Industry Long Service Leave Fund. The payments were made on 6 July 2021, however the taxpayer did not include the payment for his returns in the 2021-22 income years. However, the ATO amended the assessment and included the payment in his amended assessment. The taxpayer argued that the relevant statutory provisions, Trust Deed and Rules of the Fund operated so that the interest payments (for the purpose of s 6-5(4) ITAA97) were derived in the 1988, 1989 and early 1990s, with many of those years being time barred per s170 ITAA36.

The Tribunal rejected the taxpayer’s argument and said that under the governing documents, the taxpayer did not have an absolute entitlement to any income not the right to call for payment in the prior income years. He merely had an expectation of the payments in the prior years. Further, the taxpayer became absolutely entitled to said payments when certain conditions were met and those conditions were met during the 2021-22 income years. As a result, the payments were derived in the 2021-22 income years.

3 – Dalby v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2025] ARTA 1060 – Businessman failed to keep Proper Records for Amended Assessments

The taxpayer here was a businessman from QLD whose range of businesses included the construction and rental of student accommodation, delivery of workplace machinery training and trading in scrap gold. He returned no assessable income for the 2013 to 2016 income years, his declared expenses was higher than his declared income for those years. Following this, the ATO commenced an audit into the taxpayer’s affairs and amended his assessment with his additional income tax liability and penalties totalling approximately $3m.

The issues here consisted of the following:

The Tribunal upheld the amended assessments given the taxpayer had failed to keep proper records, issue tax voices for work he had done, keep receipts for the expenses he incurred. The ART had commented that:

As a reminder, taxpayers always have the burden of proving that their assessment were either excessive or incorrect, or that the taxation decision should have been made differently per section 14ZZK of the Taxation Administration Act 1953.

4 – Tran v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2025] ARTA 1036 – Poker Player assessed for $9.25m in addition to Penalties

Ti Ke Tran, the taxpayer, and also known as “Lucky Eddie”, a successful amateur poker player has recently been assessed with a significant income tax liability, in addition to penalties, for failing to explain where several deposits, totalling $9.25m, came from.

In 2017, the ATO audited the taxpayer for failing to lodge income tax returns in the 2014, 2015 and 2016 income years. This had resulted in the ATO issuing an amended assessment for those years for unexplained deposits into his bank account totalling approximately $9.25m. The taxpayer attempted to argue that these deposits were from his poker winnings and repayments of loans he provided to friends and family. Further, he had assumed that his poker winnings were from his hobby and were not assessable so kept no records.

Despite the Tribunal agreeing that the taxpayer was a successful poker player, the taxpayer had failed to show that the deposits into his account were loan repayments. There were several deficiencies in the taxpayer’s case of which included:

Should you wish to discuss the above, please contact Tony Pointon and Andrew Pointon of our Taxation Team.

Late June Tax Update

This article provides an update on key developments in taxation law for accountants and participants in the tax advice industry for late June. This update in summary covers:

  1. High Court’s Grant of Special Leave for Bendel Decision
  2. Provision of Motor Vehicles to Directors of Corporate Trustee assessed as Fringe Benefits
  3. Principal Place of Residence Exemption rejected for Residential Property with a Commercial Premise.

1 – Bendel Decision – High Court Grants Special Leave to ATO

The High Court has granted special leave to the ATO to hear its appeal against the Full Federal Court decision in Commissioner of Taxation v Bendel [2025] FCAFC 15. The Deputy Commissioner has also released an update regarding the ATO’s position on Bendel. However, it differs little from the one covered in our update last month.

In short, the Deputy Commissioner answers the following queries:

2 – FCT v SEPL Pty Ltd as Trustee of the SFT Trust [2025 FCA 581] – Provision of Luxury Motor Vehicles to Directors of Corporate Trustee considered Fringe Benefits

In this case, the Federal Court held that 3 brothers who controlled a family business through a family trust were employees of the taxpayer trustee company with the non-cash benefits provided to them being characterised as fringe benefits.

The taxpayer was the corporate trustee of a family discretionary trust that carried on several profitable businesses. The beneficiaries included three brothers who were directors of the corporate trustee. In the 2016-2020 FBT years, the brothers acquired 40 luxury vehicles of which they had exclusive use of. The Commissioner assessed the trust to additional FBT on the value of the luxury vehicles. The corporate trustee objected to this, stating that the brothers were not employees and the exclusive use of the vehicles was not in respect of employment. The Federal Court allowed the ATO’s appeal.

The Federal Court applied section 137 (1) which broadens the definition of employment under the Fringe Benefits Tax Assessment Act 1986. Notably, each of the brothers:

Due to this, the brothers were treated as employees under s136(1).

The Court also found that the benefits were provided in respect of their employment. The main issue here was whether there is a sufficient or material relationship, rather than a causal connection or relationship, between the provision of the motor vehicles and employment. The Court found that on the evidence supplied, the provision of the vehicles was conferred on the brothers in respect of their employment as an employee.

3 – Simich v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue – NSW Principal Place of Residence Exemption Unavailable

The NSW Supreme Court upheld an earlier Tribunal decision finding that the principal place of residence exemption under Section 6 of Schedule 1A of the Land Tax Management Act 1956 was unavailable, given the proposed use of part of the property would have been unlawful.

