Pointon Partners

Insolvency: unreasonable director-related transactions

The Victorian Court of Appeal recently considered s.588FDA of the Corporations Act (the Act) relating to unreasonable director-related transactions: Vasudevan as Liquidator of Wulguru Retail Investments Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) (Wulguru) v Becon Constructions (Australia) Pty Ltd (Becon) and Anor [2014] VSCA 14. This was the first consideration of s.588FDA at an appellate level after a string of first instance decisions had narrowed the scope of the section. The Court of Appeal distinguished such decisions and did not follow the general proposition as to requirement of a ‘direct benefit’, restoring s.588FDA as an effective remedy for liquidators generally and, in particular, against third parties taking the benefit of the transaction.

Section 588FDA can be a very effective remedy against third parties because it:

However, where a third party has changed its position in reliance on a transaction so that it would be unfair or unjust to avoid the transaction ab initio, relief may not extend that far. Importantly there was no evidence of such change of position in this case. It can be expected that arguments as to change of position will be made by third parties in other cases.

Wulguru entered into a deed assuming joint liability for a debt owed by a director to a third party and granted a mortgage to secure such debt. At first instance the Liquidator’s application to set aside the Deed was dismissed. The Court of Appeal (Nettle JA., Beach JA and McMillan AJA) unanimously granted the appeal and declared the transaction to be void ab initio. The result was that the proceeds of sale of the relevant land was property of the company in the winding up and the third party could not prove as an unsecured creditor.

In summary, the facts were:

  1. Mr Thompson was the sole director and shareholder of:
    (a) Wulguru;
    (b) Richmond Commercial Pty Ltd (Richmond); and
    (c) Mulgrave Commercial Pty Ltd (Mulgrave)
  2. Mr Thompson provided personal guarantees in respect to liabilities of Richmond and Mulgrave to Becon;
  3. Mulgrave and Richmond defaulted on their obligations and Becon commenced proceedings against Mr Thompson pursuant to the personal guarantee;
  4. Mr Thompson, Wulguru and Richmond then entered into a deed with Becon to guarantee repayment of obligations of Mulgrave and Richmond to Becon (Deed);
  5. Wulguru assumed a joint and several liability to pay Mulgrave’s debt to Becon and provided a mortgage over real property as security in exchange for the release of Mr Thompson’s liabilities (Mortgage);
  6. Prior to the Deed, Wulguru had no obligation or liability to Becon;
  7. Wulguru entered into a contract of sale to sell part of the mortgaged property. The proceeds were held in trust pending determination of Becon and another’s entitlements; and
  8. Liquidators were appointed to Wulguru 13 months after the Deed was executed.

S.588FDA provides as follows:

A transaction of a company is an unreasonable director-related transaction of the company if, and only if:

(a) The transaction is:
(i) a payment made by the company; or
(ii) a conveyance, transfer or other disposition by the company of property of the company; or
(iii) the issue of securities by the company; or
(iv) the incurring by the company of an obligation to make such a payment, disposition or issue; and

(b) the payment, disposition or issue is, or is to be, made to:
(i) a director of the company; or
(ii) a close associate of a director of the company; or
(iii) a person on behalf of, or for the benefit of, a person mentioned in subparagraph (i) or (ii); and

(c) it may be expected that a reasonable person in the company’s circumstances would not have entered into the transaction, having regard to:
(i) the benefits (if any) to the company of entering into the transaction; and
(ii) the detriment to the company of entering into the transaction; and
(iii) the respective benefits to other parties to the transaction of entering into it; and
(iv) any other relevant matter.

The obligation referred to in subparagraph (a)(iv) may be a contingent obligation

The definition of ‘on behalf of’ in s.9 of the Act includes ‘on the instructions of’.

The Court of Appeal considered whether the Deed and Mortgage were made on behalf of Mr Thompson within the meaning of s.588FDA(1) given they were executed on Mr Thompson’s instructions, or alternatively, made for his benefit because they relieved him of his obligations to Becon.