The taxpayer purchased the property in question in December 2020 with the intention of constructing a 4-storey residence on the land with space on the ground floor for commercial use. The taxpayer intended that the commercial spaces be left vacant. During the 2021 to 2022 land tax years in which the land was undergoing construction, the taxpayer was assessed for land tax. They objected on the basis that they intended to use it as the principal place of residence under Section 6 Schedule 1A of the LTMA.

The Court had agreed with the Tribunal’s view that although the taxpayer intended to leave the commercial spaces vacant, they would be using and occupying those spaces for residential purposes as part of their home. Further, since the parties agreed that the residential use of the commercially zoned areas was unlawful, any such intended use was unlawful under section 6(2)(c) and the principal residence exemption did not apply.

However, in obiter, the Court noted that if the parties had not agreed on the unlawfulness of the residential use of the commercial space, the Tribunal’s reasoning may have been incorrect.

Should you wish to discuss the above, please contact Tony Pointon and Andrew Pointon of our Taxation Team.

Early June Tax Update

This article provides an update on key developments in taxation law for accountants and participants in the tax advice industry for early June. This update in summary covers:

  1. How the ART does not have power to stay an imposition of GIC
  2. ART found Home Office and Car Expenses Deductible
  3. Taxpayer hit with $4m debt, under s 167 ITAA36, and unable to prove that reassessed amounts were excessive
  4. Further Convictions found under the ATO’s Operation Protego

1 – Mason v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2025] ARTA 567 – ART does not have the power to stay imposition of General Interest Charge

The Administrative Review Tribunal (“ART”) has outlined that they do not have the power to freeze the imposition of GIC. Around June 2024, the taxpayer applied to the AAT for a review of penalty assessments. A week later, the taxpayer also applied for an order under section 32 of the ART Act that the interest be frozen while the review comes to a conclusion.

The taxpayer sought a “freeze” on the GIC under section 32 of the ART Act. However, Subsections 14ZZB(5) and 14ZZB(6) of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 in conjunction with section 5-15 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 outlines that GIC is automatically added to the principal debt and is not part of the reviewable objection decision before the ART.

As such, the ART concluded by stating that the provisions outlined beforehand indicates that the ART does not have the power to stay the imposition of GIC.

2 – Hall v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2025] ARTA 600 – Home Office and Care Expenses Deductible

A taxpayer required to work from home during the Covid-19 pandemic was found by the ART to be entitled to deductions for home office and car expenses.

The taxpayer was a presenter for the ABC whose role had two main aspects:

Due to the Covid-19 restrictions, the taxpayer had to perform his digital role at home, using a spare bedroom in his rental premise as a home office. His workweek consisted of working from home digitally on Monday and Friday and a mix of digital work followed by live broadcasts at the studio from Thursday to Sunday for the NRL Season. Off-season, the taxpayer had a mix of digital and live work, depending on the assignments.

The key issue here the ART had to determine was whether the taxpayer could claim the home office deductions based on a portion of his rent of ($5,878) due to approximately 16% of the apartment being used as an office and car expenses of ($1,148) for driving between his home and studio on days he had to broadcast live.

The ART decided that in regard to the home office expenses, that for the year when the taxpayer had to perform his digital role, the second bedroom was his workplace and was a necessary and required party of his work. The car expenses were also deductible due to the fact that when he drove to his workplace at Southbank studios or AAMI Park, he was at work the whole time and his travel was therefore on work as were his return journey.

3 – ZFPR v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2025] ARTA 572 – Taxpayer hit with $4m ATO Debt unable to prove that reassessment was excessive

A taxpayer was recently assessed under section 167 ITAA 1936 with a $3.66m increase in his assessable income was unable to prove to the ART that the reassessment was excessive.

It is noted that s167 ITAA assessments can be made by the Commissioner  where no returns have been lodged or where the Commissioner believes the returns are not sufficient  are not necessarily involving an assets betterment which is commonly done by the Commissioner  ,  but on any basis upon which its judgment income tax ought to be levied.

The taxpayer had moved to Australia in 2004 and had established several businesses in mining and shipping. From 2009 to 2017, his main declared income was as a director and shareholder of an Australian iron ore trading company with his salary being $900,000 for that period.

The taxpayer was involved in several offshore companies consisting of:

Following an ATO audit, the ATO issued default assessments for the taxpayers for the 2008, 2010 to 2012 and 2014 to 2016 income years under section 167 ITAA36 and section 170(1) ITAA36, increasing his assessable income by nearly $3.66m, and resulting in:

The ATO categorised the declared income as:

As a reminder, in respect of a section 167 ITAA 36 assessment , the onus is on the taxpayer to show that the Commissioner’s assessment is excessive per section 14ZZK of the Taxation Administration Act 1953. The taxpayer failed to establish the following which was detrimental to his case that the payments were received through home loan repayments and as gifts:

As noted in Commissioner of Taxation v Liang [2025] FCA 535:

As a general rule, a taxpayer proves an amount is not assessable as income under ordinary concepts by proving what the amount represents and demonstrating that what the amount represents is not ordinary income. It would be a very rare instance where a taxpayer was able to prove an amount was not income under ordinary concepts without positively establishing the source and character of the amount. As a matter of logic, it is difficult to prove a negative by proving a series of other negatives unless those other negatives represent the entire universe of possibilities.

4 – Further Convictions in the ATO’s Operation Protego

The ATO has issued its latest release for Operation Protego with 3 convictions found for individuals committing GST fraud. For your information, Operation Protego is an ATO-led investigation into large-scale GST fraud that was promoted on social media, especially on Tik Tok which involved individuals:

The latest convictions consisted of:

Another woman was sentenced to 9 months imprisonment after being charged with one count of dishonestly obtaining a financial gain. She obtained an ABN for a business she claimed had provided beauty and salon service and obtained $49,700 in GST refunds. She has been ordered to pay the amount of $49,700.

Should you wish to discuss the above, please contact Tony Pointon and Andrew Pointon of our Taxation Team.

Mid May Tax Update

This article provides an update on key developments in taxation law for accountants and participants in the tax advice industry up to mid-May. This update in summary covers:

  1. Deputy Commissioner Comments on Bendel Decision
  2. Primary Production Exemption found not to Apply for NSW Taxpayer
  3. ATO’s Closer Scrutiny on Work Related Expenses

1 – Deputy Commissioner Comments on Bendel Decision

In late March, we covered the decision of the Full Federal court in Bendel, here, and the implications that this case has on UPEs. Recently, the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation has released an article covering how private companies and their advisors should treat Bendel.

In short, the Deputy Commissioner is confident on the prospects of their application for special leave to the High Court being successful “in the next few months”. However in the scenario the High Court rejects their application, the ATO will endeavour to publish practical guidelines for taxpayers as well as updating their Decision Impact Statement. As a reminder, the ATO’s position on Bendel is that they will continue to administer the law in accordance with their views expressed in TD 2022/11 pending a decision in the High Court.

The Deputy Commissioner also notes that no deferral for the lodgement of tax returns for affected private companies will be granted due to the unknown timeframe and flagged the possibility of using section 100A and subdivision EA for UPEs.

The Deputy Commissioner does say that while it is up to the discretion of taxpayers to decide their own approach following the Full Court decision, taxpayers that continue to follow the ATO’s views on UPEs will have certainty, regardless of the outcome whether special leave to the High Court is successful.

2 – Zonadi Holdings Pty Ltd ATF Wombat Investment Trust v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2025] NSWCATAD 84 – Primary Production Exemption found not to Apply

The NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal found in this case that a taxpayer did not qualify for the primary production exemption found in s 10AA of the LTMA 1956.

The relevant property was used as a vineyard in which grapes were produced and of which were either sold or used to produce wine which was subsequently sold. The taxpayer argued that the land was used for primary production given it was used to produce grapes. However, the Tribunal found that the dominant purpose of the land was for the production of wine which was not within the ambit of s10AA. For the exemption to apply, the cultivation must have been namely for the purpose of selling the produce of the cultivation rather than the product of wine.

The production of wine, rather than the sale of the grapes, was found by the Tribunal to be the dominant purpose for which the land was used for.

3 – ATO’s Key Area of Focus – Closer Scrutiny on Work Related Expenses

On 7 May 2025, the ATO issued a media release detailing its focus on areas such as work related expenses, working from home deductions in respect to multiple income sources. Further they remind taxpayers that “work related expenses must have a close connection to your income earning activities, and you should be prepared to back it up with records like a receipt or invoice”.

Indeed, some of the more outrageous work related expenses taxpayers have claimed that the ATO noted down include:

Should you wish to discuss the above, please contact Tony Pointon and Andrew Pointon of our Taxation Team.

ATO Audit Warning – Family Trust Elections – When an Interposed Entity Election is Appropriate

A recent area of concern that our taxation team has been increasingly encountering is with whether distributions made by a family trust are within the family group and whether said distributions will attract the 47% family trust distribution tax. We expect that in the context of family trusts, the ATO will allocate further audit resources in determining whether the distributions are compliant which is made more abundantly clear with the ATO’s key priority are from its Next 5,000 report suggesting that they will scrutinise succession planning arrangements more closely

It is therefore important to determine whether your arrangements within your family trusts are compliant with schedule 2F of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 and whether you require an interposed entity election (IEE). In our experience, IEEs are common given that family trust structures may involve trusts being interposed between the family trust and ultimate distributions to family members. These interposed entities, subject to certain circumstances, can be included as part of the family group. The below structures are in our view, the most common structures which utilise interposed entities.

If the interposed entity is not part of the family group, this may mean the family trust distribution tax will be imposed on any present entitlements conferred on the entities or distributions made to them by the family trust. As a reminder, the family trust distribution tax is payable at the highest personal marginal tax rate, including the Medicare levy, for a total of 47%.

Hence, it is particularly important for tax professionals and members involved in a family trust arrangement to know when an interposed entity election (IEE) is required, the requirements for an IEE and the effect of said IEE.