Nettle JA stated at [16]:

“…the requirement that a disposition be made “on behalf of’ a director requires something more than that it be effected on the instructions of the director. Arguably, the provenance of the section and the objectives which (according to the Explanatory Memorandum) it was designed to achieve, imply that a disposition to a person ‘on behalf of a director’ connotes a disposition which is of some benefit to the director. At the same time, however, I doubt that Parliament intended to confine the operation of s 588FDA to direct benefits or that the section should be so construed.

The Court distinguished  Ziade Investments Pty Ltd v Welcome Homes Real Estate Pty Ltd & Anor [2006] NSWSC 457 (2006) 57 ACSR 693 (Gzell J) and Re Great Wall Resources Pty Ltd (in liq) [2013] NSWSC 354 (Brereton J) . Re Great Wall Resources Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) [2013] NSWSC 354, where it was held that provision of benefit to a company of which the director was a shareholder was an indirect benefit not caught by s.588FDA. Brereton J. saying:

“…only a direct benefit will suffice and that a benefit to a company of which the director is a shareholder, even the sole shareholder, will not”

The reasoning in Ziade Investments was also followed in Verge v Stinson [2011] WASC 158 and Lawrence Waterhouse Pty Ltd (in liq), Re Shaw v Minsden Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 964 which are not cited in this decision.

In this case the Court of Appeal found that there was a direct benefit to the director, being Becon’s covenant not to sue and the contingency of ultimately being relieved of his obligations as surety to Becon. Nettle JA, however, went further than distinguishing the preceding cases and rejected an argument that the concept of benefit was restricted to actual equitable interests or equities and did not extend to mere financial interests or contractual rights [22-24]:

“I reject that argument for three reasons. First, if Becon’s contention were correct, the words ‘for the benefit of’ in s 588FDA(1)(b)(iii) would add nothing to the preceding expression of ‘on behalf of’. In that connection, I do not accept Becon‘s suggestion that ‘on behalf of’ is intended to capture cases in which the director in question derives an equitable interest in the disponed property and that ‘for the benefit of’ is directed at cases in which the director in question derives a mere equity in the disponed property (as where the disposition is in favour of a trustee of a discretionary trust of which the director is an object). Although the objects of a discretionary trust may not have an interest as such in the assets of the trust, it is commonplace to refer to assets of that kind as being held on behalf of the objects of the trust, and there is no reason in the context of this legislation to suppose that Parliament would do otherwise.

Secondly, the natural and ordinary meaning of a requirement that something be for ‘for the benefit of’ a person is that it be ‘for the advantage, profit or good’ of the person.[13] So, in this context, just as moneys paid by A to B to discharge C’s indebtedness to B would ordinarily be conceived of as paid to B for the benefit of C, so too the incurrence by A of obligations to B in order pro tanto to relieve C of his obligations to B would naturally and ordinarily be conceived of as being for the benefit of C.

Thirdly, the natural and ordinary meaning of ‘for the benefit of’ accords to the objective of the section of preventing directors stripping benefits out of companies to their own advantage. Conversely, given the ease with which an errant director might channel benefits from a company under his charge to another company in which he is financially although not legally or equitably interested, there is every reason to suppose that Parliament intended not to confine the meaning of the expression to something in the nature of an equitable interest.”

The reasoning in Ziade and Great Wall depended in part upon the definition of ‘close associate’ in the Act; it was thought that if Parliament intended to catch transactions benefitting companies of which a director was a shareholder then the definition of ‘close associate’ could have been expanded to include such companies. The Court of Appeal disagreed [26]:

“With respect, however, I disagree. As I see it, the close associate provisions are designed to catch a benefit flowing to a close associate whether or not the benefit has the effect of legally or financially advantaging the director in question. In contrast, the natural and ordinary meaning of ‘for the benefit of’ in s 588FDA is calculated to catch a benefit which legally or financially advantages the director in question regardless of whether it is paid or directed to a close associate of the director. Since the two regimes are aimed at different albeit potentially intersecting sets of possibilities, it would run counter to the evident intention of the legislation to read down either to the point of mutual exclusion.”