When an IEE is not required

Some entities and individuals are automatically considered part of the family group by way of s 272 – 90. These include the following:

By way of reference to the diagram above, the Family trust distribution tax may only be avoided if the distribution is within the family group. Hence, for distributions from Trust 1 to Trust 2 to be essentially exempt from this provision, Trust 2 must have a fixed entitlement to all of the capital and income held by the specified individual or family members of the family trust under consideration. Relevantly, s 272 – 90(5) provides the following:

Note that the reference to fixed entitlements means that an IEE for a discretionary trust is always recommended. This is because a discretionary trust (if Trust 2 in the example is a discretionary trust) will never have a fixed entitlement to the distributions in Trust 1. The case is different for a unit/fixed trust.

It is also sufficient for another individual, provided it is the specified individual of the FTE or a member of that individual’s family to also be entitled to part of Trust 1’s distribution and not attract the Family trust distribution tax. For your reference, a person is a member of a primary individual’s family if either:

Interestingly, a spouse also includes a de facto spouse (including same sex relationships) and who are registered under a State law or Territory law for the purposes of section 2E of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901. Family also includes an adopted child, step-child or ex-nuptial child.

Based on this, the following structure and distribution to an interposed entity (Trust 2) would also be appropriate and not attract the family trust distribution tax.

How an Interposed Entity Election can be made

The rules governing how an IEE may be made are set out in s 272 – 85. In doing so, the first requirement generally states that the election must be in writing and a form approved by the Commissioner. A link to access said form, and the Commissioner’s requirements, for your reference may be accessed here.

The largest hurdle to cross for a successful IEE is that the election must pass the family control test. A trust will pass the family control test if the following persons control the trust at the time of the election:

Control is a wide term and imports the following per s 269 – 95(1), a group controls a trust if the group:

Specified Year of the Election

The effect of a successful IEE is that following the “specified” date of the election, the trust will be considered as part of the family group and any distributions of capital or income to the trust will not attract the 47% tax.

The interesting thing about this is that an IEE may be made for an earlier income year provided that the trust passes the family control test in relation to the FTE and the trust has made no distributions of income or capital to anyone outside of the family group. This essentially means that an IEE does not have to be made the same year as an FTE and can be a later income year.

Should you wish to discuss the above, please contact Tony Pointon and Andrew Pointon of our Taxation Team.

The Absentee (Foreigner) Land Tax Surcharge and Exemptions

Similar to the Vacant Residential Land Tax (discussed here), the Absentee (Foreigner) Land Tax Surcharge is another state tax which may be payable on top of the total taxable value of the land held by taxpayers. This article will discuss what the Absentee (Foreigner) Land Tax Surcharge is, who it applies to and ways in which taxpayers may be able to claim an exemption for it.

What is the Absentee (Foreigner) Land Tax Surcharge?

If you are a foreign owner of property in Victoria, you will likely have to pay a surcharge, on top of land tax, known as the Absentee land tax surcharge. While in other states, the surcharge may apply only to residential land, the surcharge in Victoria applies to all types of land, including residential, commercial, primary production and etc.

From 2024, a surcharge of 4% applies to all Victorian land owned by an absentee owner, up from 2% in the 2020 to 2023 land tax years.

There are currently three categories of absentee owners, these include the following:

An absentee individual is an individual who constitutes all of the following:

As such, the absentee surcharge does not apply to Australian citizens or permanent residents who reside overseas. It is clear from the Land Tax Act 2005 that the surcharge was not meant to apply to Australian citizens. However, our practice has often seen cases where Australian citizens who reside overseas being imposed the surcharge despite the clear wording of the legislation. In these circumstances, the lodgement of an objection against this has always been successful.

An absentee corporation on the other hand means:

Lastly, an absentee trust is defined as a trust with at least one absentee beneficiary has a beneficial interest in land subject to a fixed trust, or is a unitholder in a unit trust scheme or is a specified beneficiary of a discretionary trust.

Exemption

When the surcharge was introduced, the legislature also introduced an interesting exemption through sections 3B and 3BB of the Land Tax Act 2005. Put simply, applicants may apply to the Treasurer to exercise their discretion to exempt the applicant form the Absentee Land Tax Surcharge.

Section 3B provides as follows (our emphasis):

Further, Sections 3BB of the Act outlines that in respect to subsection 2(d) of above, the Treasurer must published guidelines in relation to the exemption under 3B.

In exercising the power of exemption under 3B, the Treasurer will give close consideration to the fact that the applicant seeking exemption is Australian based, makes a significant contribution to the Victorian economy and community, and exhibits good corporate behaviour.

In regard to having a significant contribution to the Victorian economy, the Treasurer will consider the extent of commercial activities of the absentee corporation in Australia, the number of local workers engaged in Victoria and the amount of expended resources being used for the said commercial activities in Victoria. Additionally, good corporate behaviour will be exhibited where any FIRB requirements in relation to landholdings are met, any Australian laws have been complied with and Victorian taxation laws have been abided by.