Although the defence in s.588FG(2) does not apply to s.588FDA there is a limiting discretion in the Court in s.588F(4) which [30]:

“provides that, where a transaction is liable to avoidance solely because it is an unreasonable director-related transaction, the court is to make an order only for the purpose of recovering the difference between the value if any provided by the company and the value that it may be expected that a reasonable person in a company’s circumstance would have provided having regard to the benefits and detriment to the company of entering into the transaction, the benefits and detriments to other parties to the transaction, and any other relevant matter. In effect, that confers a broad degree of discretion on the court to do what is just and equitable in the particular circumstances of each case and so thereby to avoid the possibility of capricious and unfair consequences for innocent third parties. That and the limited number of cases in which the unreasonable director-related provisions have featured since their introduction are a relatively sound indication that the potential application of this legislation is not nearly as broad as Becon says it fears.”

The outcome of this case suggests that the courts will adopt a broader interpretation of the words “for the benefit of”, in the application of s.588FDA of the Act. This decision is likely to lead to liquidators paying closer attention to transactions made for the benefit of a director, holding such directors accountable. It may well be that there will be more cases featuring this provision in the future.

For further information, or if you have any queries relating to this area, please contact Andrew Cox of our office on 03 9614 7707.

Liquidator impartiality: ASIC v Franklin, Horne and Stone (Liquidators), in the matter of Walton Construction Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) (Company)

ASIC has filed an appeal against the dismissal of a case in which it sought to have liquidators removed on the basis of an apprehension of impartiality: ASIC v Franklin, in the matter of Walton Construction Pty Ltd (in liq) [2014] FCA 68. The appeal has not yet been heard, but it indicates concerns by the regulator about the current Declaration of Relevant Relationships (DIRRI) which may result in legislative amendment if the appeal is unsuccessful.

Liquidators have a fiduciary duty to the creditors, shareholders and the court. This includes the duty to act honestly in the exercise of their powers for proper purpose at all times and not allow their private interests to come into conflict with their duty as liquidator.

The courts will not, however, exercise their discretion in the case of apprehended (rather than actual) impartiality of a liquidator (see Accord Pacific Holdings Pty Ltd v Gleeson v liquidator of Accord Pacific Land Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) [2011] NSWSC 1021) without finding a logical connection between such apprehension and matters which may impede or inhibit a liquidator in the performance of her functions.

Background

Mawson Group (Mawson) provided finance and restructuring advice to businesses. From time to time it referred clients to the Liquidators’ firm, Lawler Draper Dillon.

Mawson provided advice to the Company and assisted in the assignment of transactions and assets prior to the Company’s liquidation (Transactions). The Transactions were effected with entities associated with Mawson. Mawson subsequently referred the Company to the Liquidators, who were appointed administrators of the Company.

ASIC brought applications pursuant to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Act):

  1. to remove the Liquidators on the basis of a reasonable apprehension that the Liquidators may not be impartial, due to the referral of the Company and a history of 6 earlier referrals. ASIC argued that the Liquidators would need to investigate Mawson’s involvement in the Transactions (s.503); and
  2. a declaration of breach of s.436DA given the Liquidators’ failure to disclose in the DIRRI that they may need to investigate the Transactions and Mawson’s involvement.

 
The onus was on ASIC to prove to the Court that it should make the orders.

The Federal Court refused both applications on the basis that it was not satisfied there was an apprehension of lack of impartiality and that the DIRRI was compliant.

Lack of independence or impartiality

ASIC did not claim that the Liquidators’ lacked actual impartiality. Rather ASIC contended that a hypothetical observer would have a perception or apprehension that the Liquidators might not bring an impartial or unprejudiced mind to the Transactions due to:

 
The Honourable Justice Davies stated:

 
Her Honour held that a logical connection could not be made by a fair minded observer in this matter, as to an apprehension of the Liquidators’ impartiality, such observer being informed as to

  1. liquidators’ functions, statutory duties and responsibilities and duty to discover voidable transactions and/or breaches of the Act;
  2. liquidators are commonly referred by business advisors (such as Mawson) and accountants, solicitors;
  3. Mawson’s involvement with the Company was of a professional nature;
  4. knowledge that there was no suggestion as to a lack of independence or impartiality in respect to the other insolvencies referred by Mawson to the Liquidators; and
  5. any deficiency, if any, in the DIRRI was inadvertent.

 
Disclosure in DIRRI

S.60 requires administrators to declare any relevant relationships and as to why such relationships do not compromise the administrator’s impartiality. The declaration is provided to creditors, to allow them to make an informed decision about whether to replace the administrators.

The Liquidators declared in the DIRRI (at that time they were administrators) that they were referred by Mawson, who refer insolvency work from time to time and, in particular, “Referrals from solicitors, business advisors and accountants are commonplace and do not impact on our independence in carrying out our function …”. No statement was made that it may be necessary for the Liquidators to investigate the involvement of Mawson associated entities.

ASIC contended that the DIRRI was insufficient pursuant to s.60(1)(b) of the Act, given the Liquidators omitted any statement that there was potentially a need to investigate the Transactions involving Mawson associated entities. S.436DA(5) of the Act requires that the DIRRI be updated upon becoming aware of additional matters required to be disclosed.

Her Honour held that the Liquidators complied with the requirements of s.60 by declaring the referral by Mawson to them and why the relationship did not create a conflict of interest.

Decision

ASIC was unsuccessful and the Court was satisfied that:

  1. from an objective standpoint, there was no apprehension that the Liquidators would not treat the Transactions and Mawson’s involvement in them any differently, regardless of the referral by Mawson of the Company, as well as previous and prospective referrals; and
  2. the Liquidators properly disclosed the referral by Mawson in the DIRRI.

 
ASIC lodged a notice of appeal with the Federal Court on 26 February 2014 and is listed for callover before Justice Marshall on 29 April 2014.

Conclusion

ASIC’s view is that a need to investigate entities associated with a referrer should be disclosed to creditors. The Court at first instance did not consider that the current legislation required such disclosure. It may, however, be prudent for liquidators to make such disclosure when appropriate.

If you have any queries about this matter, please contact Andrew Cox at Pointon Partners on 03 9614 7707.

Are You Authorised? – Important Update For External Administrators Of Licensees

In recent times, with the various economic and financial pressures impacting on the hospitality industry, it’s not uncommon for External Administrators to be appointed to administer Licensees and their Licensed Business.

What is often overlooked when an External Administrator is appointed to a Licensee is the protection and continuation of the various licences that are required to operate the Licensed Business.

This update addresses various issues that arise out of the Liquor Control Reform Act 1998 (the LCRA) and Gambling Regulation Act 2003 (the GRA) that must be considered by an External Administrator prior to being appointed to a Licensee.

Application for Endorsement

In accordance with Section 66 of the LCRA, the Liquor Licence will lapse within 90 days after the Licensee becomes an administered body corporate unless the External Administrator is endorsed on the Liquor Licence.

The approval of an Application for Endorsement will prevent the Liquor Licence from lapsing.

An External Administrator of a Licensee must obtain the approval of an Application for Endorsement from the Victorian Commission for Gambling and Liquor Regulation (the VCGLR) under Section 80 of the LCRA to be endorsed on the Liquor Licence prior to carrying on the business operated under a Liquor Licence. In addition, an External Administrator will need to have completed the Licensees’ First Step and Responsible Service of Alcohol courses (the New Entrant Training) before the VCGLR will approve the Application for Endorsement.

Effect of an Endorsement

Following the approval of the Application for Endorsement, the person or entity endorsed on the Liquor Licence will be permitted to continue to operate the Licensed Premises and to protect this valuable business asset.