The following factors will also be considered in determining whether an exemption ought to be granted:

In considering the factors highlighted in section 3B(2), Kamirice offers an interesting perspective on how the Tribunal will exercise this discretionary power. At [37] the Tribunal highlighted that “ it is clear the discretion given by section 3B of the Act can be exercised by having regard to any one or more of the matters set out in section 3B(2), it is appropriate, in this particular case to have regard to each of the specified matters that are raised in the subsection and consider them in light of the relevant guidelines supplied by the Treasurer”.

Further, primacy is afforded to the legislated factors, namely the nature and degree of ownership and control the absentee person has in the corporation, the practical influence the absentee person exerts to determine or influence the corporation’s financial and operating policies and any practice or behaviour of the absentee person has which affects the corporation’s financial or operating policies. As noted in Kamirice, the Guidelines will primarily be used as consideration of general principles of the relevant circumstances with regard to the statutory considerations set out in s3B(2). In essence, the Guidelines are in fact a statement of Government policy and as such, the Tribunal should have regard and apply the Guidelines in exercise of the discretion conferred by section 3B(2) unless there are reasons to warrant departure from those policy guidelines.

Despite this, the weight given to each of the factors enumerated above will depend on the circumstances of the particular case. In some cases such as Kamirice, it may be more important to look at matters such as control and the benefit to the Victorian economy than matters such as competitiveness.

Should you wish to discuss the above, please contact Tony Pointon and Andrew Pointon of our Taxation Team.

End of April Tax Update

This article provides an update on key developments in taxation law for accountants and participants in the tax advice industry up to mid-late April. This update in summary covers:

  1. Portion of Tax Debt and General Interest Charge cancelled on Serious Hardship Grounds
  2. Part IVA applied to Cancel Capital Loss on Sale of Shares
  3. Distinction between Capital vs Income in relation to Development Agreements;
  4. Changes to PCG 2023/1 – WFH Additional Running Expenses; and
  5. Payments received in respect of settling workplace dispute not compensation for personal injury, unfair dismissal, harassment or discrimination

1 – VBNX and FCT [2025] ARTA 374 – Portion of Tax Debt and General Interest Charge cancelled on Serious Hardship Grounds

This concerned a taxpayer’s debt comprising of shortfalls in PAYG instalments and income tax over a period of 20 years in addition to the General Interest Charge (GIC) that accrued along with the principle debt. The interest that accrued amounted to $148k. The principle debt was $528k.

Initially, the ATO rejected the taxpayer’s application to release him from the debt under section 340-5 Schedule 1 of the Taxation Administration Act 1953. On application to the Administrative Reviews Tribunal, the ART decided the following:

The above was based on the reasoning that:

2 – Merchant v Commissioner of Taxation [2025] FCAFC 56 – Part IVA applied to Cancel Capital Loss on Sale of Shares

The Full Federal Court in this decision held that the general-anti avoidance provisions applied to a transaction where a unit trust made a significant capital loss on the sale of shares.

The Merchant Family Unit Trust (MFUT), which was owned by the taxpayer owned $10m shares in Billabong Group (BBG). It also owned 100% of the shares in a subsidiary called Plantic Technology Ltd (Plantic). Plantic relied on the Merchant group, comprising of companies wholly owned by the taxpayer (GSM, Tirouni and the Trustee of the Angourie Trust), for funding. This resulted in the Merchant Group lending approximately $55m to Plantic.

Dissatisfied with the way Plantic was operating, the taxpayer endeavoured to sell Plantic which his accountants warned would result in a significant capital gain for the taxpayer.

Hence, in September 2014, MFUT sold its shares in BBG to the Gordon Merchant Superannuation Fund (GMSF), which was also owned by the taxpayer, for $5.84m, resulting in a capital loss of $56.5m. MFUT then sold Plantic to a separate third party and as part of the deal,  the loans from the Merchant Group were forgiven (for no consideration).

The ATO applied section 177D(1) ITAA36, noting that the transactions entered into by MFUT were entered into for the dominant purpose of allowing the Merchant Group, particularly GSM, to obtain a tax benefit rather than being for the benefit for the members of the Gordon Merchant Superannuation Fund. The result was that the ATO made a determination to apply section 177F to cancel the tax benefit.

The Full Federal Court rejected the taxpayer’s appeal. The court restated that Part IVA and also the dividend stripping provisions found in section 177E ITAA36 applied to the scheme given that significant capital losses were created to offset the capital gain made through the transaction.

3 – Morton v Commissioner of Taxation [2025] FCA 336 – Distinction between Capital vs Income in Respect of Development Agreements

In this case, the Federal Court has provided guidance on the distinction between income vs capital in respect of proceeds from land development. The taxpayer was successful in their appeal.

This case concerned a retired farmer (the taxpayer) and a parcel of land he owned in Tarneit Victoria. The land had been held by the taxpayer’s family for several years and was ordinarily used for agricultural purposes. The land was rezoned into residential land and the taxpayer entered into a development agreement with a third-party developer to facilitate the sale.

The developer had taken responsibility for much of the development which included obtaining planning approvals, constructing the infrastructure on the land, marketing and managing the sales process. The taxpayer had retained legal ownership of the land throughout this process. Following the sale, the taxpayer held onto the proceeds from the sale after the payment of the development fee and other associated expenses to the third-party developer. The Commissioner of Taxation amended the taxpayer’s assessment for the 2019 and 2021 income years, noting that the proceeds from the sale were assessable income either as ordinary income or as income from a profit-making undertaking/scheme. The taxpayer appealed this and was successful.

The key issues here concerned whether the taxpayer was carrying on a business, whether the proceeds arose from a profit-making undertaking/scheme and whether the proceeds were on capital account.

In short, the Court first found that there was no business conducted by the taxpayer with their emphasis being on the fact that the taxpayer did not finance the development, did not engage in regular or frequent land developments and that there was no evidence of a business structure. There was also no profit making undertaking/scheme being that the land had originally been acquired by the taxpayer’s family for agricultural purposes, the land development came decades after the initial purchase and the taxpayer’s actions were merely a response to the rezoning.

4 – PCG 2023/1 – Changes to Working from Home Guidelines

As a reminder, PCG 2023/1 sets out the ATO’s usual practice, which taxpayers can rely on, in relation to setting out the fixed-rate method for calculating the work-related additional running expenses. This is useful in calculating your expenses in respect of:

From 1 July 2024, the rate for the fixed-rate method is 70 cents per hour, previously this was 67 cents an hour.

The ATO in their PCG 2023/1 provides the following example on how this could apply.

5 – XRXR and FCT [2025] ARTA 357 – Payments received in respect of settling workplace dispute not compensation for personal injury, unfair dismissal, harassment or discrimination

The facts are as follows, the taxpayer had filed a General Protections Application Not Involving Dismissal under s340 of the Fair Work Act 2009. Following conciliation, there was a settlement whereby the taxpayer and their employer agreed to resign the taxpayer’s employment and the employer was to provide $189,000 which was stated as representing 12 months’ pay in lieu of notice and $70,000 which was stated as representing an ex-gratia payment in addition to the 12 months’ pay in lieu of notice.

The ATO issued a private ruling stating that the payments were an employment termination payment and hence, no part of the payment above was an excluded payment. The taxpayer contended that the payments were principally compensation for personal injury, unfair dismissal, harassment, discrimination or a matter prescribed by the regulation.

The effect of the ATO’s private ruling was that they applied the $180,000 whole-of-income cap whilst the taxpayer contended that the ETP cap of $235,000 ought to have applied as it was an excluded payment. The effect of this is that if the taxpayer was right in their reasoning, then they paid more tax than they should have. The key issue was whether the payments were compensation for personal injury, unfair dismissal, harassment, discrimination or a matter prescribed by the regulations.

Interestingly, the ART said that the “correctness of the conclusions in the private ruling must be assessed only in relation to the facts outlined in the private ruling scheme,” citing that the case law is to broad effect that any additional information that is not outlined in the scheme of a private ruling cannot be taken into account by the Tribunal on review. The taxpayer had provided additional facts, which if considered, could have altered the ART’s decision and the taxpayer’s outcome.

Based on the facts in the private ruling alone, the tribunal found that the there was no evidence outlining that the payment was principally for harassment, the payments could have been principally for other matters, such as incentivising the taxpayer to resign, there was no evidence the Deed of Release was entered into under duress of law and further that the payment was made as a consequence of the termination of the taxpayer’s employment.

The result was that the lower whole-of-income cap of $180,000 was applied to the payments made in relation to the Deed of Release resulting in a higher tax liability for the taxpayer.

Should you wish to discuss the above, please contact Tony Pointon and Andrew Pointon of our Taxation Team.

FIRB Issues – Recent Changes in Respect of Residential Land – Approvals Required where Change of Trustee

The Foreign Acquisition and Takeover Act 1975 (Act) sets out when foreign persons cannot buy Australian Property, need approval to buy Australian Property or need to notify the Australian Government in respect of the intended purchase of Australian Property.

The ATO is currently undergoing data matching in respect of residency status for Foreign Persons who they suspect of having acquired interests in real estate in Australia. If you receive such a notice, we recommend you act immediately by seeking advice as you may be liable for potential civil and criminal penalties. Recent changes announced by the Government has meant that both foreign residents and temporary residents are now banned from purchasing existing dwellings.

This article also comments on Beneficiaries not ordinarily resident in Australia who are considering a change in trustee to their trust ought to consider whether FIRB approval the Act would apply in respect to their circumstances. Failure to comply and give notice to may constitute a breach of the Act giving rise to civil or criminal penalties. This article will outline the legislative mechanisms in place in regard to beneficiaries who are not ordinarily resident in Australia and considering a change in trusteeship.

ATO Data Matching Program

As a reminder, Australia has laws prescribing what a foreign person must do before, during and after they purchase Australian assets as set out in the Act. We note that the ATO monitors for non-compliance of foreign persons through:

As such, it is essential that any laws regarding purchase of assets by foreign persons be followed, other civil or criminal penalties may be imposed.

Ban on Foreign Persons Purchasing Existing Residential Property

It was common practice for past Federal Governments to maintain a policy that generally prohibits foreign persons from purchasing established dwellings. There were limited exceptions with the main one being that temporary residents being able to apply for approval to buy an established residential property as long as it was their PPR.