It is important for the individual or entity seeking endorsement on the Liquor Licence to understand that it will become liable under the LCRA as if that person or entity is the Licensee (Section 86 of the LCRA).

The liability of the endorsed individual or entity extends to breaches of the LCRA and more particularly, offences for which a Licensee may be found liable under Part 8 of the LCRA.

Application Requirements &Process

The Application requirements are similar to those required for the approval of a Director of a corporate Licensee in that, the following documents will need to be lodged with the VCGLR:

1. Application Form.
2. Liquor Licensing Questionnaire/s to enable the Victoria Police to complete probity checks on the Applicant.
3. Licensee’s First Step and Responsible Service of Alcohol Certificates.
4. Evidence of the Applicant’s appointment as an External Administrator.

A copy of the Application will be forwarded by the VCGLR to the Victoria Police for comment and under Sections 83 and 84 of the LCRA, the Commissioner of Police may object to the Application on the basis that the Applicant is unsuitable to carry on the business under the Liquor Licence.

Additional Related Matters

An External Administrator seeking endorsement on a Liquor Licence should also be aware of the following matters under the LCRA:

    1. in  an accessorial capacity where the officer/s authorised or permitted the offence to occur or was knowingly concerned in the commission of the offence (Section 53A); and
    2. for failing to exercise due diligence in the conduct of the Licensed Premises (Section 53B and 53C).

The purpose of seeking approval of a Nominee is to limit the liability of the Licensee in the event that the Licensee is charged with offences under the LCRA.

Where a Nominee is not approved, it is open for each Director of a corporate Licensee to be issued with an infringement notice for each offence.

In light of the significant risk and liability assumed by an External Administrator in becoming endorsed on the Liquor Licence, we strongly recommend that External Administrators that deal with distressed hospitality venues, complete (and in the case of a corporate administrator, a Director) the New Entrant Training prior to being appointed to a Licensee.

The purpose of completing the New Entrant Training is twofold:

  1. The External Administrator will gain a working knowledge of the obligations and responsibilities of a Licensee under the LCRA; and
  2. The External Administrator will be in a better position to lodge an Application for Endorsement and have that Application granted in a shorter period of time than if it had not completed the New Entrant Training.

Licensed Premises with Gaming Machines

In relation to Licensed Premises with Gaming Machines and the requirements relating to External Administrators under the GRA, an External Administrator must seek approval of the VCGLR to be endorsed on the Venue Operator’s Licence (the VOL) under Section 3.4.24 of the GRA.

Section 3.4.24(3)(d) of the GRA, states that the endorsement of an External Administrator on the VOL is necessary to permit the continuity of the VOL and the operation of Gaming Machines at the Licensed Premises in circumstances where the Venue Operator/Licensee is being externally administered.

In terms of the application process, the request by an External Administrator for endorsement on the VOL under the GRA should be lodged with the VCGLR at the same time as the Application for Endorsement under the LCRA.
An External Administrator endorsed on a VOL under the GRA is regarded as being the Licensee for the purpose of compliance with the GRA.

Conclusion

Insolvency practitioners who are involved in the administration of distressed hospitality businesses must be aware of and understand the obligations of External Administrators and the essential steps and application requirements to enable the continuation of the Licensed Business and the protection of valuable assets in respect of any Liquor and Gaming Licences which enable the Licensed Business to continue to operate.

External Administrators should apply to the VCGLR for a ‘semi-permanent’ approval under the LCRA and GRA prior to their appointment to administer a Licensee in order to speed up the processing of any Applications for Endorsement.

The author has extensive experience dealing with all aspects of Licensed Liquor and Gaming Premises including Sales and Purchases, all types of Gaming and Liquor Applications and the defence of Infringement Notices and disciplinary proceedings.

For further information on how Pointon Partners can assist you to comply with the requirements of the Liquor Control Reform Act 1998 and Gambling Regulation Act 2003, please contact Nicholas Brand or David Mazzeo on 03 9614 7707.