Note that since 1 April 2025, the Government has banned temporary residents from buying established homes for at least two years as a way to address the housing challenge for first home buyers.

This change also includes temporary residents purchasing established residential properties for use as a PPR. Temporary residents can however apply for FIRB approval to purchase vacant land or new residential properties. The types of residential properties a foreign person, including a temporary resident, may purchase includes:

The Legislation

In short, there is a foreign investment approval mechanism that regulates certain types of acquisitions by foreign persons. These acquisitions may relate to equity or legal interests in an Australian company, trust and interests in Australian land.

Further, the definition of foreign person is much broader than the dictionary meaning which leads to some interesting scenarios in the Act. “Foreign person” is enshrined in section 4 to mean either (our emphasis):

  1. An individual not ordinarily resident in Australia;
  2. A corporation in which an individual not ordinarily resident in Australia, a foreign corporation or a foreign government holds a substantial interest; or
  3. A corporation in which 2 or more persons, each of whom is an individual not ordinarily resident in Australia, a foreign corporation or a foreign government, hold an aggregate interest; or
  4. The trustee of a trust in which an individual not ordinarily resident in Australia, a foreign corporation or a foreign government holds a substantial interest; or
  5. The trustee of a trust in which 2 or more persons, each of whom is an individual not ordinarily resident in Australia, a foreign corporation or a foreign government, hold an aggregate substantial interest; or
  6. A foreign government; or
  7. Any other person, or any other person that meets the conditions, prescribed by the regulations.

Under (a), Australian citizens who are not ordinarily resident in Australia will be considered foreign persons. Additionally, a corporate trustee, incorporated in Australia, will also be considered a foreign person if the beneficiaries are also considered foreign persons under the Act. As such, an Australian corporation will be considered a foreign person if it has foreign beneficiaries despite the fact it is incorporated in Australia.

Note however that despite the fact that Australian citizens that are not ordinarily resident in Australia may be foreign persons, given their close connection to Australia, the regulations enable these class of people to purchase properties in Australia without requiring FIRB approval.

Broadly speaking, the Act prescribes that certain acquisitions made by foreign persons may fall within either:

Central to the application of the compulsory notification system is whether a “notifiable action” and “significant action” occurs.

Section 43 of the Act provides that a significant action is as follows:

An action is a significant action if:

  1. The action is for a foreign person to acquire an interest in Australian land; and
  2. The threshold test is met in relation to the land

The definition of “notifiable action”, found in section 47of the Act, is as follows:

1.An action is a notifiable action if the conditions in this section are met

2.The first condition is that the action is any of the following:

      1. AN Australian entity that is an agribusiness; or
      2. An Australian business that is an agribusiness;

3.The second condition is that the threshold test is met in relation to the entity, business or land
4.If subparagraph (2)(a)(i) or paragraph (b) applies, the third condition is that the entity is:

5.The last condition is that the action is or is to be taken by a foreign person.

Assuming the threshold test is met, the assets outlined in (2) constitute the corpus of the trust, and there is a change in trusteeship where the beneficiaries are foreign persons (as defined in the Act), the change in trusteeship will give rise to a legal change in ownership and therefore, the trustee acquires a direct interest in respect to the trust assets. Note that the meaning of interests in various assets (i.e. securities, assets, trusts and land) defined in section 9 to 12 includes both legal and equitable interests.

Regard should also be had to Guidance Note 7 provided by the Foreign Investment Review Board.

A change in trustee of a trust (including where the new trustee is an Australian corporation) generally requires foreign investment approval where it involves the acquisition of an interest in land, securities or assets by a foreign person, and the relevant threshold is met.

…

When the trust property is transferred to the new trustee, it may involve the acquisition of an interest in land, securities, or assets by a foreign person and therefore may be captured as an action under the Act requiring foreign investment approval. The relevant conditions of a significant action and/or notifiable action would need to be met, including any relevant monetary thresholds. It could also be a notifiable national security action or a reviewable national security action.

Through this, the prima facie position is that a change in trusteeship of a discretionary trust where there are foreign beneficiaries may be subject to the compulsory notification provisions.

There are however certain exemptions prescribed in the Foreign Acquisition and Takeovers Regulation 2015 (“The Regulations”). Division 3 of Part 3 of the Regulations prescribes exemptions for certain actions. Section 28 of the Regulations provide the following:

  1. This Division applies to the provisions of the Act, other than:
    • The definition of foreign person in section 4 of the Act; and
    • Any other provision of the Act to the extent that it relates to that definition.

The effect of this is that acquisitions of interests dealt with under Division 3 of Part 3 are not taken to be significant actions or notifiable actions.

Relevantly, regulation 35 prescribes the following:

  1. The excluded provisions do not apply in relation to an acquisition of an interest in Australian land by the following persons:
    • An Australian citizen not ordinarily resident in Australia;
    • A foreign person that is an Australian corporation and would not be a foreign person if interests held directly in it by any one or more of the following persons were disregarded:
      1. A person to whom either of paragraphs (a) and (c) applies;
      2. A person covered by a previous application of this paragraph;
    • A foreign person that is the trustee of a resident trust at the time of the acquisition and would not be a foreign person if interests held directly in it by any one or more of the following persons were disregarded:
      1. A person to whom either paragraphs (a) and (b) applies;
      2. A person covered by a previous application of this paragraph;
    • A charity operating in Australia primarily for the benefit of persons ordinarily resident in Australia.

Effectively, regulation 35 prescribes that the excluded provisions, being the provisions on significant actions and notifiable actions, do not apply where Australian citizens are involved. The following case study outlines how this operates in regard to a change in trustee where Australian citizens who are not ordinarily resident in Australia are involved.

In short, given the close connection to Australia the classes of persons outlined in regulation 35 have, this also importantly provides for an exemption for land acquisitions by these class of peoples effectively bypassing the FIRB approval regime.

Whilst no notification is required, a more conservative client may wish to notify FIRB with advising on their circumstances and whether notification may be required in respect of their circumstances.

Should you wish to discuss the above, please contact Tony Pointon and Andrew Pointon of our Taxation Team.

Early-April 2025 – Tax Update

This article provides an update on key developments in taxation law for accountants and participants in the tax advice industry up to early April. This update in summary covers:

  1. 4 year Imprisonment for Taxpayer who obtained $2.4m in GST refunds;
  2. Denial of Primary Production Exemption in Section 67 of the Land Tax Act 2005; and
  3. Federal Court Decision on Non-Binding Death Benefit Nomination in estranged family situation.

1 – 4 Year Imprisonment for taxpayer who fraudulently obtained $2.4m in GST refunds

A Victorian man has been jailed for fraudulently obtaining $2.4m in GST refunds for his plumbing business as part of the ATO’s Operation Protego. Practitioners may remember the TikTok tax scam where influencers on social media convinced viewers that they could create a fake business to submit false BAS statements to gain a GST refund. This resulted in $1.7 billion in losses to the government.

The taxpayer had lodged around 30 business activity statements claiming $30 million worth of purchases spending the refund on various luxury items. As a result, he received a sentence of 4 years and 7 months imprisonment.

Further as at 28 February 2025 and as part of Operation Protego:

2 – Australian Investment & Development Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue [2025] VSCA 47 – Primary Production Exemption Denied

This case concerned whether the primary production exemption found in section 67 of the Land Tax Act 2005 (Vic) applied in respect of land the taxpayer owned at Diggers Rest.

The taxpayer claimed that the exemption applied on the basis it was located wholly in greater Melbourne, wholly in an urban zone and given it was primarily used for the cultivation of cassinia trees, it was used for the business of primary production.

The cassinia trees that grew naturally on the land were used mainly to remedy the high salinity content of the soil which were identified by experts in 2007. The experts were initially consulted by the taxpayer in regard to the development of the land for residential premises. The taxpayer had obtained planning permissions for a multi-lot staged development of the land with several planning applications obtained for the subdivision of the land. Further, a business name was registered. In addition to this, the Court also found that another use for the land was for the agistment of animals.

Croft J at trial held that while there were certainly a number of purposes of the land, which included the cultivation of cassinia trees, the agistment of animals and the proposed development of the land, the cultivation of cassinia was not the primary use of the land and therefore the exemption did not apply.

The Victorian Court of Appeal rejected the taxpayer’s claims that Croft J erred by making a “ wholesale unattributed copy” of the Commissioner’s closing submissions, that they were inconsistent and that Croft J had erred in applying a number of decisions which the taxpayer relied upon.

3 – Lynn v Australian Financial Complaints Authority [2025] FCA 175 – Issues of not having a Binding Death Nomination in Place

This Federal Court decision highlights the issues with not having a binding death nomination in place. Mr L, deceased at 51 in 2021, was legally married to Ms L. She was an eligible beneficiary of the deceased’s superannuation death benefit which amounted to $171,300. However, Mr L had a non-binding death benefit nomination in place in favour of his 6 children in equal shares. Mr L also had in place a will which left his entire estate to Ms L.

The evidence showed that Mr and Ms L were estranged for a number of years but were still legally married. Interestingly, prior to his death, Mr L had emailed his lawyers to prepare a new will in favour of his 4 daughters as equal beneficiaries and around this time had obtained an interim Violence Restraining Order against Ms L. At Mr L’s death, the trustee paid 100% of the death benefit to Ms L due to her financial dependency following her objection to the trustee’s decision to pay all of it to the LPR of Mr L’s estate.

After a complaint by the children, AFCA determined that 50% of the death benefit should be paid to Ms L with the balance to the children in equal proportions. Ms L appealed this.

The Court found that AFCA had applied the provisions under the Trust Deed and Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 correctly by identifying all the dependants and expectations of financial support.

This decision highlights the issues found in not having a binding death benefit nomination in place where family members are estranged. A superfund is legally obliged to follow a binding death benefit nomination whereas in a non-binding version, the superfund is allowed to use its discretion in deciding which beneficiaries will be paid the death benefit. This is needlessly complicated in circumstances where members of families are estranged which would lead to drawn out disputes such as this one which took 3 years to resolve through the Federal Court decision.

Should you wish to discuss the above, please contact Tony Pointon and Andrew Pointon of our Taxation Team.